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## History of Islamic Philosophy

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# Allameh Tabataba'i: The Absoluteness Monotheism And Its Relationship With Free Will

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### ABSTRACT

The Absoluteness Monotheism based on absolute unity is a point of view that Allameh Tabataba'i explains based on verses and traditions. He criticized the previous philosophers's theory of formational unity of and the mystics's theory of personal unity of Being and established a point of view that has an impact on his entire intellectual and philosophical system. He admits that with this point of view, even discussions of predestination and free will are dismissed and irrelevant. Therefore, the problem of predestination and free will must be solved in another way. Because what is thought to be the action of man and caused by his free will is actually from God and man is not the owner of any act.

In this research, we aim to first express the view of The Absoluteness Monotheism according to Allameh. Secondly, the ratio of discretion with The Absoluteness Monotheism should be checked. finally, it will become clear that with this monotheistic view, issues and problems arise in a different way, and some questions and contradictions are basically not raised in the intellectual framework of this monotheistic view and will be irrelevant; It will be clear that according to monotheism, there is only one absolute existence in universe, and the other entities are conditioned and related to God. A person who accepts monotheism has actually surrendered himself to God and freed himself from servitude to others, and such a person has the highest level of freedom, because servitude to others is slavery and coercion, and in the shadow of God's servitude, man will achieve full freedom and true happiness.

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### **Introduction**

Allameh Tabataba'i has presented different foundations and explanations of philosophical issues in his intellectual system. One of those topics is predestination and free will; In Risalah al-Afaal, with the design of the two world of Divine Command (Amr) world of creation (Khalq) and the characteristics of these two worlds, he considers man as an incomplete cause and one of the causes of optional actions in the world of creation, and this is the fact that the divine order is ongoing and continuous in both worlds of order(Amr) and creation(Khalq). And God's activity is complete in both worlds; However, the characteristics of the world of creation require that, in addition to the divine order, material talents and powers complete the chain of causes, and man, as one of the causes, intervenes his agency and causes the completion of the cause and the realization of the action. (Tabatabaei, 2011A, p. 140)

In Risalah al-Afaal, after stating these issues, Allameh Tabataba'i has stated a detailed matter, the detailed explanation of which can be obtained from his earlier and later discussions in this collection of letters and his other works. He states that with his special view of monotheism - which is The Absoluteness Monotheism - all these debates will be rejected. And basically, the issue of predestination and discretion will become irrelevant. Because all human actions are from God.

In this article, while explaining the view of The Absoluteness Monotheism according to Allameh Tabataba'i, it has been tried to examine the relationship of this view of monotheism with human free will. And this question should be answered, can it still be said that man is independent from the perspective of The Absoluteness Monotheism? Does man have a role in determining his own destiny? And how is this option optional?

For this purpose, a brief definition of The Absoluteness Monotheism and what it is has been stated. Also, in the following, the relationship between The Absoluteness Monotheism and discretion, taking into account the meaning and truth of human perfection and happiness, the

concepts of validity and the definition of discretion according to Allameh, are examined and expressed. Also, in the continuation of the relationship between apposite monotheism and discretion, taking into account the meaning and truth of human perfection and happiness, the concepts of validity and the definition of discretion according to Allameh are examined and expressed. Finally, by presenting a different explanation of free will, it is expressed in the view of monotheism, looking at man and his destiny and happiness in such a way that his free will can be justified and interpreted in order to reach his desired perfection in the framework of monotheism. Man can reach happiness; The happiness that is the servant of God and has this amount of authority to determine his destiny in this world and the world after death. Also, he can determine the limit of his existence, which is related to the nearness and distance to the Lord.

Before this, articles have been written about God or monotheism from Allameh's point of view. For example, the article " Allameh Tabataba'i`s view on the objectivity of values and freedom in moral motivation based on The Absoluteness Monotheism" was written by Hasan Moradi, which deals with the relationship between moral motivation and the absoluteness monotheism. (Moradi, 2014, Ahlaq Vahiani)

Although there are few works about monotheism which includes a certain aspect of the monotheistic view, but in those few works, the connection and ratio of this view with human free will was not specifically investigated. Therefore, the present article, in addition to expressing the monotheistic view, has investigated and related it to human free will and has shown that despite the control and application that is considered for God in this monotheistic view, it is still possible to defend human free will.

### **1. The meaning of The Absoluteness Monotheism**

Every divine philosopher expresses opinions about theology that are in harmony with other principles and foundations of his system. About God and his relationship with creations , Mullah Sadra went from the theory of

the creational unity of existence to the personal unity of existence. Allameh Tabataba'i goes beyond this with his special principles and expresses the absolute unity.

From Allameh Tabataba'i's point of view, there is only one being in being, which is absolute Being; And creations are versed and connections, which connection constitute their whole dignity, and this matter does not exist in the past philosophies, even in Mulla Sadra. This monotheism consists of The Absoluteness Monotheism and God has an absolute unity and they are the opposite of all the verses of the God. In the system of formation, we are faced with the creation verses of the God, in the system of legislation, with the legislative verses of the God, and in the system of compilation, with the compiled verses of the God, and in all these systems, The Absoluteness Monotheism is current. (Akbarian, 2023a, p. 244)

Allameh Tabataba'i in '*Tawheed Elmi va Eyni*', in response to the question about the characteristics of God's Essence, says: " God's Essence has a definition that is not limited and is above any definition and limitation. The high-flying bird of reason should not fly to that lofty position and should not be caught by the snare of any description, name, expression, expression, gesture, or allusion." (Tabataba'i, 2007, pp. 170-171)

He says about the effectiveness of God: God is the active agent and the independent source of all things, and he is inherent in its creation and causality, and he is effective in the true meaning of the word. There is nothing effective in existence other than him, and other than him they have no independence - which is the criterion of causality and creation - except relative independence. creations, in fact, means the word conjunction, relation and addition. (Tabataba'i, 2010b, vol. 2, p. 131)

In his treatise *Lab al-Bab*, he writes about the personal unity of existence:

"The meaning of the unity of existence completely negates the meaning of multiplicity and variation, and in front of the holy existence of

Hazrat Ahadit, he considers all imaginary beings as illusions and considers everything as shadow, and the seeker loses his entire existence by being elevated to this position. He gives and loses himself and becomes mortal and does not perceive and taste anything other than his holy essence in the world of existence. (Tabataba'i, 2010A, p. 116)

This truth has a higher meaning than absoluteness and mutual limitation. (Tabataba'i, 2007, p. 170-171) The requirement of this absoluteness is the presence of surrounding on all objects and the opposition of surrounding with them. (Yazdan Panah, 2011, p. 230) and everything is limited and confined to God. (Tabatabaei, 1996, vol. 12, p. 143)

In other words, it can be said: The Absoluteness Monotheism is the negation of any kind of adverb in a very broad way (Salbe Tahseli) from the divine nature: "(Tawheed Etlaiqi) removing any conceptual determination, limitation, including examples and any distinction, even this ruling. It is exactly from God's essence (Tabataba'i, 2016, vol. 5, p. 1046).

In the same way, it is stated that "the existence that is observed in beings is actually the existence of the right... not their own existence; These do not exist... and there is no plurality " (Tabataba'i, 2010 A, p. 195) so being non-existent and illusory and valid is the essence of the object. But on the other hand, appearing, showing, and being a mirror are also the essence of objects. (Tabataba'i, 2009 A, Vol. 5, p. 976) In other words, what we observe from the nature of the being, is actually the true existence of the obligatory, to the extent that this nature is present and has an existential relationship with it. Therefore, possible is a manifestation of the obligatory appearance in him. (Tabataba'i, 2011, p. 43) and Manifestation (Mazhar) shows only the appearance, not the self, because there is no identity, independence and originality. (Tabataba'i ,2009b, p. 35-36)

According to Tawheed Etlaiqi, God is the absolute existence and is free from any adverb - even the adverbial adverb - but they (creations) are

opposite to the aspects of the verses whose existence is the same as the connection and belonging to God. (Akbarian, 2023a, p. 245)

All beings are from the same principle of existence, the verses that show their origin. (Tabataba'i, 2008b, p. 51) And if they are independent in their own existence or in some aspects of their existence, they are no longer a signifier and a sign for the divine nature, and this is against the assumption. (Tabataba'i, 1996, vol. 13, p. 195)

At *Nehayat al-Hikma*, we also read: "Every possible being, whether material or abstract, above and below, is nothing but a verse for God in all aspects, which speaks of God's perfections with the perfection of its existence." (Tabataba'i, 2010b, Vol. 2, p. 110)

Everything is a sign of God's essence and a sign of His beauty and glory. These objects are mirrors that show the beauty of the beyond with their beauty, and show the absolute richness of God with their poverty, and show the superiority of their superiors with their humility and humiliation (Tabataba'i, 1996, vol. 11, p. 159).

In addition, all objects are like shadows of God's essence and his perfect attributes. The shadow associated with objects indicates the characteristics and existential effects of objects, and at the same time, it is both identical to them and different from them. Objects also only indicate the characteristics and works of their creator and maker and are inseparable from him. Because they show him, they are the same as him, and because they are nonexistent, they are other than him. (Tabataba'i, 1996, vol. 10, pp. 105-106)

Therefore, imperfect creatures are the same as the divine essence in terms of communication, representation and being a mirror for the divine essence, and the divine essence (Moheet) is also their same. However, incomplete beings are not the same divine nature (In the native land) due to their limitations. Because if they were of the same essence as God, they would not be bound anymore.

And in general, what the Holy Quran teaches is that: everything that exists in the world, whether it is the nature or the actions and effects,

belongs to God; And it is for God to do whatever He wants in these kingdoms. And there is no authority or power for anyone other than God, except to the extent that God has given him power over it. And God is the absolute owner of all creatures, and of man and of man's possessions. And in many positions of the Qur'an, God attributes actions to the Prophet and the people, but at the same time, he negates independence in relation to humans and considers being exempt from God's permission and will to be invalid. (Tabataba'i, 1995a, pp. 388, 393)

Also, the formation rule is specific to God and the legislative rule, like other matters, is supremely and independently attributed to God Almighty. (Tabataba'i, 1995, vol. 7, p. 165) with this statement, it becomes clear that The Absoluteness Monotheism is current both in the formation system and in the legislation system. In this way, monotheism, which is one of the principles of the Muslim religion and one of the common principles of all divine religions, can have different interpretations despite sharing the original meaning. Proving the oneness of God and denying polytheists on him is one issue, and how God affects the world and how divine power works is another issue that needs more explanation in relation to human actions.

After clarifying the meaning of The Absoluteness Monotheism and Allameh's view of God and His effectiveness, his theoretical foundations are explained in the following.

## **2. Basics of The Absoluteness Monotheism according to Allameh Tabataba'i**

After expressing Allameh's opinion about The Absoluteness Monotheism and Allameh's attitude towards obligatory existence, we can raise the question why Allameh proposed applicative monotheism. What were his intellectual bases in expressing this opinion?

It is necessary to note that in every philosophical rule there are a series of fundamentals and basic principles, which are based on the rational principle. The difference of opinions of thinkers is usually rooted in the

difference of their foundations. Therefore, due to the importance of this topic, we will examine the important principles that underlie Allama's view of monotheism.

The Absoluteness Monotheism in Allameh's philosophy is based on two important principles. The first principle is that Allameh considers nature to be the emergence of bound existence in the mind and believes that we do not have nature outside; But outside, only existence is accompanied by deprivations and executions. This existence, which is accompanied by deprivations and executions, appears in the human mind in the form of nature, and figuratively, nature can be referred to as bound to this existence. The second principle in proving The Absoluteness Monotheism is his theory of causality. From Allameh's point of view, the cause is real and the effect is pure. Ma'alul is a bound existence with deprivations and executions, and since it is the same as belonging to the real thing, and the connection and belonging is all of his dignity, then he is a *Raqiqa*. (Akbarian, 2023a, p. 247)

In the following, these two principles will be explained briefly, and finally, the relationship between free will and The Absoluteness Monotheism will be clarified.

### **2.1 Limited existence and absolute existence**

One of the important bases in the proof of The Absoluteness Monotheism and other philosophical issues is the issue of existence and nature. By analyzing existence, one can understand the difference between obligatory and creations and how creations is related to God Almighty. Since Allameh Tabataba'i starts his philosophy from proving reality and existence, it is necessary to explain his point of view, we also start from existence and its place in his intellectual system. His interpretation of existence is different from previous philosophers, so different results are obtained in different topics.

Mulla Sadra, while accepting the two dignity of existence and essence for possible objects and beings, considers existence as authentic and

essence as valid, secondary and temporary. (Sadr al-Din Shirazi, 2004, p. 10) Allameh Tabataba'i proposes the originality of existence in a different way. He does not consider the nature of dignity except in the mind. And it defines the whole existence with existence and their difference with deprivation and execution.

He states that reality is existence and nothing but existence is realized in the context of reality. In fact, according to Allameh Tabataba'i, what is realized in the context of reality other than absolute existence, are executions and denials that have caused the determination and identification of specific existences; That is, the execution and deprivations themselves benefit from reality, and if a certain existence is distinct and distinct from another existence, it is because its association with absence and the way it is limited by the deprivations related to itself is different from other specific existences: ... and it is not like this except in terms of the limits of existence according to the container of existence." (Tabataba'i, 2008 A, p. 171)

Also, in this view, the degree of closeness of bound entities to the absolute existence determines the extent of their limits and execution:

"Since the proximity of every creature to the right is equal to its inherent limits and execution." (Tabataba'i, 2008A, p. 221)

Regarding existence, it has been stated that "existence is the original truth, and there is no other for him outside, because whatever is other than him, it will be empty and void; Existence is a pure truth. Therefore, the truth of existence is intrinsically and in every way necessary for existence and has all the attributes of perfection and free from all defects and non-existence. (Tabataba'i, 2011 A, p. 16)

He says about the essence: "Essences, rulings, and effects of essences are not current in the reality of existence." (Tabataba'i, 2011b, p. 63)

When the mind is faced with denials and existential execution, and the inherent execution is imposed on the mind and emerges in it, the essence is formed in the mind. In fact, the nature of the same is the emergence of limits and limitations of certain existences in the mind. In other words,

according to Allameh, nature has only an epistemological position. It means that it is only the mind that manifests the essence, and in the absence of the mind, the essence does not exist in reality.

"The original principle in everything is its existence and its essence is imagination; It means that the reality of existence is real by itself (in essence and soul), that is, it is the same reality, and all essences are real and unimaginable with it. Rather, these essences are only the manifestations and manifestations that external realities create in our mind and perception, and otherwise they cannot be separated from existence and become independent in some way outside of perception. (Tabataba'i, 2011b, Vol. 3, p. 46-48) "The existence of anything is the reality and that thing itself" (Tabataba'i, 2011b, p. 64).

Due to the difference in the attitude towards existence, which is the basis of other discussions and views, the explanation of the relationship between God and man differs from the point of view of different philosophers. In Allameh Tabataba'i's philosophy, nature does not play an ontological role, and the relationship between the creations and the obligatory, as well as their difference, is explained only by existence, not by nature.

According to Allameh Tabataba'i, creations, all of them are related to existence and all their dignity is related to absolute existence. (Tabatabai, 2010b, Vol. 2, p. 131) Allameh considers creations to be the existence of a verse and considers the existence of a verse to be related to the existence of God. The existence of a verse is an existence, the same as connection and belonging, whose whole dignity is connection and belonging.

In this way, he succeeded in proving the *Vahdat Haghe* of existence. Of course, it is necessary to note that Allameh proves the *Vahdat Haghe* for absolute existence, not for bound existence. Of course, this does not mean that bound entities do not exist. In general, Allameh does not accept the nature outside as true and considers it as the appearance of the bound existence in the mind. (Dehghani,2009, vol. 2, p. 41)

In this way, the distinction between God and creations is that creations

is a combination of existence, deprivations and executions, but God is an absolute existence in which deprivations and executions do not exist. Deprivations and executions create limitations for the existence of the bound and make the existence of the bound plural. Pluralism in Allameh's philosophy is corrected by deprivations and executions, not by nature. (Akbarian,2023a, p. 93)

According to Allameh, the relationship between objective existences and essences that exist in the researcher's mind is explained by the emergence of existential limits in the mind. Allameh Tabataba'i also considers the intensity and weakness of certain entities, but he links this intensity and weakness with the amount of execution and deprivations that each of these entities have. In other words, according to Allameh, existence is divided into two general categories, absolute and bound. Absolute existence does not have any existential limitations and is exempt from any condition:

"If (the existence of *Wajib al-Wujud*) is limited to a limit, naturally it will not exist beyond the assumed limit, and the mentioned assumption is one of the conditions by which God does not exist, and the necessity of His existence in this case is dependent on the container before the assumed limit. which requires the *Kholf*, because it is assumed that the existence of his holiness is not subject to any condition and not humble in any capacity. (Tabataba'i ,2008b, p. 22) Of course, Allameh mentions that this removal of the limits of the *wajib al-wujud* is *Salbe Tahsili*, not the requirement of deviation. (Tabataba'i, 2017, p. 23)

On this basis, according to the above argument, it can be said that according to Allameh, the only existence that fills the text of reality is the obligatory existence; Because if an existence other than that is realized in reality, it limits the necessary existence to its existential boundaries. Therefore, it can be said that according to Allameh:

"...outside, there is nothing but the one truth" (Tabataba'i, 2004, vol. 1, 67)

It should not be thought that the bounded existences of verses are

secondary to absolute existence. This is because bounded existences are synonymous with belonging and connection to absolute existence. All the dignity of these versed and relative existences stems from their belonging and connection to absolute existence. In this context, relational existences cannot be considered secondary to absolute existence; rather, absolute existence should be seen as one entity together with all its verse existences. Verse existences are insignificant compared to absolute existence, but all are encompassed within absolute existence. This is why we read in the honorable verse, 'whatever you look at is the face of God' (Baqarah: 115). This does not imply that what is presented in front of God is considered secondary to Him. Bounded existences, whose entire dignity is derived from relatedness and belonging, cannot be considered secondary by necessity.

In this view, the existence of the external interface is the same as the connection, and it is no longer considered intrinsic to it that it has a connection in itself. Because nature is false and destructive in itself, and even the proof of its nature and essence is through existence. (Tabataba'i, 2010b, p. 12) The nature of the limit of existence is the absence of dignity and is associated with deprivations. (Tabataba'i, 2010b, pp. 14, 54, p. 295, Tabataba'i, 2011b, vol. 5, p. 1045) In more precise terms, nature is the only manifestation that the limited external reality creates in our mind and perception. (Tabataba'i, 2009A, Vol. 3, pp. 498, 510) It is a fictitious, imaginary and absurd nature. (Tabatabaei, 2009A, pp. 496, 498) Its container is the container of reason and has a mirage realization. (Tabataba'i, 2007, p. 167) Proof of the permitted nature will be permitted. (Tabataba'i, 2007, pp. 166, 174)

What has been said shows that although the originality of being is accepted by some philosophers and they share it with each other, the way of expressing and interpreting existence can cause many differences in the continuation of rational thinking. Therefore, since being is the beginning of all philosophical explanations, it became clear that Allameh's special view can cause subsequent differences in philosophical and intellectual

analysis.

## **2.2 The position and meaning of causality in The Absoluteness Monotheism**

In the ninth article of the third volume of the '*Osole Falsafeh va Raveshe Realism*', he wrote that causality is an existential relationship between cause and effect, cause is divided into incomplete and complete, possible is necessary for equality with existence and non-existence, the existence of a complete cause is prior to the existence of an effect and from the sum of these statements, we conclude that "the independence and existential integrity of the effect is the same as the independence and existential integrity of the cause" that is, "cause and effect are two independent entities with one independence" (Tabataba'i, 2011b, Vol. 3, pp. 671-655)

Creations, in their relational existence, are entities that do not contradict the cause and do not exist independently of it. So the cause and effect relationship does not cause the multiplicity of things and beings, but the existences are the link of multiple affairs and moods for the cause. (Tabatabaei, 2010b, p. 226/ Obudiat,2006. vol. 1. p. 220-221) but this connection is dissolved in one of the components of the world and unity, in the sense that it has transformed its obligatory identity into the identity of one of the possibilities and the same one. It is not to become one of his own creations. (Tabataba'i, 2011b, vol. 5. p. 983)

Appearances tell about existing truth and independent existence because they show truth and independence, and because they show dependence and connection, they tell about limitations and non-existent things (that is, it is the same as the existing truth and it is not the same). (Tabataba'i, 1996, vol. 10, p. 105. Obudiat,2006, vol. 1. p. 223)

But the appearances are figuratively and metaphorically attributed to the truth. (Tabataba'i, 2007, p. 169)

There is nothing but the single truth and its attributes (according to Shani's restrictive dignity). that the single truth (the cause) includes those affairs (the effect depends on the cause) and between the cause and the

effect, the truth and the truth are carried. (Tabataba'i, 2010b, p. 242) In addition, there is doubt in these appearances. (Tabataba'i, 2007, p. 175)

Because the principle of reality does not accept non-existence and nullity by nature (pleasures). Therefore, the principle of reality is the same as *Wajib al-Wujud*. So, here the reality is essentially obligatory... and from this it becomes clear to the thinker that the principle of existence of obligatory is essentially necessary for man, and the proofs that prove it are in fact punishment. (Tabataba'i, 1981, vol. 6, p. 14, appendix 3)

According to Allameh effect, it is nothing but a bound and related existence, and all the dignity of that relationship is due to its cause. (Akbarian, 2023c, p. 412)

But the appearances are figuratively and metaphorically attributed to the truth, indicating both truth and independence, as well as dependence and connection, thereby revealing limitations and non-existent things (i.e., they represent both existing truth and non-existence).

The perfection of every effect and the end of its existence is the existence of its cause. (Akbarian, 2023b, p. 227)

Therefore, the interpretation of causality can show the relationship between the creator and the created. Divine agency is in the light of understanding divine causality. With these statements, it is possible to examine the meaning of human free will and its relationship with efficacy and effectiveness and The Absoluteness Monotheism.

### **3. Free will and its relationship with The Absoluteness Monotheism**

Now that the meaning of The Absoluteness Monotheism and the relationship between monotheism and obligatory in this meaning of monotheism have been clarified, it is necessary to examine the meaning of free will in this monotheistic view. The question that is raised is that if everything is absolutely related to God and there is no effect except his action in existence, then what is the meaning of human free will? Can it be said that man is free to achieve happiness and perfection?

Allameh believes that The Absoluteness Monotheism has the highest

relationship with authority. Because when we accept a specific monotheism, the will of man flourishes in its highest sense. Man is freed from many restrictions. He gets rid of the bondage of material things and servitude to anyone other than God and walks in a higher horizon. In a field that suits his existence, soul, prosperity and evolution. Servant of God and turning away from anyone other than God realizes free will in the original and broad sense for man. In the following, while examining the meaning and truth of happiness and perfection for humans, it will be examined whether in the case of belief and commitment to monotheism, it is possible to defend the free will of man to achieve this perfection and happiness or not.

Before we talk about what hours are for humans, it is necessary to know the truth of humans. In the religious view, man is made up of soul and body. Material body and single soul.

"The soul is one of the entities of the order world Alame Amr)" (Tabataba'i, 2011, p. 28). The soul shares its existence with other beings of the world. The soul is different from the body and it has become a divine breath and has descended from its exalted status. (Tabataba'i, 2012, p. 29)

The descent of souls to the earth and the world of physicality causes the path to branch into two branches: the path of happiness and the path of misery, and then people are divided into two groups: a group in heaven and a group in hell. The path of misery is actually a kind of nothingness and destruction, and therefore this nothingness will be the end of their journey from the holy world. (Tabataba'i, 2012, p. 32)

From Allameh's point of view, the purpose of divine legislation is not only to give order to human societies; Rather, the truth of the matter is that the divine law wants to bring every type of creature to the perfection of its essence and purpose. One of the perfections of human existence is to have a righteous system in the life of this world and another is to have a happy life in the hereafter. Man has closeness and distance to God Almighty, and the criterion for his permanent happiness and misery, and

the criterion for the competence and corruption of his society, is this closeness and distance, and religion is the only factor in creating this proximity and distance. (Tabataba'i, 1996, vol. 3, p. 299)

The way to achieve happiness is faith in God and righteous actions that are issued by the will and free will of man, happiness and misery are not inherent in man; Rather, it is an acquired matter, that is, a person either becomes prosperous or miserable. (Tabataba'i, 2013, vol. 12; p. 18)

According to what was stated in al-Mizan, "Complete happiness is when a person rises to righteous action with knowledge and awareness, in other words, he acknowledges the truth and his action is in accordance with the truth. Therefore, in order to know the truth and act according to the truth, it is necessary that knowledge and have the necessary belief." (Tabataba'i, 2013, vol. 6, p. 84)

With the clarification of the meaning of happiness and before dealing with the relationship between free will and monotheism, it is necessary to note that humans are faced with two types of things in their existence. In other words, creatures are divided into two types from one point of view; Because every meaning that we perceive, or for that perception, there is an external reality and example, whether it is a perceiver or not; Like foreign jewels, such as inanimate objects, plants, animals, and the like; Or for that perception, there is no real, corresponding and external perception; That is, if there is no human perception, it will not exist either, like "property"; Ownership is a meaning whose existence is based on perception, and if there is no perception and validity, there is no property, no owner, and no ownership; The first part of these perceptions is called "truth" and the second part is called "credibility". (Tabataba'i, 2008 A, p. 9)

It has a formative root. When a person examines and reflects well, he realizes that all the meanings related to humans and the relationships that exist between these meanings are fictitious and illusory; Such as ownership and its assignments, leadership, associations, issues related to it, and things like this. (Tabataba'i, 2008A, p. 10) According to the

appearance, man lives with a contractual and credit system, but according to the inner and the truth of the matter, he lives in a natural and formative system. (Tabataba'i ,2008A, p. 11)

In the legal system, Sharia law is the validity that relies on exemplary facts. The legal system is realized in the world of example (Alame Mesal). According to Allameh, the world of example (Alame Mesal) is the cause of the world of nature and the effect of the world of intellect. They are also available in the system of names and attributes. (Akbarian, 2023a, 247)

In most of his works, Allameh has put forward opinions about human agency that are in accordance with the common view. But in fact, they have another point of view which is based on their monotheistic point of view. What has been stated about free will from a general point of view is that by accepting free will for humans, they have tried to explain it, and in fact, they have presented reasons based on human free will against those who defend predestination.

He states that the voluntary act of man, like other effects, requires the obligation of another to be fulfilled. And the obligation of others also ends with the inherent obligation. The inherent obligation is only God's. In this way, God's power includes all voluntary actions of man. (Tabataba'i, 1997, p. 66)

In other words, it can be said that the optional actions of a person are disabled. And the existence of the effect in relation to the existence of its cause is a relational existence, and the existence of the relation is not realized except by relying on an independent existence that gives consistency to it. The independent existence in essence is God. that the disabled depend on him for their existence. (Tabataba'i 1997, vol. 4, p. 146)

This is how he explained the ratio of man's optional actions to God in *Bedayah al-Hikmah* and finally says that this attribution of man's optional actions to God is during God's activity, not within it. In other words: the reference of the verb to the human agent is on one level, and the reference

of its existence to the Almighty is on a higher level, at that level, the existence of man himself and the existence of the material on which he performs his work, and the existence of tools that He does the work through them, everything is documented to him.

And from this, it follows that the effect of human will as "the last part of the cause of totality" in its work, does not contradict the existence of all the components of the cause of totality, to God. In fact, this duality that human voluntary actions must either be documented by God or documented by humans, is not a correct assumption; Because man's existence is not independent from God, and all his existence is under God's power, and he is not independent from God under any circumstances and at any time. (Tabataba'i, 1997, vol. 4, p. 147)

On the other hand, in his *Resale Al-Afaal*, after describing the two worlds of matter and creation, and the characteristics of these two worlds and the application of judgment and destiny to these two worlds, he considered divine judgment, which is the same divine order, as current and permanent in both worlds, but in the world of creation. which has power, talent and matter, although divine judgment is going on, but in order for the present to take place, it is necessary for a talent to join the realization, and in this world, human free will is presented as one of the causes of all actions. (Tabataba'i, 2011A, p. 140)

In *Tafsir Sharif al-Mizan*, he says: Verbs have two aspects, one is proof and existence, and the second is to attribute them to the subject of the verbs. , which are described between the two titles, so the voluntary and optional actions that are attributed to humans are attributed to the subject, but these actions are based on the proof and existence of God's actions. (Tabataba'i, 1995, vol. 1, p. 157)

Therefore, Allameh Tabataba'i, while he accepts and expresses the highest level of God's effectiveness and influence in the whole world, at the same time, he can also defend the free will of man with precision in different aspects of an action and by considering the degrees and levels for the world. and show that not only these two principles do not

contradict each other, but both are necessary and defensible in the design and arrangement of the world.

#### **4. The perfection of man's free will in the shade of the view of The Absoluteness Monotheism**

But what is very different from the opinions expressed about free will is based on Allameh's monotheistic view. In *Risalah al-Afaal*, at the end of the seventh chapter, after explaining and detailing these issues, Allamah stated that with the current monotheistic view, it is nothing but God's action and these issues become irrelevant. From a monotheistic point of view, it is not the case that man is powerless and forced, but basically the issue of predestination and free will is not raised. Because man is not the real owner of the present, and if he places his existence in the shadow of monotheism and Almighty God, his actions are in line with God's commands.

At the beginning of *Risalah al-Afaal*, it is stated that there is no action in the outside world, except the action of God Almighty; And this is the truth that both proof and taste indicate. (Tabataba'i, 2011A, p. 83)

And at the end of the seventh chapter of *Risalah al-Afaal*, it is stated: "It should be known that there is another point of view here, with which the topic of these discussions is destroyed, and that is the view of monotheism that was expressed during these letters. In this view, all actions are for him, just as the names and essence are for him, there is no action for anyone other than God so that the question of predestination or delegation is raised. " (Tabataba'i, 2013, p. 140)

The question that may come to mind is how to justify human happiness and misery in this case. According to the system of truths and values and the definition of happiness from a monotheistic point of view, it must be said that a person who accepts true monotheism and as a result distanced himself from credit matters and acts in the system of truths and in the shadow of serving God, his happiness is secured; Because human happiness and perfection is nothing but God's servitude.

It can be concluded from the previous discussions that, in Allameh's view, discussions such as predestination and free will are basically not relevant from a monotheistic point of view; Because man is absolutely related to God. The perfection of man is servitude, and his happiness is to reach the perfection of servitude, and at this stage, the servant is obedient and he does not see authority for himself in front of the command of the master.

Since human existence is a versed existence and human action is attributed to both God and man, and since human existence is a relational existence, there is a connection between knowledge of God and self-knowledge. Right is associated with duty, and the worship of God Almighty by man is associated with human freedom. (Akbarian, 2023c, p. 416)

It can also be said that humans have two types of guidance. The first guidance comes back to man himself and man himself wants to be guided by God. In this case, the second guidance includes him. (Akbarian, 2023b, p. 464)

A person who reaches absolute monotheism is freed from himself and attains the status of trust and satisfaction and knows that all actions are for God. And there is no room left for other verbs to be the subject of determinism and discretion. It is in this way that Allameh says that every action is the action of God from the point of view of proof and existence, and it is the action of man only from the point of attribution to the subject. (Akbarian, 2023b, p. 467)

### **Conclusion**

According to what has been said, it is known that the world and its systems are all credit, and the choices and options of man are within the realm of credit, and those choices that bring us happiness, truly determine the path of our life. In principle, a person is free when they do accept the servitude of other anyone other than God, liberating themselves from the circle of the Circle of credit system and does not walk in the

credit system.

Man is free when he does not accept the servitude of anyone other than God; In the shadow of absolute monotheism, free himself from everything anyone other than God. Such a person who is freed from all restrictions and bonds and has come out of the trap of credit, and accepts the absolute authority of God, is free and such a person can truly choose and his choice will be nothing but the will of God because he is in principle and truth. The system of existence is ripe, freed from the traps, it chooses; He is free and free from material and credit constraints, but his choice and will is nothing but the will of his Lord, because he is in the circle of the system of truths and is freed from credit matters. By focusing on monotheism, he doesn't want anything but God and he doesn't go beyond his will, whatever he wants and whatever he does is on the way to reach the Almighty. And finally, it is on the path of happiness, servitude and perfection.

It can be said:

- 1- The Absoluteness Monotheism refers to the existence of God surrounding all things and the opposite of being surrounded by them. All things are limited and surrounded by God. In other words, The Absoluteness Monotheism is the removal of any conceptual definition, delimitation of examples, and any purity, even this ruling, is a reflection from the divine essence.
- 2- The meaning of free will is negated only in the meaning from which the existential independence of man is taken, and where the existence of free will for man is defended, the meaning of free will should be expanded and its true and original meaning received.
- 3- Man has authority in a circle and area that is completely under God's control and existence and is not outside the domain of God's causality and dominion; It can be said that man does not have authority that is independent from God.
- 4- In the monotheistic view, the happiness and perfection of man is in servitude, and man is purely related to God, and in this view,

the extent of God's existence does not leave any possibility for others, and the present does not basically have validity and real existence except for his action.

- 5- In the shadow of God's servitude, man walks in the true circuit of his happiness and perfection in line with the system of truths, a man who accepts appositve monotheism goes beyond the system of credit and his true free will is realized because he is freed from the slavery and captivity of others.

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# The uncertainty principle and non-violation of causality in Islamic philosophy (The critical analysis based on Avicenna and Allameh Tabataba'i's view)

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### ABSTRACT

The principle of causality is one of the most fundamental principles that has been discovered in the history of philosophy and science. Several foundations revolve around this concept. The importance of this principle in classical physics lies in giving physicists the ability to predict phenomena. Furthermore, due to causality is recognized as a fundamental principle in classical physics. With the introduction of the principle of uncertainty, the principle of causality is empirically called into question. Because the claim of the principle of uncertainty in quantum mechanics is that the relationships between fundamental particles are not causally related to each other, and even the behavior of an electron or a subatomic particle is not based on the principle of causality. If we want to identify the speed of particles, we will not be able to identify their state, and if we want to determine their state, we will not be able to identify their speed. The best way to resolve this conflict is to bring the discussion into philosophy, which is exactly what has been done in Islamic philosophy. The concept of causality in Western philosophy seems to be based on Newtonian concepts. But what has been stated in Islamic philosophy is based on metaphysical concepts, and therefore the principle of uncertainty cannot contradict the concept of causality in Islamic philosophy, especially what has been discussed in the philosophy of Avicenna and Allameh Tabataba'i.

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## 1. Introduction

Causality, as one of the most important philosophical and physical topics throughout the history of philosophy, has been discussed. Some consider it a self-evident principle (Avicenna, 1997; Razi, 1984), while others view it as a theoretical law in need of proof (Sadra, 1402 AH). The perspective on this issue also varies. For example, Aristotle's view focused solely on cause and effect, leading him to propose the theory of the four causes (Aristotle, *Physics*; *Ibid*, *Metaphysics*). On the other hand, other philosophers like Avicenna, Suhrawardi, and Mulla-Sadra have considered causality as the relationship between cause and effect (Avicenna, 1997; *Ibid*, 1983; Suhrawardi, 2002b; Shirazi, 1981). They have regarded the relationship of causality as an independent existential discussion. Furthermore, it is worth noting that some consider the necessity of the effect's dependence on the cause in the occurrence of an entity (e.g., Iji, n.d.; Jurjani, n.d.), while others believe in the possibility of the effect's dependence on the cause in its contingent existence (Avicenna, 1997; *Ibid*, 1983; Suhrawardi, 2002a; *Ibid*, 2002b; Razi, 1992; *Ibid*, 1987; *Ibid*, 1990; Shirazi, 1981; Tabatabai, n.d; *Ibid*, 2018). Some like Aristotle consider the relationship between cause and effect as an essential relation, while others like Avicenna and Mulla-Sadra view it as an existential relation (Avicenna, 1997; *Ibid*, 2012; also see Tusi, 1997; Shirazi, 1981).

Due to the wide-ranging perspectives on causality, individuals' interpretations of this topic vary. For instance, Muslim philosophers consider metaphysical causality, while individuals like Newton consider physical causality. The concept of causality from a Newtonian perspective has influenced Western philosophy. Therefore, it should be noted that causality discussed in Islamic philosophy has philosophical and metaphysical explanations, while causality in Western philosophy is based on epistemological explanations. Based on this distinction, philosophers discuss the possibility of entities but in empirical sciences, causality is discussed concerning phenomena perceived by empirical

senses.

Moreover, the criteria for the effect's dependence on the cause in classical physics are based on the occurrence of an entity and are similar to those held by Muslim theologians. However, in the view of Muslim theologians (mutakallimun), everything other than God is contingent, both physically and metaphysically. In contrast, physics does not delve into metaphysics. Hence, many views on causality are more general than others. It must be asserted that the term "causality" is a common discussion point and should be considered in all discussions with these distinctions in mind. It is worth noting that many Muslim philosophers have explained causality based on the theory of the four causes. However, their explanation differs from Aristotle's. This difference becomes apparent when rejecting Aristotle's theory of forms and proving the existence of atoms; the theory of the four causes will also undergo transformation.

Meanwhile, some Muslim philosophers like Allameh Tabataba'i have reached a different type of proof for causality that is entirely metaphysical in nature and will not be affected by scientific theory changes, but the main proof of other philosophers like Avicenna is valid. It should be noted that the categorize of Avicenna's causality is based on the theory of four causes and this theory is not valid according to the Form Theory. As a matter of fact, the Form Theory is not valid, but we can reform this theory and we must adopt atom and energy rather than formal cause and material cause.

With the emergence of quantum physics, the foundation of classical Newtonian physics shook, and many fundamental physical principles underwent changes. Moreover, many epistemological and philosophical foundations also became subject to doubt and uncertainty. With the introduction of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, the concept of causality in classical physics was called into question. Heisenberg acknowledged that in order to measure the velocity of electrons and atomic particles, we must disregard their position, and if we want to

identify their position, we are no longer able to measure their velocity (Heisenberg, 1989). Therefore, in the subatomic world, stating the issue of certainty and predicting with certainty is not possible, contrary to the main assumption of Newtonian mechanics, which is predictability of the future. In such a way that Einstein, who was against the principle of uncertainty, said, "God does not play dice with the universe" (Einstein, 1945). Based on this, the theory of the uncertainty principle in quantum mechanics was proposed as one of the contradictions and oppositions to causality.

The issue raised in this study is whether the principle of uncertainty can contradict the causality discussed in the philosophy of Allameh Tabataba'i or not?

It should also be noted that the method adopted in the current research is descriptive-analytical, in a way that first the relevant topics are described and then analytical considerations are presented in certain positions. Additionally, in the evaluation section of this article, our statements are also presented analytically. Furthermore, the data has been collected in a library-based.

In addition, Many studies have been done about the uncertainty principle in different fields of study. For example, "The generalized uncertainty principle" by Li& Qiao (2021) and "The Uncertainty Principle: How Quantum Mechanics Is Transforming Jurisprudence" by Abdikhakimov (2023). According to relationship between the uncertainty principle and causality, numerous researches have been done with different view. Razi et al (2021) has published a paper titled "A Study of the Transcendental Philosophy and Quantum Physics Approach toward Causality and Uncertainty with an Emphasis on Heisenberg and Boehm's Views". In addition, Kiankhah (2007), Yazdani& Bagheri (2020), and Shakerin (2022) also published their studies about this subject.

It is worth noting that, our study is noble according to our content. We investigated Avicenna and Seyyeh Muhammad Hossein Tabataba'i's view about the causality and we can extract this result that the principle of

uncertainty cannot reject the philosophical meaning of causality. Our understanding of this matter that the principle of uncertainty cannot reject causality in Islamic philosophy is what was concluded in our article and is also considered the innovation of the present research.

## **2. ~~Research Background~~**

### **3. Uncertainty Principle**

The uncertainty principle is one of the principles stated in quantum mechanics. In addition, this principle is "one of the most famous aspects of quantum mechanics" (Uffink, 2016). Quantum mechanics is a branch of theoretical physics that is used at the atomic and subatomic scale instead of classical mechanics and describes the behavior of fundamental particles that make up the universe (Ramin, 2013). This theory was proposed by Heisenberg in an environment where previous scientists believed that the existence system is a compensatory and machine-like system and the phenomena of the world are determined by other phenomena during cause and effect relationships. According to classical physics, every phenomenon has a specific position and speed at any moment, and if someone knows this specific position and speed and is aware of the laws of motion, he can predict the position and speed of that object at any other time. (Kiankhah, 2007; Turani and Sultan Ahmadi, 2013). The fact is the classical physics formulated by Galileo and Newton offered a mechanical interpretation of the world and considered nature as a huge lawful machine in which everything was based on a precise and complex order based on cause and effect (Yazdani& Bagheri, 2020).

Quantum physics, whose foundations were laid by Max Planck, challenged Newtonian physics. This is because the claim of quantum physics is that atomic and subatomic phenomena cannot be predicted. Quantum means wave-like particles, that is, something that has both wave properties and particle properties. Physicists believe that phenomena should not be classified as waves or particles, but that quantum

phenomena called quanta are capable of being both. According to physicists, quanta are the basic matter of the universe (Ibid, 2020). This opinion became known as the theory of complementarity or wave-particle duality (Bohr, 1958; Ramin, 2013).

It can, therefore, be argued that there are several assumptions about quanta:

1. Quanta are both particles and waves;
2. Quanta are neither particles nor waves (the opposite is assumed);
3. Quanta can be both particles and waves (main assumption).

The fact that quanta can be both a particle and a wave is the first point that deprives us of certainty in predicting natural phenomena.

The sum of the physicists' research indicated that in microscopic objects, that is, in the world of particles and atoms, the speed and state of the particles cannot be fully predicted, but because of the existing disorder, physicists can only speak with probabilities. The sum of these experiments conducted in the microscopic world, which was the result of probabilities, was called quantum theory (Yazdani& Bagheri, 2020). In doing so, by observing the disorder among atomic and subatomic particles, and the inability to predict its speed or state, the second proof of uncertainty appears to us.

Another point that deprives us of certainty is that the assumption that electrons are conceivable, as some consider electrons to be like the solar system and go around the nucleus, is a mistake. The structure of the atom is not only far from direct observation, but it cannot even be analyzed based on the categories of time, space, and causality, and it seems that it has a different reality from our common experience, and our conventional concepts cannot be applied to them (Ramin, 2013).

It is on this basis that Feynman says: it can be claimed that with certainty that no one understands quantum mechanics (Feynman, 1967). Bohr also says that if someone does not get a shock after reading quantum, he has not understood it (Bohr, 1958).

In 1927, Heisenberg derived a series of mathematical-physical

equations using the Dirac-Yordan transformation theory, which became famous for Heisenberg's uncertainty principle relations a little later (Kiankhah, 2007). He believed that there is an inverse relationship between the location of an electron and its speed, the more accurately the location of an electron is measured, the less accurate the prediction of its speed will be (Heisenberg, 1989). Therefore, according to the claim of this principle, it is not possible to accurately determine both the spatial position and the kinetic energy of a particle at the same time, because there is an unavoidable error in each of them. So that the product of these two mistakes is always a constant value, i.e. the more accurate one is in determining the other, the less accurate it is in determining the other, and vice versa (Kiankhah, 2007).

In this regard, Heisenberg expresses a conditional proposition: if we know the present, we can predict the future, but due to uncertainty relations, we cannot know the present completely (Golshani, 2020). The result of this conditional proposition is that the future cannot be predicted. In his opinion, quantum laws rule in all experiments and quantum mechanics does not consider the law of causality as valid (Ibid, 2020).<sup>1</sup>

After formulating the uncertainty principle, Heisenberg derived three philosophical consequences:

1. The uncertainty principle leads to the negation of causality. In subatomic phenomena, only statistical analysis is possible. In fact, these phenomena deal with probabilities and not with sure cause and effect chains.<sup>2</sup>
2. The principle of uncertainty leads to the negation of determination in causality. Because we cannot determine the position or speed of electron and atomic particle at a given moment.
3. The traditional distinction between the knowing subject and the

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1. Some studies have been done about Heisenberg's uncertainty principle (e.g. see Busch et al. 2007;

2. Heisenberg's formalism confirmed Hume's criticism about causality in a certain range, that is, in the atomic space (Alavinia, 2006).

knowing subject in having causality and between the observer and the observed must be discredited due to the principle of uncertainty. The very experiments we do to find out the reality involve a violation of the reality (Kiankhah, 2007).<sup>1</sup>

These results of experiments and the principles of quantum physics and Uncertainty principle caused deep changes in classical physics and revolutionized the traditional thought of physics. These developments are not limited to physics, because the theorists of quantum physics also entered the field of philosophy of science and epistemology and brought certain consequences from quantum theory to philosophy. Therefore, the physical relations of the uncertainty principle led to a series of epistemological results (Kiankhah, 2007). The most important epistemological consequence of the uncertainty principle was the denial of the causality. Since Heisenberg denies the existence of scientific laws governing atomic events, he believes that quantum mechanics establishes the destruction of causality (Golshani, 2020; Kiankhah, 2007). In addition, the principle of uncertainty brought with it other philosophical consequences. Eddington claimed that the negation of causality and causality at the subatomic level makes it possible for human behavior to be determined by free will (Golshani, 2020; Kiankhah, 2007). Russell also said that atomic particles have freedom and are not subject to law and order (Russell, n.d).

#### **4. Analyze of concept of causality based on Islamic Philosophy**

It is certain that quantum physics and its foundations changed classical physics, and as all sciences are influenced by each other, it must be claimed that the influence of the foundations of quantum physics caused the fundamentals of epistemology and philosophy to be revised. The principle of causality is one of the important principles accepted in philosophy and classical physics. The uncertainty principle, as one of the

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1. The principle of uncertainty is one of the important positions of the Copenhagen school. (See Alavinia, 2006)

important foundations of quantum physics, questioned experimental causality by stating that the movements and states of atomic and subatomic particles are unpredictable and do not act according to specific rules and laws. It should be claimed that causality has a philosophical concept in general. Therefore, although the uncertainty principle raised as a conflict against the whole concept of causality, it seems that it cannot reject causality in a philosophical sense (especially what is proposed in Islamic philosophy).

#### **4.1 Avicenna's View**

Avicenna has built his system of cause and effect on the basis of the four causes (Avicenna, 1997: 96-97; Ibid, 1983: 257; Ibid, n.d: 518-519). The theory of four causes is damaged when atoms are fixed in the bodies, because by accepting the atom, the Aristotelian form theory is rejected. It must be claimed that the content of Avicenna's words about causes is acceptable in some paths. First and foremost, we can modify the system of four causes and consider atoms and energy as causes instead of material and formal causes. It should also be noted that atoms and energy are the causes of material things, just as form and matter were the causes of elemental bodies and material things.

On the other hand, as it appears from Avicenna's view, among these four causes, he considers the existential causes, i.e., the efficient cause and the final cause, and among these, he also considers the efficient cause to be the original (Ibid, 1997: 97; Riahi, Akvan and Najafiafra, 2023: 234-235). In addition to what we mentioned, he does not consider the criterion of the effect's need for the cause in its occurrence, and considers it in the existing contingency (Avicenna, 1997: 97; Ibid, 1983: 261-262; Ibid, n.d: 522-524).

It can, therefore, be argued that Avicenna's opinion about causation refers to the whole of existence, and when the discussion is about the whole of existence, the focus is on the efficient. Just as if we consider form and matter as part of the causes, then they themselves are also the

effects of the efficient. Additionally, if we consider atoms and energy as the cause, they are also the effect of the efficient.

In doing so, according to Avicenna's opinion, existence is either necessary or contingent, I.e. it may or may not be. So, something that is equal to existence and non-existence needs something else to exist, because distinction without a difference is impossible. Furthermore, the existent itself cannot bring itself into existence, because it has not yet existed to be able to bring itself into existence.

#### **4.2 Allameh Tabataba'i's View**

Nature in its essence is neither existing nor non-existent, so it is equal to existence and non-existence. Therefore, one of its two sides is primarily dependent on the other. Distinction without a difference is also impossible. Moreover, the necessity of nature in its absence from other than itself is a kind of permissible, and the truth is that the rise and extinction of the other, which nature needs in its existence, is not separate from the rise and extinction of the existence of the nature, due to the dependence of the existence of the nature on the existence of the other. It is clear that this dependence is on the existence of something else and not dependence on non-existence. Because it is not for lack of any nature. In doing so, we call this existence that gives existence as a cause, and we call something dependent on a cause as an effect.

Then, the effect that the cause leaves on the effect is either the existence of the effect or the nature of the effect or the becoming of the nature of the effect into existence. It is impossible for the effect to be the nature, because the nature is credit, while what the effect uses from its cause is something original. Otherwise, everything will be the cause of everything and everything will be the effect of everything, while there is no relationship between nature in its essence and non-nature. Furthermore, it is impossible for the effect to becoming, because in this case, the original objective effect will be transformation, which is a relative matter and equal to the parties. However, according to the

assumption, its nature and existence are two valid things, and it is impossible for the objective and original thing to be equal to the two valid sides, and when it is impossible to have the effect of its nature or form, it is clear that the effect is existence.

1. There is cause and effect.
2. Any contingent is effect.
3. Causality is an existential relationship between cause and effect, and this relationship is circular between the existence of the cause and the existence of the effect. The place of establishment is also the existence of the effect and the nature is dependent on the existence of the effect.
4. Due to dependence is basically for the existence of the effect and the existence of the effect is dependent in its essence, otherwise the dependency would be conditional and the effect would be deprived in its essence, and while with exception, there would be no effect. It can, therefore, be argued that the essence of the existence of the effect is the same as dependence, i.e. the existence of the effect is in its essence independent and dependent on its cause (Tabatabai, n.d.: 156-157).

### **5. Critical Remark**

On the other hand, it should be said that in order to answer Heisenberg's doubt, one should refer to Avicenna's words in the Book of Healing. Avicenna's claim is that sometimes we do not find the true cause of knowledge and consider something else as the cause (Avicenna, 1983: 264), and in other words, negate causality. What is sensed is the succession of phenomena with each other. Discussion of causality is not an empirical discussion at all. Sense only discovers the succession between phenomena, whether or not there is a causal relationship between them. It is for this reason that it is not possible to conclude the rejection of causality with experimental sciences. Being unable to understand the causal relationship between particles is a proof of the violation of

causality, of course, it will not be in a philosophical sense. For this reason, it should be claimed that quantum physics can violate causality in the empirical sense, but it is not capable of violating and rejecting causality in the philosophical sense.

As a realist physicist, Albert Einstein said in a letter to Max Born that "God does not throw dice in the work of the world" (Einstein, n.d). Niels Bohr also told him in response that " Einstein, stop telling God what to do" (Bohr, n.d). Moreover, Stephen Hawking said in response, " Not only does God definitely play dice, but He sometimes confuses us by throwing them where they can't be seen." (Hawking, 1999).<sup>1</sup>

Einstein writes in a letter to the Royal Society of England on the occasion of the 200th anniversary of Newton's death, "It is only in quantum that causality is not strictly valid, but the final word has not yet been said. It is hoped that Newton's spirit will grant us the power to establish unity between physical reality and Newton's deepest teachings, namely the causality" (Golshani, 2020). He and other physicists such as de Broglie and Bohm, in opposition to the Copenhagen school and the principle of uncertainty, believed that quantum uncertainty is related to our intellectual and practical ignorance (Kiankhah, 2007). Aristotle also has a similar statement and names the things that humans consider to be equivalent to coincidence as indeterminate (Aristotle, Physics). Not knowing these causes does not provide understanding for humans, and humans consider them luck or coincidence (Saber Fathi, 2020). Farabi also names uncertain causes as far causes and says that not knowing the far causes makes some people think these events are coincidences (Al-Farabi, 1992). Max Planck also expressed the same statement (Planck, 1963).

Some physicists believe that quantum systems are also subject to scientific laws and one day their secret will be revealed and it will be known that nature follows very precise laws uniformly everywhere and

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1. Stephen Hawking (1999) also said in his lecture:

there is no coincidence in nature. Every phenomena is the effect of a cause that we may not have reached yet (Kiankhah, 2007).<sup>1</sup> Bertrand Russell also said that there may be laws governing the phenomena that are not yet known (Russell, 1931).

## 6. Final Remarks

Although the theory of uncertainty principle can be a violation of causality in an empirical sense, it cannot in any way violate causality in a philosophical sense that has a holistic view. We must also say that ignorance of the cause is not a reason for its non-existence. Based on this, it should be said that causality in the empirical sense is as valid as causality in the philosophical sense, and in atomic particles, there is ignorance about their behavior. Therefore, the movements of atoms in two directions cannot rule out causality. Firstly, the atomic particles themselves also have a cause according to the law of causality, secondly, not knowing the cause is not a reason for the absence of causality.

## 7. Conclusion

The scientific world is a world that witnesses the presentation of new scientific theories every day and the previous ones are refuted. If we accept that the principle of uncertainty is a scientific principle, then there is no problem in trying to refute it, and it is completely based on the scientific method. The debate here is whether we consider the principle of empirical causality to be a metaphysical principle or a scientific principle. If we know the philosophical and metaphysical principle, its circle goes beyond the senses and empirical sciences, and then this principle cannot

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1. The term quantum causality can be expressed in this position. Quantum causality can also be considered as a substitute for experimental causality and scientific causality. In this case, the term empirical causality and scientific causality will become a historical term that refers to causality in the Newtonian sense. But if we consider quantum causality to be synonymous with empirical causality and scientific causality, all terms can be used interchangeably. For example, we can refer to the Bohemian quantum mechanical system, which is considered a causal mechanical system (Golshani, 2020; Kiankhah, 2007).

reject the metaphysical and philosophical causality. In Islamic philosophy, causality is expressed in a philosophical sense and is not based on sensations. Avicenna and Allameh Tabataba'i have proved the principle of causation by looking at the essence of beings, and everything that exists is possible to exist, and everything that is possible to exist has a cause. As a result of this, atoms also have causes as beings. On the other hand, it should be claimed that not knowing the cause is not a reason for the absence of a cause, and this makes the uncertainty principle unable to reject the causality principle. It can even be said that causation in the empirical sense is not rejected with this view, because perhaps there is no access to understanding the cause. It should be claimed that by violating causality in the empirical sense, no harm is done to causality in the philosophical sense, and atomic particles themselves have a cause.

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# Evolution of Perception: Farabi to Avicenna

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### ABSTRACT

Maintaining strong flavor of Aristotelian theory of perception, Farabi as well as Avicenna have appended new phases to the theory. Depicting imaginary perception with its crucial jobs, Farabi explains these three activities: storing sensory forms, composing and decomposing sensory forms, as well as imagery. What Farabi names the imaginary faculties, is conceptualized as three inner perceptions, i.e., imagination, estimative and memory faculties in Avicenna's works. Evolving existing theories of perception, Avicenna delivers an account of five inner perceptions. Beforehand Farabi did not consider any difference between imaginary perception and *mote khayelah*. However, he mentioned one faculty doing both activities and was usually calling it *mote khayelah* and sometimes imaginary perception. Conceptualizing imaginary perception with its functions, Farabi deals with three primary activities: storing sensory forms, composing and decomposing sensory forms, and imagery. In other words, Avicenna defines what Farabi calls the imaginary faculties as three inner perceptions, i.e., imagination, estimative and memory faculties.

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### Introduction

Inner perception theory plays a key role in issues of epistemological mindset. Any ambiguity in inner perception theory results in various sophisms and destroys its role from efficiency. Here we study the problem of inner perception with comparative historical approaches of Farabi (339-258) and Avicenna (373-428). Farabi in terms of innovative theories about various roles of perception and Avicenna in terms of expansion in concepts of perception faculties are important for the purpose of the field.

Some features of Aristotle's theory of perception are included in Farabi as well as Avicenna's theory of inner perception. Most of Aristotle's views on inner perception theory could be seen in his book about human soul called *De Anima* (Aristotle, 1995, 427a18-429a4). Explaining the nature inner perception, Aristotle first gives a negative account about what imaginary perception does not include. He emphasizes on the difference of imagination with thinking, judgment, opinion, belief, conviction, reason, perceiving, knowledge and intelligence. He thinks that imagination is different from thinking and judgment. Although imagination can't be created without perceiving, judgment is not found without imagination. Therefore, the difference between thinking and judgment is obvious, because imaginary perception is in our control when we want and we can imagine a picture (Aristotle, 1995, 427b14-19).

The idea that imaginary perception under human power and desire do not merely mean being devoid of imaginary perception because thinking is arbitrary too. Therefore, thinking is bound to logical criteria that we can obtain by following them whereas imaginary perception is not bound to logical criteria and barriers. The other point is that imaginary perception can rely on practical wisdom due to its characteristics, under human power and desire. Because the affairs belonging to practical wisdom are under human power and free will, whatever belonging to practical wisdom is worthy to be judged. We have dealt in detail this issue in problems of imaginary perception topics.

Aristotle differentiates between imaginary perception and opinion. His argument is that we are not free in forming opinions and cannot avoid error or correct alternation.

In addition, when we think that something is horrible or threatening, immediately interests and emotions are produced inside our body as well as for something reliable. But when we just imagine, we won't have those regrets and are like those who are watching a nice or horrible scene painting (Aristotle, 1995, 427b20-24).

Besides, opinion goes together with belief. Because without belief in what we have opinion power, we cannot have opinion whereas most animals have imaginary perception not belief. Moreover each opinion is with belief, each belief is with conviction and each conviction is with reason. But some animals have imaginary perception without reason (Aristotle, 1995, 428a18-23).

Aristotle separates imaginary perception from perceiving by the reasoning that the perceiving is potential or actual. For example, visual potential and act of seeing and imaginary perception occur in both absences as in dreams. The second reasoning is that perceiving is always available unlike the imaginary perception. The third reason is that if the actual imaginary perception and perceiving were the same, all animals should have imaginary perception. But it is not so. For example, there is no imaginary perception in ants, bees and worms. The fourth reason is that perceiving is always true unlike imaginary perceptions. The fifth reason, when our sensory feelings pay attention to the objects carefully, we don't say that we imagine this object is for example a human. But when our sense perception is vague about that object, we say that sentence that maybe it is true or not. The sixth and the last Aristotelian reason is that visual imaginary perception appears even while our eyes remain closed (Aristotle, 1995, 428a5-16). He separates imaginary perception from the affairs which are always impressive like knowledge or intelligence, because imaginary perception can be an error (Aristotle, 1995, 428a17-18).

Studying the differentiation of imaginary perception from perceiving and opinion, Aristotle shows that imaginary perception cannot be opinion in addition to perceiving, or opinion resulted from perceiving or combination of both. This is impossible, both due the things we have mentioned and the reasons that objective opinion cannot differentiate from objective perception (Aristotle, 1995, 428a24-29).

Aristotle describes what imaginary perception *is not*. But what *is* the imaginary perception? He reckons imaginary perception as a movement that cannot be created without perception. It means that it will occur just in sensitive creatures and in to objects belonging to them. And since movement can be produced from actual perception and has a similar characteristic to the perception itself, then this movement cannot be separated from the perception or in the creature without perception. Therefore, a person having imaginary perception is the agent of many things and receptive to them (Aristotle, 1995, 428b11-17).

The characteristic of imaginary perception is that it is similar to perception except that perception has to do material objects and imaginary perception does not have one (Aristotle, 1995, 432a9).

Aristotle concludes that if the imaginary perception does not have other features except above mentioned ones, then it should be a movement that results an actual reaction from a perceptive origin (Aristotle, 1995, 429a1-2).

Mentioning in appellation of imaginary perception to a Greek name *phantasia* from *phaos*, Aristotle stresses that imaginary perception belongs to the perceiving act and the most important sense is vision being impossible without light (Aristotle, 1995, 429a1-4).

A word of warning is in order. Farabi has not used the term *phantasia* and Avicenna has used *phantasia* and *bantasia* as meaning *sensus communis*.

*Motekhayelah* and *khiyal* are not considered as two faculties in Aristotle's works as we could see later in conceptualization of Muslim philosophers especially in Avicenna that formed under than the five

senses. Therefore, *takhayol* and *khiyal* are used as synonyms in the literal translation as imaginary perception.

### **Farabi's Theory on Inner Perception**

Unlike what we have understood about Aristotle, Farabi does not point out *what is imaginary perception* as a problem. He does not follow its essential analysis or its conceptual analysis. In such situations as in planning, one can obtain what is imaginary perception from his view by an indirect approach. Therefore, we will address his opinion about different perceptions, i.e., sensory perception, imaginary perception and intellectual perception and self-intellective faculties including the faculties of sensation, *motekhayelah*, and rational.

Farabi conceptualizes intellective faculties from both theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom whereas sages after him paid attention to intellective faculties through theoretical wisdom like Avicenna.

Farabi does not consider any difference between imaginary perception faculty and *motekhayelah*. He mentions one faculty doing both activities and often calls it *motekhayelah* faculty and sometimes imaginary perception faculty (Farabi, 1992, 51-58).

Avicenna explains these distinctions. Basically we cannot see Avicenna's explanation about fifth inner senses as we found in Farabi's works.

Farabi does not express separately about nature of perception. But he points to the kinds of perceptions in his other discussions. For example, he expresses in his talking about the first lover and pleasure that he enjoys in it. Because of feeling or imaginary perception or rational science (Farabi, 2003, 85; 1997, 71) and says in his analysis of psychological faculties that the science will be realized by rational, *motekhayelah* or sensory faculties (Farabi, 2003, 156).

In his opinion, rational faculty is responsible for intellectual perception, *motekhayelah* faculty for imaginary perception and appearance senses for the sensory perception.

Avicenna completed this theory. He conceptualizes estimation as a kind of perception. We cannot see this term in Farabi's works. Farabi has defined estimation as an imaginary perception for something that is not existent. (Farabi, 1987, 162).

Farabi has not defined faculty in his discussions about self-faculties. Avicenna believes that faculty means both doing origin and acceptance origin. Because the affairs out of self includes movement and perception and faculty about perception means acceptance of origin and stimulation means action from origin. There is no preference to refer faculty to one of these two cases and if one uses the term of faculty for both perception and stimulation faculties, namely both acceptance and doing origins; it will be due to sharing of terminology (Avicenna, 1983, 7).

Farabi explains self faculties according to its existing order and expresses their activities (Farabi, 2004, 10; 2003, 151-155). Among these faculties is sensitive faculty including touch, sight, auditory, taste and smell senses. There is a dominant sense over appearance sense that is the focus of all sensory perceptions, and senses act like its spies and each is responsible for a special case from information and a special area of the body estate whereas the *motekhayelah* faculty does not have several servants and agents in the body and will act lonely (Farabi, 2003, 153-154).

*Motekhayelah* faculty preserves the tangible images that are stamped in the self and also it combines some images with others or divides an image to some parts and therefore creates a new image. After *motekhayelah* faculty, rational faculty will be created that the human can think by it.

Farabi has emphasized conceptualization of perception faculties from practical wisdom in various situations (Farabi, 2003, 152; 2004, 11; 1997, 33). He knows rational faculty as a faculty that human can differentiate between beautiful and ugly ethics and acts through it and thinks that which action should be left or continued and in addition finds that beneficial and harmful and enjoyable and ornery, whereas *motekhayelah* can just perceive the beneficial and harmful and enjoyable and ornery,

and sensitive can perceive just enjoyable and ornery (Farabi, 1997, 33).

One of the definitions obtained through collection of an object's definitions and works that is called compound particular. Therefore, regarding the activities of *motekhayelah* faculty, important thing is to reach what it is.

Farabi has defined three important activities for *motekhayelah*. First, it preserves sensory perceptions after cutting sensory relation. Second, it combines or decomposes them. These combinations and decompositions are various and *motekhayelah* faculty governs them desirably. Their results are sometimes relevant and sometimes irrelevant (Farabi, 2003, 154). For example, it will combine bird wing with the horse body or invent a Pegasus. The third activity is imitation and illustration. Only *motekhayelah* faculty can illustrate through the sensory and the intelligible. Even *motekhayelah* can imitate the intelligible in the ultimate perfection like the first principle and the non-materials. Of course, it is illustrated by the most complete and highest objects such as beautiful objects and in contrast, it imitates the incomplete intelligible by incomplete and posts and the ugly sensory.

Since Farabi does not analyze what imaginary perception is, we focus on his other views like of human faculties, Utopia ranks, stage of universe and body members.

He begins description of this similarity with the stages of universe. Creatures are continued from the most completed one to the most incomplete one. The last stage is that the creature's doings are just for service and other things are not realized after him and never does actions as headship. The first creature that is superior never performs service and the middle creatures perform headship rather than their lower creatures to serve the first creature.

So there will be an order and relationship and cooperation and community among stage of universal and the stage of society are the same. The status of the first header is like God in the universal system. The same relation can be found in body members and also in self faculties

(Farabi, 1991, 63-66). This similarity means *motekhayelah* faculty is under the service of rational faculty and sensitive faculty is under the service of *motekhayelah* faculty. In terms of stage and headship and design, the rational faculty is the first and *motekhayelah* and sensation are next in status of headship.

### **Avicenna's Theory on Inner Perception**

*What is imaginary perception* can be conceptualized from two positions in Avicenna's discussion: the first is where he explains kinds of perceptions and the second is where he divides internal faculties.

Imaginary perception theory has been ordered and developed consequent to perception theory and perception faculties. Avicenna first studied kinds and essences of perceptions in *al-Isharat va al-Tanbihat* and then analyzed internal perception faculties and rational soul (Avicenna, 1997, 308-404). He studied internal and external perception faculties, rational soul and kinds of perceptions in *al-Shifa* and argued in detail about each internal and external senses (See: Avicenna, 1983, 33-171).

Avicenna has divided perceptions into four kinds: feeling, imaginary perception, estimation and intellection in most of his works (Avicenna, 1983, 51-53; 1986, 344-346; 1995, 277-278; 1985, 102-103; 1984, 23; 1953, 30-33).

Until there is a relation between external senses and external object, sensory perception is resulted, if not, it is imagined and its idea is exemplified inside. Like Zayd who we saw him and then we imagined him while he is absent.

Perception of particular meanings and belonging to the sensory are called estimation. Like Zayd's kindness or hostility. Intellection is resulted when Zayd is imagined as a human, meaning that this meaning has been realized in others too.

Avicenna has tripartite divisions of perception and does not mention the estimation (Avicenna, 1997, 322-323). In *Sharh al-Isharat*, Tusi has

all four divisions and tells the reason why the Avicenna did not mention estimation that sensory and imaginary conceptions are created alone and illusory perception is not possible without participation of imaginary perception and imaginary perception makes it particular and individualized. Because estimation is the perception of intangible meanings like the qualities and relations specific to a material object (Tusi, 1997, 324).

After analyzing kinds of perceptions, Avicenna studied internal intellectual faculties. In his opinion, internal perception faculties include *sensus communis* or *bantasia*, imaginary perception or illustrated, estimation, *motekhayelah* or thought. He discussed these faculties with examples which we will discuss later (Avicenna, 1997, 331-346).

We see rain drops in straight line and a point which is turning quickly as a circle; these apprehensions are through sense, not imaginary perception or recollection. On the other hand, only the opposite idea will be stamped in the eye and the opposite idea of the rain drop or the point turning is a point not a straight line or circle. Therefore, the first painted idea will remain in one of human faculties and the current idea will join it and all sensory apprehensions will be gathered in that faculty. This faculty is called *sensus communis* or *bantasia*.

The second faculty is imaginary perception that will retain the sensory after getting hidden against external senses. Having these two faculties of *sensus communis* and imaginary perception, human can rule about the color and taste. For example, this black date is sweet and this yellow lemon is sour.

The third faculty is estimation that understood intangible detailed meaning in detailed tangibles like sheep that knows the intangible meaning of horror in the wolf and the lamb that knows the intangible meaning of kindness in his mother.

The fourth faculty is memory to retain particular meanings. This faculty is except imaginary perception which retains particular forms. One of the other human faculties can separate and combine the forms that sense

would conceptualize and the particular meanings that estimation has them and also it can separate and combine between forms and meanings. If this faculty will be worked with wisdom is called thought and if with estimation, will be called *motekhayelah*.

Tusi has called this faculty representation because it occupies in perceptions. Avicenna has determined a position for each kind of these five faculties in brain.

### **Comparing and Contrasting Farabi and Avicenna**

Historical study of the views of the Farabi and Avicenna concerning inner perception theory, explains the evolution of this theory and the persistent effect on posterity and innovations and inventions of each of them. Aristotle has done researches on the nature of the inner perception which are accepted by Farabi and Avicenna as the basis-material hence they were not elaborated. He analyzed imaginary perception as distinct from feeling, thought, belief, opinion, science and intellect, in addition to the imaginary perception and feeling being similar and its relationship with the judgment. These insights were kept in the later philosophy.

Aristotle used the word *phantasia* for imaginary perception. Farabi has not used this word to imaginary perception and nor to any other thing. Avicenna applied the words *bantasia* and *phantasia* based on common sense. While Aristotle called the common sense as *sensus communis* (Aristotle, 1995, 425b27, 450a1, 686a31)

Farabi does not consider the conceptualization of imaginary perception or its distinctiveness from dubious and similar concepts as a problem. He received the teachings of Aristotle via tacit means and deals with activities and capabilities of imaginary perception and its civil status. As Aristotle considered imaginary perception and *takhayol* with a word *phantasia*, Farabi too does not consider duality between imaginary perception and *takhayol* in the infinitive and between imaginary perception and *motekhayelah* in the meaning of faculty.

He stated three tasks for *motekhayelah* based on three imaginary forms

that can be distinguished: imaginary form that is sensory and is obtained from common sense, imaginary form that *motekhayelah* makes with possession in the first imaginary forms and their analysis and synthesis, and imaginary form that *motekhayelah* is invented by the representation of the intelligible and the sensory.

This tri-partite division is used in the conceptualization of the creativity of imaginary perception. Especially the performance of imaginary perception in imagining from the intelligible makes possible the power and specific capacity in order to form ideas and works of art. All three types are common in clear and distinctive features of substantive that Aristotle has expressed.

Farabi has also considered the ability of *motekhayelah* in understanding helpful and harmful, pleasurable and painful affairs.

Avicenna conceptualizes inner perceptive faculties. The faculties are based on a branch called *motekhayelah* and thought is considered as representation in five types and if they are considered as two faculties they are six types.

Are there any relation between faculties of imaginary perception and *motekhayelah* in Avicenna with *motekhayelah* faculty in Farabi? Avicenna knows the imaginary perception as a treasury of common sense which is responsible for maintaining the sensory forms, namely the first task of *motekhayelah* Farabi is independently for Avicenna imaginary perception. Avicenna's *motekhayelah* is responsible for analyzing forms and their composition. It means to carry out the second activity of Farabi's *motekhayelah*. Avicenna considers perception as passion category and takes from dominion in forms to act of *motekhayelah* (Avicenna, 1983, 35). He does not consider the third activity of Farabi's *motekhayeleah*, namely the representation. It should not be mentioned in addition to the perceptions and interactions of faculties.

In summary, the same interaction which Farabi considers for *motekhayelah*, Avicenna considers for two faculties, namely imaginary perception and *motekhayelah* and does not consider the representation. It

can be said that Farabi's *motekhayelah* includes Avicenna's estimative faculty because Farabi considers *motekhayelah* faculty capable of understanding pleasure, pain, benefit and detrimental affairs. It means Farabi's *motekhayelah* can find meanings in all these.

While Avicenna considers estimative faculty responsible for perceiving the sensory, as Farabi has not differentiated the estimative faculty, it is not necessary to separate the memory—that is, the treasury of partial meanings. It seems that Avicenna considers Farabi's *motekhayelah* faculty as one of the four faculties of imaginary perception, *motekhayelah*, estimative and memory. It is basically impossible to separate the sensory affairs in particular meaning from the sensory forms. So Avicenna in his book of *Isharat va Tanbihat* divides the perception in three kinds of feeling, imaginary perception and intellection and put estimation in his other works.

Another point that needs mentioning is that in some works of Farabi we can see inner cognitive faculties. In *Fusus al-Hikam* the faculties of representation, imaginary perception, memory, thought and *motekhayelah* are defined using the same terms as Avicenna's works (Shanab Ghazani, 2003, 67). Also, the common limit phrase is mentioned between the outward and the inward that exponents are stated for it equivalent of common sense. (See: Shanab Ghazani, 2003, 164; Astarabadi, 1980, 320) In addition, in *Uyun al-Masayel* we have *motekhayelah*, imaginary perception, recollection and thought without a definition for them. (See: Farabi, 1930a; 1930b, 9-10)

Various methods can be used to clarify this issue. One is that Farabi uses different phrases in different places, for the validities of cognitive faculties and he expresses their differences are in terms of brevity and detail. This probability is altered, because Farabi in *motekhayelah* activities has not named detailed names of faculties.

In addition, Farabi defined estimation as follows: 'the estimation is that we have something in imaginary perception while it does not exist' (Farabi, 1987, 162). This definition is equivalent to lexical meaning of

estimation and does not resemble Avicenna's conceptualization.

Another possibility is that Farabi changes his opinion. This possibility is not very notable. In other words, the path is not clear for such a change in the works of Farabi. Another difference is that some works do not belong to Farabi, as some Arab and European researchers denied belonging *Fusus al-Hikam* to Farabi while some have attributed it to Avicenna and also there are serious doubts in the document of *Uyun al-Masayel* and *al-Daavy al-Qalbiyeh*. (See: Georr, 1946, 31-39; Pines, 1951, 121-126; Strauss, 1934, 99-139; Michot, 1982, 50-231; Cruz, 1950-51, 23-303; Rahman, 1979) Their approach is mainly referring to the terms, concepts and theories contained in these books and have deduced most of the arguments from topics of the soul.

### **Conclusion**

Maintaining strong flavor of Aristotelian theory of perception, Farabi as well as Avicenna have appended new phases to the theory. Depicting imaginary perception with its crucial jobs, Farabi explains these three activities: storing sensory forms, composing and decomposing sensory forms, as well as imagery.

What Farabi names the imaginary faculties, is conceptualized as three inner perceptions, i.e., imagination, estimative and memory faculties in Avicenna's works.

In other words, Farabi conceptualizes *motekhayelah* faculty as a faculty responsible for keeping the sensory forms, their possession and representation of the intelligible and the sensory by them. However, Avicenna conceptualizes faculties of imaginary perception, *motekhayelah*, estimative and memory rather than Farabian *motekhayelah* faculty.

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# Elucidating the Philosophical Foundations of the Wisdom of "Tongue under Control," with an Emphasis on Allameh Javadi Amoli's View

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
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### ABSTRACT

Contemplation and theoretical reflections on the "tongue under control" and how it operates, or the reasons and factors that prevent humans from exercising control, are among the most important topics studied by Islamic scholars. This research seeks to elucidate the philosophical foundations of "tongue under control" with an emphasis on the viewpoint of Allameh Javadi Amoli, using a descriptive-analytical approach and through a library method and referencing their numerous works. Based on such an approach, Allameh Javadi considers the fundamental factor in "tongue under control" to be the spiritual faculties (habits). The novelty of this research lies in the enumeration and explanation of the philosophical foundations of the discussion. Therefore, by employing Quranic verses and the principles of Sadra'i wisdom, such as substantial motion, bodily manifestation of the soul, and the explanation of the embodiment and manifestation of actions on the Day of Resurrection; he has identified the repetition and continuity of actions and their transformation into "habits" as the fundamental factor in the issue of "tongue under control"; in fact, "tongue" is not in our control, but rather in the control of the "habits" Therefore, if piety governs human actions, humans can to a large extent take control of their tongue in the world and in a wakeful state. However, in the world of dreams, near death, and also on the Day of Resurrection, the "tongue" is under the control of habits and temperaments, not us.

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## 1. Introduction

Every event that occurs in the realm of existence, or every behavior and state that appears in humans, has its roots in various factors. If these factors are absent or undergo a fundamental change, human actions and states take on a different form. Therefore, every effect has its own specific cause. From an Allameh Javadi's perspective, man is considered a "theosopher being" (a being whose life is a manifestation of God) and not a rational animal (Javadi Amoli, 2002, p. 37). Some individuals are referred to not as human beings, but as "beasts" and "livestock," not for derogation, but actually to refer to their inner reality (Javadi Amoli, 2009, p. 37). In a comprehensive view of all human actions and states, there is a set of causes within humans that lead to the occurrence of each action.

The subject of "tongue" and its defects as an act of human beings has always been and still is of great interest in religious texts, philosophical schools, ethics, mysticism, psychology, and religious texts. However, the subject of this article and its main foundation for addressing it are the Quranic verses that mention the lies of the disbelievers and polytheists on the Day of Resurrection; why and for what reasons have they become like this? Can man in this world take control of tongue? What factors are involved in the issue of "tongue under control"? Therefore, in ethics, mysticism, and Islamic philosophy, attention has been paid to the subject of Habits, which is the origin of human actions, states, and attributes, and on the other hand, the idea "embodiment of actions" comes from religious texts and has been established in Islamic knowledges as "spiritual transmigration ethereal transmogrification"; because man, although in this world, is one type, but after movements and habits and becoming temperamental, becomes of the types of the celestial realms, which in this state is classified into four kinds: "angel," "demon," "beast," and "plant." In fact, the cause for their emergence are the dominance of the faculties that have been created in him as a result of the repetition of actions; the action of each human being originates from the spiritual faculties (Sabzevari, 2004, p. 421).

The main objective of the article is "tongue under control" with an emphasis on the viewpoint of Allameh Javadi Amoli. The problem is how humans can take control of "tongue" and avoid its defects? And why in some Quranic verses, initially, a mention is made of the lies of the disbelievers and polytheists on the Day of Resurrection, and in other verses, it is stated that they cannot deny the truths? In addition, can a human being take control of his tongue in this world? Therefore, the issue of "tongue under control" in this world, on the death bed (dying), and on the Day of Resurrection, are topics that this research aims to address.

so, the connection between spiritual faculties and "tongue under control" is one of the philosophical and jurisprudential foundations of the issue. This research tries to delineate the philosophical foundations of "tongue under control" using a descriptive-analytical method, and then to explain it in connection with the issue. Based on our studies of books and articles published in various databases, firstly, the topic of the article with this approach is not repetitive; secondly, the topic and its philosophical foundations based on the viewpoints of scholars, in general, and with an emphasis on the viewpoint of Allameh Javadi Amoli, in particular, has not been addressed. Therefore, this article, in terms of its subject and the enumeration of its foundations, is innovative and unique. The ultimate purpose of this research is to answer this: What are the philosophical foundations of "tongue under control" from the perspective of Allameh Javadi Amoli? To answer this, first, some concepts related to the topic are explained, and then, since he has a Sadra'i background in his viewpoint and has also utilized Quranic verses, the philosophical foundations of his viewpoint are extracted and then elaborated upon. Finally, the exposition of Allameh Javadi Amoli's viewpoint on "tongue under control" – a term coined by him - is discussed.

## **2. Explanation of Concepts**

For a better arrangement and coordination of the discussion, first, some concepts are explained in terms of vocabulary and terminology so that

there is no ambiguity remaining in the theoretical foundations of the discussion. Then, a description of the foundations involved in the research topic is provided.

### **Mood (Character)**

literally, mood means temperament, quality, disposition, nature, and habit (Dehkhoda, Vol. 7, p. 9925), as well as morality and religion (Sajjadi, 1994, Vol. 1, p. 111). In terminology, it means a firmly established state of the self, such that as a result, actions are issued from the self easily and without the need for thought (Sajjadi, 1994, Vol. 1, p. 111). Actions that are not firmly established in the soul are not called characters, such as giving away wealth in moments of emotional turmoil (Sajjadi, 1994, p. 423). Therefore, character is the habits that are firmly established in the human's soul and cause actions and movements (Javadi Amoli, 2009, Kh, p. 41). Therefore, noble character in moral philosophy means that a person is the master of themselves and their behavior, stable and powerful in decision-making (Saliba, Sanei, 1987, p. 342) and in the eyes of the wise, it is one of the types of the psychic disposition (Shirazi, 1981, Vol. 4, p. 63).

### **Decorum (Adab)**

Decorum, in its lexical sense, refers to knowledge, culture, accepted behavior, and observing the boundaries of everything. In essence, decorum refers to details and refinement in behavior and observing the boundaries of every action that is based on free will and within the framework of divine law. The perfection of decorum is that non-religious matters do not take its place, neither in language nor in action, heart, or thought (Javadi Amoli, 2009, kh, p.49). According to Allameh Tabataba'i, decorum is refinement in action that firstly, is legitimate (for example, decorum has no meaning in oppression and lying), and secondly, is voluntary (Tabataba'i, 1417, Vol. 6, p. 366). Discipline, in the sense of organizing and coordinating internal faculties, regulates any deviation and

deviation in behavior (Javadi Amoli, 2009, kh, p.53). In the Quran, monotheism is the true origin of human manners.

### **The Permanent States(Habits)**

In philosophical terminology, The habits refers to a psychological figure that leads to the emergence of an act or reaction without thought or contemplation (Sajjadi, 1994, Vol 3, p 191). Stable qualities in the soul are called the habits and it is classified as a type of psychic disposition (ibid). It is an ability through which work can be done with skill and enthusiasm (Sajjadi, Saliba, Sanei, 1987, p611). Anything that exists opposite to non-existence or opposite to the current state is also referred to as "the habits". If it is opposite to non-existence, it indicates an existing matter, and if it exists opposite to the current state, it indicates the quality of being firmly established (Sajjadi, Saliba, Sanei, 1987, p612). Repetition of an action leads to the emergence of habits, and every faculty that dominates a person in the world manifests itself in the other world in a form appropriate to that habits (everyone acts in their own way)<sup>1</sup>. It can be said that "the habits" has two types: either it does not require a master, contemplation, or thought, or it requires a model, thought, guess, and experience (such as calligraphy and painting). Therefore, performing an action repeatedly and consistently results in the emergence of psychological faculties and habits, which is the subject of ethics knowledge (Tabataba'i, 1417, Vol. 11, p.16).

### **Virtues and Vices**

Allameh Tabataba'i believes that although acquiring some habit is not in the hands of humans, the prerequisites for acquiring them are in human control, and by performing these prerequisites, one can acquire the faculties (Tabataba'i, 1417, Vol. 1, p.533). Sadra addresses this issue in a specific manner, stating that every action affects both the self and has

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1. Al- Isra/ 84

effects outside the self. Just as the actions and behaviors of every human have specific existential effects outside, they also have an impact within the human self (Shirazi, 1987, Vol. 2, p 335). In fact, the real appearance and manifestation of a human being are those habits.

### **3. Philosophical Foundations of Discussion**

In order to elucidate the concept of "tongue under control," we need to discuss the philosophical foundations of the discussion. Considering that Allameh Javadi Amoli adopts a Sadraei's approach, this section focuses on the foundations that can be drawn from Mulla Sadra's philosophy in this regard.

#### **3.1 The relationship between Soul and Body**

The relationship between the soul and the body during human life, even during sleep, is such that if there is a great distance between the soul and the body, they will come into contact with each other at the slightest indication and opportunity (Nourani, 2005, Vol. 7, p.405). Every action performed by the body involves the participation of the soul, and any change that occurs in the soul affects the body as well<sup>1</sup>. Are the body and soul two distinct entities? In the philosophy of Mulla Sadra, the soul and body are not entirely separate entities; rather, they are two modes of a single reality. The soul is considered the result of the substantial motion of the natural and innate body. Thus, man is a unified reality, with the natural body on one side and the human rational soul immaterial on the other. To transcend the material side and reach the level of abstraction, one must pass through intermediary boundaries (the faculties and instruments of the soul), which serve as mediators between the two sides (Shirazi, 1981, Vol. 8, p.150). According to Mulla Sadra, the governance of the soul over the body is intrinsic to the soul and is its empowering force. He uses the analogy of the relationship between God and the world

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1. Nourani M, *Medicine in Islamic World Gand Encyclopedia*, Vol. 12, Armaghan Yusef, Qom, 1st ed., 2005

to illustrate the relationship between body and soul (Shirazi, 1987, Vol. 2, p.482).

According to the unity relationship between the soul and the body, the body is the descending level of the soul (Shirazi, 1417, vol. 2, p. 551). Therefore, the soul first occupies the ideal body and then, through it, affects the material body. The body consists of two different levels: 1) the level of bukhari soul (arising from the equilibrium of the four elements) and 2) the physical limbs (arising from the denser portion of the four elements). The soul takes possession of the body through the ideal body and through the bukhari soul, and then with the help of the spirit of Bukhari, it belongs to the physical body; Because only the ideal body has intrinsic life. Thus, the soul and the body are levels of human existence, and due to their unity relationship, a change in one level affects the other, and this influence is not limited to cognitive or practical states. Therefore, each characteristic and habits, whether perceptual or active, permeates the level of the body and becomes sensory and material. According to Mulla Sadra's viewpoint, the soul is initially physical before the emergence of attributes and becomes immaterial after habits. In his view, the body is not merely a physical body, rather, bukhari soul and ideal body are also considered bodies.

### **3.2 The relationship between Nutrition, Ethics, and the Soul**

Temperament and nutrition are very influential in connection between the soul, body, and gaseous soul. What is described in Islamic texts as prohibitions and disapproved is intended to purify the soul and prepare it to receive divine grace. Every food has an effect on the formation of both the body and soul, as the relationship between body and soul is a unity. Based on substantial motion, food manifests itself as perfection in both thought and practical aspects (Javadi Amoli, 2004, vol. 4, p. 41). Javadi Amoli considers nutrition as highly influential in the cognitive aspect, as it is very difficult for a person who consumes forbidden food to think correctly. If someone nourishes themselves with forbidden foods and their

body grows, admonition has no effect on them, like a crooked tree that cannot be corrected. Therefore, nutrition, on one hand, is one of the influential factors in the quality of the relationship between the soul and the body, and on the other hand, nutrition is one of the fundamental factors in elevating the bodily existential position relative to the soul and the enhancement of the balance of temperament, which is itself linked to human thought and behavior. Due to the special relationship between nutrition and the body and their unity, nutrition affects the soul and its qualities (Shahgoli, 2019, p. 191). According to Mulla Sadra's perspective, because the soul is "the corporeal contingency and Spiritual survival of the soul" and has a significant impact on the emergence of the soul, the body provides a basis for perception, acting as a platform for receiving them. The reason for the mutual influence of the soul and the body must be understood in their intense connection and belonging to each other. From his perspective, food, after being converted into nutrition, becomes a material tool for perception and the psychological attributes of a certain type and originates from the body's matter and form and evolves through substantial motion into a plant, then animal, and finally human level (Rayzan, Fazeli, & Karami, 2023, p. 106).

### **3.3 Action and Outcome are the same**

One of the profound issues in self-awareness is that action is in essence the outcome (Naraghi, 1990, p. 29). Knowledge and action are not secondary but rather essential to the essence of human beings. Knowledge constructs the soul, and action constructs the body. In all worlds, the body of that world is the descending level of the soul, and the worldly and otherworldly bodies are interconnected. Therefore, the retribution of the soul is knowledge and action because retribution is along the path of knowledge and action, and the habits are forms of metaphysical entities. Each action has a form that manifests in the intermediate world, and the human form in the afterlife is the result and purpose of their actions in this world. Therefore, in this world, human beings are a genus, and under

it, there are individuals and instances. In the afterlife, they are species, and under it, there are various kinds. They have expressed this through the embodiment of actions or the embodiment of attributes, and the purpose is the realization of the results of actions in the essence of the soul (Naraghi, 1990, p. 32)

### **3.4 Unearthly Metamorphosis (Ethereal Metamorphosis)**

Metamorphosis (maskh) means transformation and changing nature, such as when a human becomes a monkey. According to Mulla Sadra, transformation is a reality both in this world and the afterlife. If an animalistic attribute dominates someone to the extent that it overrides their primary potential and becomes their inherent quality, they have effectively undergone metamorphosis or transformation (Sajjadi, 2000, p. 450). Because with every action, human beings create a habit of habits for themselves, in scientific matters, speaking and listening, and practicing with mental forms knowledge, and in practical matters, action becomes the basis for the manifestation of psychological forms, initially as a state and then as a faculty. Habits gradually transcend the limits of psychological breadth and depth and become rooted in the individual's soul, becoming unified with their spirit and becoming forms and actions for their soul. Because until the soul reaches ultimate purity, it will accept any form or action, whether it aligns with human nature or not (Javadi Amoli, 2010, b, p. 144). Human beings at birth are potentially animals, and potentially humans; if they follow reason and divine law, they become actually human; if they do not follow the command of reason and revelation, they will remain in the rank of animals.. According to Mulla Sadra, human souls, according to their original nature, are united in terms of genus, and when they move from potentiality to actuality and acquire attributes as a result of repetition, their genus becomes diverse. Each type of genus corresponds to its type of habits and ethics, and the number of animals resulting from human habits on Judgment Day is greater than the number of animals in this world because of the blending of various

animal attributes and habits that are gathered within a single human being, resulting in multiple types of animals (Sajjadi, 2000, p. 450).

#### **4. Embodiment of Actions from Allameh Javadi's Viewpoint**

Mulla Sadra articulates that based on Quranic verses and traditions, the embodiment of actions is a well-known concept, and habits manifest overtly (Shirazi, 1981, Vol. 9, p. 5). According to Allameh Javadi, the embodiment refers to "the materialization of non-material entities such as beliefs, ethics, qualities, actions, and effects of humans." Essentially, the thoughts and actions that a person has and performs in this world will be manifested and essence of those thoughts and actions will be actualized, whether they are good or bad, after departing from this world (Javadi Amoli, 2010, Vol. 5, p. 77). The habits, ethics, and actions that a person performs in this world will manifest themselves in reality in the afterlife. In this world, a person is a unified entity, but in the afterlife, they have various forms because their appearance and presence are based on their habits, which will manifest in different forms corresponding to those habits (Asadollahzadeh, 2014, p. 127). According to the writer's belief, in interpreting the embodiment and incarnation of human beings in the form of habits, several important principles are involved, the most important of which will be briefly mentioned below.

##### **4.1 The Corporeal Contingency and Spiritual Survival of the soul**

In summary, Mulla Sadra's innovative idea can be interpreted by saying that the human soul at the beginning of its creation is a corporeal and material affair, impressed in matter. However, with essential evolution, it gradually transforms and attains the level of ideal abstraction immaterial, and thereafter, it has the ability to ascend the degrees of perfection through its own will and choice, reaching the level of intellectual abstraction and even higher (Shirazi, 1984, pp. 135-136). Before Mulla Sadra, it was believed that an animal is a lower genus and after that, a lower species (real species). However, he considers humans as a middle

genus under which there are various kinds. In fact, whatever actions a person performs and whatever beliefs they acquire, they create their own reality. Therefore, the internal state of a person, based on the originality of existence and the distinction of existence, is a genuine, real, and essential matter. A person can become a middle genus (the same genus) and be classified into various types under it, while keeping their essence (as a lower genus and a middle species), they are truly an animal. Their animality is throughout their humanity, not just within it (Javadi Amoli, 2009, Vol. 3, p. 241).

From Mulla Sadra's perspective, the term "body" here refers to the unconditional non-conditioned body (without having or not having a condition) (Shirazi, 1981, Vol. 8, p. 15), not the conditional conditioned body (with conditions). Because the unconditional body has the potential to accept subsequent perfections, but the conditional body does not have such a possibility; because in being unconditional, it is complete and does not need to accept subsequent perfections. Therefore, the soul is perfection for the unconditional body and can be diverse and complete with it, becoming united with it (Javadi Amoli, 2010, Vol. 31, p. 142). The soul, apart from the providential causality, has no other reality (ibid, p. 95) and by gaining knowledge and truths and acquiring the virtues of human beings, its existential intensity increases, and it reaches unity of knowledge and the knower, and action and the agent, and it evolves towards absolute perfection. Therefore, the soul, through the continuation of its essential and complementary movement, reaches complete immaterial, and it only has a providential relationship with the body in the position of action (Javadi Amoli, 2010, Vol. 33, p. 1).

#### **4.2 Substantial Motion of the Soul**

Another philosophical innovation of Mulla Sadra is substantial motion. He has solved many other issues such as intensive motion through substantial motion. Intensity exists in being, not in matter; because intensity in matter is meaningless; intensity in matter means matter

undergoes a transformation; that is, in the process of intensive motion, from the material world to the spiritual world, gradually, matter reaches the stage of complete immaterial (Ebrahimi Dinani, Karimzadeh, 2009, p. 11).

From Mulla Sadra's perspective, the emergence of different levels of the soul is the result of substantial motion and intensive existence of the same natural body, while the natural body is secondary to the soul and originates from it; because the natural body is a receptacle and bed in which the soul appears and evolves, and with reaching a particular level of development, it can separate from this bed, while the ideal body, because it has reached the ideal level of abstraction, cannot be separated from it, and its form and appearance are determined by the habits acquired through the soul, which themselves have their roots in knowledge and action, while the form and appearance of the natural body are due to material and environmental factors, and the soul itself has little involvement in shaping this body (Zamaniha, Yavari, 2017, p. 187).

Allameh Javadi believes that according to substantial motion, any belief, moral quality, and action entail a substantial transformation, to the extent that the essence of human nature moves towards a specific direction through substantial motion, by acquiring habits and transcending the aspect of temporality of qualities, it provides the ground for the transformation of essence, so that habits gradually emerge as a constitutive form. With this analysis, a person is never the last type; rather, the latter type is something that arises through substantial motion. Thus, in reality, it is an existence that starts from the elemental body and evolves through intrinsic transformation and substantial motion. The soul of each person is constructed throughout their life; because the soul at the beginning is devoid of secondary attributes and perfections. Therefore, by strengthening theoretical reason, one attains correct thoughts, and by strengthening practical reason, one achieves pure intentions and good ethics, and with these two, one achieves angelic status (Javadi Amoli, 2007, Vol. 3, p. 233).

### **4.3 The Completeness of the Soul**

Initially, it should be noted that completeness has two types: 1) scientific completeness of the soul; 2) practical completeness of the soul (Jamshidi Kouhsari, Fakharnovghani, Seyyed Mousavi, 2021, p. 119). It can be said that completeness can be analyzed into two types: evolutionary and volitional completeness. Based on substantial motion, evolutionary completeness is always upward. (Gorgian and Esmaeili, 2018, p. 87). The soul in the process of evolutionary completeness takes possession of the natural body through the gaseous soul (Gorgian and Esmaeili, 2018, p. 87). For this reason, Mulla Sadra considers the soul as the result of the evolutionary completeness of forms (Shirazi, 1981, Vol. 9, p. 5).

### **4.4 Habits and the Truth of Embodiment**

Initially, a question arises as to whether habits are subject to change or not. Opinions vary; Aristotle considered them changeable, but Plato regarded a portion of them (acquired ethics, not natural ones) as changeable (Javadi Amoli, 2018, p. 83). According to Allameh Javadi, the possibility of human transformation until the end of life, based on substantial motion, is well delineated (Javadi Amoli, 2008, Vol. 5, p. 30). This is because God has created humans to attain perfection and has also bestowed upon them the potential for perfection, and the main axis of human evolution is the journey through the stages of the soul (Javadi Amoli, 2006, p. 236). He believes that rational evidence for change and empirical evidence for its occurrence emphasize this (Javadi Amoli, 2008, p. 89); thus, there is a stark difference between hardship and reluctance, and among its evidence is the existence of obligations in all stages of life and existence of prophets. Therefore, humans can change their habits and attributes by their own will and choice. All habits and attributes can be transformed as humans are in this world, constantly moving and changing, and can turn vices into virtues and vice versa through voluntary evolutionary movement. Therefore, no disposition is intrinsic, and even inherited moral traits are subject to perishability because, based on

substantial motion, both the soul and the human body are changeable, let alone the psychological traits. If moral qualities are formed through repeated action, they can also be changed through the same means.

Thus, ethics create the reality of a human, and upon embodiment, gradually, they shape a kind of human (Javadi Amoli, 2007, Vol. B, p. 130). In Hikmat Motaaliyeh, every action a human performs actually creates their reality and resurrect with it; this action is the participation of ethics (Javadi Amoli, 2007, Vol. B, p. 130). In any case, the role of substantial motion and the embodied nature of the soul in ethics is very effective; this means that humans not only take a trait through qualitative movement but also through substantial motion. Hikmat Motaaliyeh has returned these types of knowledge to the mode of "existence" and has considered them as "concepts"; not "essence." In this way, it is beyond the Ten Categories, and the mode of existence itself creates the moving human; this sentient being becomes knowledgeable on the path of knowledge—which is the truth of existence—not through the essence known, because humans unite with knowledge, not with the known. This knowledge is both knowledge, the known, and the knower (Javadi Amoli, 2008, p.326). In fact, a human is the embodiment of ethics; the soul in substantial motion and in the stage of knowledge becomes identical to knowledge, and in the stages of ethics, identical to those qualities and dominion. If a human becomes the ruler of ethical matters, gradually, a certain form of him is constructed. Therefore, the nature of a human depends on their faculties (Javadi Amoli, 2008, p.326).

##### **5. "Tongue under Control"**

In the culture of the Quran and the Prophet's tradition, humans are not merely articulate animals (Javadi Amoli, 2009, vol.1, p.370); rather, some are, in essence, animals. He believes that to understand the issuance of human actions, attention must be paid to the "firmaments of humans," not the "resemblances of humans"; thus, mettle, which is the firmament of humans, is related to their soul and spirit, and other faculties must serve it

(Dolat, Valizadeh, 2023, p. 107). To achieve this, the role of theoretical reason guides human perceptions, in harmony with their nature mettle and divine spirit. Therefore, in his view, the true human is a "divine-oriented living being," "theosopher" and the human heart has a strong relationship with human insights, tendencies, and actions.

### **5.1 The emergence of Action in Terms of Occurrence in Humans**

either it is compulsory, coerced, or voluntary. Therefore, human action is any action or reaction that is voluntary, whether it be natural, innate, or based on whims (Dolat, Valizadeh, 2023, p. 115). The agent that distinguishes human action from that of animals is "will" or "volition" (Dolat, Valizadeh, 2023, p. 107). He distinguishes between will and volition in their guiding force; the leader of "will" is reason, and the guide of "volition" is the faculty of "imagination." The origin of volitional work in humans is their knowledge or and practical inclination, and since all voluntary actions of humans are conditioned by their psychological traits, they will be colored by their vile or virtuous nature, and if the faculty of intellectual and practical virtue is established in a person's soul, all human actions will gradually give birth to a firmly established faculty and a spiritual quality (Javadi, 2009, Vol. C, Vol. 2, p. 572). Therefore, the essence of knowledge and action and their humanization, i.e., that knowledge is the maker of the soul and action is the maker of the body, is always in all worlds, the lower level of the soul of that world, and their difference lies in imperfection and perfection (Tusi, 1995, p. 85). In clearer terms, knowledge and action, as in literary knowledge, both stem from the same source and substance. The human soul expands and intensifies by accepting knowledge and action; knowledge is the maker and specifier of the human soul, and action is the maker and specifier of the human body in all worlds (Tusi, 1374, p. 85).

Those who perfect their intellectual and practical qualities, assuming that every action gives rise to a specific state in the soul (Bahrani, 1417, Vol. 2, p. 345), gradually become true humans. When it becomes

apparent that manners, concerning their attributes, are subject to the ultimate desirability in life, therefore, if a person's actions are centered on monotheism, it manifests both outwardly and inwardly, and purity in servitude and worship, emanates from his speech, actions, and other aspects of existence, in a way that no veil can cover it.

### **5.2 Mood and Tongue under Control**

Now the question arises whether manners in the matter of "tongue under control" can play a role or the psychological faculties (temperaments)? Firmament qualities in the soul are ethics, but etiquette, refinement, and precision in speech, behavior, and external actions belong to humans, while ethics is an internal matter, and decorum derives from ethics. Therefore, etiquette is the goodness of action, and ethics is the goodness of the agent. Thus, two necessary conditions are needed in decorum: 1) Behavior should be within the framework of Mulla Sadra. 2) Behavior should be intentional and voluntary (Javadi Amoli, 2009, Vol. C, p. 51). However, decorum is the first stage of piety (Tabataba'i, 1417, Vol. 6, p. 367); piety prevents bad human temperaments and prevents the negative psychological faculties of man. Imam Ali (peace be upon him) says: "O people! Take responsibility for disciplining your own souls, and through it, save yourselves from the bad habits that afflict you."

According to Allameh Tabataba'i, volitional action arises from the mediation of knowledge and will from the actor and is of two kinds; voluntary and compelled. If the performance or abandonment of an action is based on the actor's own decision, it is voluntary, but if it is based on the influence of something external to the actor, it is considered compelled. Actions that arise from human temperaments are compelled (Tabataba'i, Vol. 1, p. 164). However, in some of our actions, our knowledge does not interfere with them; rather, the only thing that matters is the existence or absence of the natural actor (Tabataba'i, Vol. 1, p. 164).

### **5.3 The difference between "Desire", "Will" and "Discretion"**

In "desire" (inclination), there is a sort of wanting, and in it, the departure from the state of equality is hidden (Sajjadi, 2000, p. 487). Allameh Javadi believes that the attraction and effort that the soul shows to perform an action are both "desire" and "will"; however, a distinction must be made between the two because one of the lower levels of will is desire, and desire also has levels that some refer to as will. Therefore, desire and appetite apply to lust, not reason (Javadi Amoli, 2009, p. 326); if the attraction and effort present in a person are applied to his practical aspect and regulated under the influence of the "perceptive" faculty, it is called desire, and if it is under the influence of the "rational" faculty, it is called will (Javadi Amoli, 2009, pp. 130-129).

However, some of our actions are done for the reason that it has become apparent to us, such as human volitional actions; meaning that our knowledge has been associated with it and we have recognized it, and this distinction and determination take place in the sense that a person judges the performance of it to be consistent with a perfection of his own perfections. Therefore, knowledge is the intermediary between man and his action; and man does not perform any action unless the perfection and integrity of his existence necessitate it, so in actions where there is no multiple intellectual form, they are performed without any thought or consideration, such as actions that arise from human faculties (like speaking), without the slightest hesitation. Consequently, the actor has no waiting state; we can speak without delay. Actions performed by limbs, hands, feet, and tongue are inevitably present on the Day of Resurrection against man in their own language, meaning that the effect of actions on the essence of the soul is realized and leads to the issuance of deeds, providing testimony, and performing swiftly.

### **5.4 The relationship between Lying Polytheists and Habits**

It can be said that lying is expiated by polytheists and disbelievers on the Day of Judgment because of the manifestation of their traits. It must be

understood that the self-purification and the acquisition of virtuous habits have only one way, the repetition of righteous actions and perseverance in them. The action must be repeated to the extent that its effect gradually settles in the soul. Although the attainment of scientific merits is not within human control, the prerequisites for acquiring it are within human reach, and by performing these prerequisites, one can attain merits. Because the health and illness of the soul and body are optional matters, thus preserving the human form or transforming it into an animal form is also optional (Tabataba'i, 1417, Vol. 5, p. 143). Therefore, the perfection of human existence over other creatures lies in the potential of various faculties within him; the human soul has the potential to accept various forms. When each of the soul's faculties reaches its maximum, it will manifest itself in the Hereafter; because the Hereafter's form is subject to the mental traits that a person has acquired in this world. The balance of faculties, through reason, places man on the path of humanity (Javadi Amoli, 2009, Part, p. 208). Soul traits are existential perfections and, by nature, possess intensity and weakness (gradation) (Javadi Amoli, 2010, A, Vol. 4, p. 195).

Therefore, polytheists and disbelievers, as they have become accustomed to lying in the world, also naturally speak lies on the Day of Judgment, which is the day of the manifestation of mental traits and habits. Otherwise, it is impossible for a person, who stands before his Lord, to lie, because his deeds are present, and all his limbs and bodily organs express themselves (Tabatabaei, 1417, Vol. 1, p. 558).

According to Allameh Javadi, in substantial motion, the moving entity itself is identical to the motion. Therefore, all beings and stages, whether near or far, are true to the moving substance unconditionally. They unite with each stage of existence they reach, and if they reach complete immaterial, they become aware of what passes through the ideal world and nature. In this sense, everything that occurs within the realm of the body is accompanied by the awareness and the exertion of the powers of human souls, and it is impossible for any action within the body's domain

to take place without the soul's knowledge (Javadi Amoli, 2006, p. 313). In substantial motion, sensory or perceptive faculties reach such a level that his perception becomes identical to his action and his knowledge becomes identical to his power (Javadi Amoli, 2006, p. 312). Therefore, in this state, no error, forgetfulness, slip, or the like is imagined (Javadi Amoli, 2005, p. 206), because the indulgence in ignorance, wickedness, and illusions is solely confined to "conjecture" and "imagination," the cause of which is the dependence on the material world (Javadi Amoli, 2005, p. 206), which does not exist, in this state.

Sinful individuals, because, according to their mental traits in the world, they have been liars on the threshold of death (the state of dying) and on the Day of Judgment, also continue to lie; because for the time being, "their tongue is under their control". But when worldly characteristics disappear, they observe the nature of their actions, and gradually, mental traits also disappear, and there is no room for lying anymore (Javadi Amoli, 2010, Vol. 18, p. 241). Therefore, the tongue is under the control of mental traits, not us (Javadi Amoli, 2009, H, p. 325); because language is under the control of actions and deeds, not us. In the world, as long as we are alive and awake, our "tongue" is under our control, but when we go to sleep, the tongue is under the control of mental traits. For this reason, a foul-mouthed person speaks foul language even in their sleep; because the tongue is not under their control. Given that sleep is the brother of death, the tongue is not under our control but under the control of mental traits. In reality, it is compulsory; because mental traits govern the outward appearance, speech, and language of humans; here, mental traits speak.

### **Conclusion**

Based on the Sadrian approach of Allameh Javadi Amoli, the results of the discussion can be summarized as follows:

1. As long as humans are in this world, they can change their moral traits and habits.

2. Considering the relationship between the soul and the body, and also taking into account two important principles in Sadra's philosophy; substantial motion and the corporeal contingency and Spiritual survival of the soul thereof, moral traits and habits are existential perfections. Therefore, they are the origin of effects.

3. One of the external manifestations of humans is their speech and "tongue"; therefore, humans can to a large extent gain control over their tongue in this world as well, by acquiring virtues and repeating and perseverance (becoming habit), and achieving piety.

4. However, in the world of dreams, on deathbed (the state of dying), and on the Day of Judgment, tongue is not under the control of its owner, but rather under the control of the owner's mental faculties and habits.

5. Therefore, on the Day of Judgment, if disbelievers and polytheists initially speak lies and then speak the truth, it is all due to their habits; in fact, what governs them is their habits, which manifest themselves on the Day of Judgment. Therefore, "tongue" is under the control of "mental faculties and habits", not under our control. in fact, morals, actions and habits that man has done in the world are manifested there in their true form.

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# Investigating the functions of intellect and their application in the births of Islamic philosophy

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### ABSTRACT

The functions of the intellect - which is one of the topics raised in the field of epistemology - are the activities and effects that the intellect performs in acquiring knowledge and recognizing objects and facts. The purpose of this research is to know the various functions of philosophical intellect and their application in the births and innovations of Islamic philosophy. This article has been made using analytical and argumentative strategies and document methods, logical and syllogistic analysis. The functions of intellect in philosophy should not be considered exclusive to its argumentative function. Philosophical intellect has various functions, and in order to know the differences of Islamic philosophy from other philosophical schools and to continue the growth of Islamic philosophy, we must pay attention to all these functions. The functions of philosophical intellect include imaginations perception, finding universal concepts, dividing concepts; combining concepts; making new concepts; building coherence between related objects, imaginations or affirmations; to affirm; questioning; description; explanation; interpretation; analysis; reasoning; ideation; theorizing; And the criticism that the application of the mentioned functions in Islamic philosophy has led to many births, such as the presentation of some divisions of existence by Islamic philosophers, the conceptualization of the perpetual origination by Mir Damad, the presentation of the problem of mental existence by Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, a new reading of Plato's political philosophy by Farabi, the analysis of how existence Generalities by Avicenna, evidences proving the originality of existence, the supreme spacious of energy by Allameh Tabataba'i, Suhrawardi's illuminated metaphysical theory, etc.

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### **Introduction**

One of the issues raised in the field of epistemology about intellect; is the discussion of the functions of the intellect, which is also considered in the works of Islamic philosophers. What is meant by the function of the intellect is the same activity and effect that the intellect performs in acquiring knowledge and recognizing objects and facts.

Also, when we want to explore the features of a philosophical system in detail and show its independent identity; We must also know its progress and births. To know these philosophical births; First, we must know the various functions and actions of the philosophical intellect in order to carefully understand which action of the philosophical intellect is the result of this particular birth. Also, in order to improve the ability of thinking and philosophizing, the philosopher must know the capacities, functions and characteristics of the philosophical intellect in order to engage in philosophical streamlining with insight.

If we reduce the function of philosophical intellect only to the act of argumentation and its methodological issues; It causes ignoring the different steps of philosophizing and various actions of the philosophical intellect. For example, the theories of the prophet-philosopher of Farabi, the resurrection of the body of Mulla Sadra, etc. cannot be examined only based on the argumentation function of the philosophical intellect and the syllogistic method, and these theories have a wider function of argumentative intellect. Therefore, knowing the various actions of the philosophical intellect helps us to know more precisely the philosophy of Islamic philosophy.

Based on what was told, the problem in this research is:

1. What actions and functions does philosophical intellect include?
2. Has the application of these functions of intellect in Islamic philosophy led to births and innovations in Islamic philosophy?
3. Since the philosophical intellect is the subset of theoretical intellect; First, we must know the different actions of the theoretical intellect, so that we can then understand which of these

actions the philosophical intellect has. So, our other issue is: What actions does theoretical intellect have?

Some of the researches that have been done in this field are:

- Ayatollah Jafar Sobhani in the book *Theory of Al-Marafa* from pages 141-154 of the functions of the intellect, including deduction; Comprehension of general concepts; grouping of organisms; analyze; combination and integration; and understanding the innovative concepts of knowledge.

- Mohammad Hosseinzadeh in his article "intellect from the perspective of epistemology" has divided the various activities and functions of intellect into two general parts: concepts and propositions. The functions of intellect in the field of concepts include: building general concepts, understanding general concepts, dividing, analyzing, combining, defining, abstracting, and measuring or comparing, and in the field of propositions, it includes ruling on propositions and arguments.

- Abdul Hossein Khosropanah in the book *Philosophy of Cognition* has considered the functions of intellect into two parts: definitive functions and suspicious functions. The definite functions of intellect are: syllogism or deduction; Comprehension of general concepts; Authoring and grouping; analyze; understanding creative concepts; and combination. And the suspicious functions of the intellect are as follows: analogy; Experience; and induction.

- Seyyed Yadullah Yazdanpanah in chapter 4 of the book *Reflections on the Philosophy of Islamic Philosophy* has divided the types of actions of the theoretical intellect into three parts, which are: the actions of the intellect that realize the part of the certain knowledge of action, The intellectual foundations of certain knowledge and the actions of controversial intellect.

The intellectual actions that realize certain knowledge include the initiative intellect, the intuitive intellect, the analytical intellect, the general intellect, the descriptive intellect, the simulating intellect, the

argumentative intellect, and the integrative intellect. The questioning intellect, the probabilistic intellect, the theorizing intellect, and the syllogistic intellect are the intellectual actions that form the basis of certain knowledge. The actions of controversial intellect include: conventional intellect, theoretical intellect, and intellect.

In this article, using analytical and argumentative strategies and documentary methods, logical and syllogistic analysis, we introduce the functions of philosophical and theoretical intellect. According to our search, the introduction of the explanatory, interpretative, ideating, and critical functions of intellect is unprecedented, and the definitions presented of the descriptive, analytical, and theorizing functions of intellect are novel. Also, dealing with the births of Islamic philosophy based on the application of the functions of intellect is a new style of introducing the independent identity of Islamic philosophy.

### **Intellect**

Most intellectuals call a person with grace and correct thinking who seeks to acquire good things wise (Mulla Sadra, 1981: V. 3, 333). The word "intellect" is used in the terminology of Islamic philosophy in various meanings, which can be said to be as follows:

- 1- In the first sense, intellect is a total immaterial substance that does not inherently have time and space dimensions and does not belong to a physical or material being.
- 2- Intellect, in another sense, is equivalent to active intellect, which is immaterial substance of another, and the man's material intellect turns into the habitual intellect.
- 3- Intellect also is used in a term of the power of wisdom, which is one of the levels of the human soul and is divided into two faculties: "alemeh" (theoretical intellect) and "ameleh" (practical intellect).
- 4- In the fourth application, intellect is the theoretical intellect that is

the proof of descriptive propositions and what is and what is not.

- 5- Intellect means perceptions that are understood by the theoretical intellect; Both imaginations and affirmations, and whether perceptions are obtained by acquisition and opinion, or whether they are perceptions that have been realized in the soul according to primordial nature.
- 6- Intellect means the acquired perceptions that are understood by the theoretical intellect.
- 7- Intellect, in other terms, means the practical intellect, which is related to the perceptions, good or bad actions of a person. In fact, practical intellect has the ability to understand issues of should and shouldn't, value and origination (Avicenna, 1996: V. 2, 352-353; Mulla Sadra, 1981: v. 3, 418-420 and 430-431 and v. 8, 130-131; Mesbah Yazdi, 2015, v. 2, 164).

### **The Functions of philosophical intellect**

As stated, intellect in the sense of power of wisdom is divided into two parts, theoretical and practical intellect, and here we have taken intellect in the term theoretical intellect, and we mean philosophical intellect as one of the subsets of theoretical intellect. Philosophical intellect is a single truth that has many actions, functions and activities according to induction, which are:

#### **1. Perceptive Intellect**

One of the actions of the intellect is the perception of imaginations. It can be said that imagination is a simple phenomenon of the intellect that has the ability to talk about something beyond itself (Mesbah Yazdi, 2015, v. 1, 177). Imagination is the acquisition of the form of an object in the intellect while that does not have a sentence (Mulla Sadra, 1981: V. 1, 397 and V. 6, 257). Although Islamic philosophers return the origin of imagination to the senses and believe in the originality of the senses in imaginations; But in the end it is the intellect that performs the act of perceiving ideas.

## 2. Universal-Finder Intellect

Another function of the intellect is to perceive and achieve universal imaginations, which Avicenna considers to be the most important characteristics of the human soul. By constructing universal concepts and attaining them, the intellect can come to the understanding of imaginary unknowns and affirmed unknowns through them (Avicenna, 1983b: V. 2, 184).

Regarding the quality of perception of universal concepts, there are two theories:

### a. Theory of abstraction

The Peripatetic consider the stages of imagining knowledge to be three levels of sense, imagination and intellect, and consider the act of abstraction and transformation of the tangible and material into something sensible, among the tasks of the intellect; In this way, when sense turns into imagination and imagination into intellect, intellect abstracts from that meaning and obtains a form (Avicenna, 1983b: V. 2, 209-211 and 215-216; Tusi, 1982: 412-413). Based on this theory, intellect separates and differentiates individual and specific characteristics and commonalities between many things and then abstracts the general concept that can be applied to all things. This view believes in the creativity of the mind and that the intellect finds the power to design general concepts and forms by using the field of partial perceptions (Avicenna, 1983c: 205).

### b. Theory of existential promotion and transference

Mulla Sadra, in an innovative point of view, believes in the theory of the promotion and ascension of concepts (along with the soul) from sense to imagination and from imagination to intellect. He believes that the soul in the stage of sensation, according to the external sensation, produces a sense image form corresponding to it. The sense image is not transferred to the imaginary stage; Rather, when the power of imagination encounters a sense image, the sense image remains at its level and the soul is elevated to the level of an ideal by substantial motion and observes the imaginary

world, and according to the ideal existence of that sense image, Creates an imaginary image.

After that, when the power of wisdom encounters an imaginary image, the imaginary form remains in its rank and the soul is promoted to the intellectual rank with the substantial motion, and observes the intellectual ideal worlds, And the soul invents an intellectual image in accordance with the intellectual existence of that ideal image (Mulla Sadra, 1981: v. 1, 319 and 289-290 and v. 3, 280 and 360-367 and v. 9, 95-96).

As an example, Farabi and Khwaja Nasir al-Din Tusi, based on this function of intellect, under the influence of the teachings of Islam, introduced some general concepts and bring them into the discussions of Islamic philosophy. Farabi calls the active intellect the "Rooh Al-Amin" and "Rooh Al-Ghodos", and the rank in which the active intellect is realized is called the "Malakoot", (Farabi, 1996: 23; Farabi, 1991: 64) and Tusi believes that the whole intellect is what is referred to in the Qur'an as "Ketab Mobin" and " Loh Mahfouz" has been interpreted (Tusi, 1985: 479-481).

### 3. Divisive Intellect

One of the actions and functions of the intellect in the field of concepts and objects is the action of division. Dividing means dividing a concept or object into several contrasting things. According to Avicenna, the function of division of intellect, which plays an important role in knowing facts and concepts, is considered as one of the ways of acquiring knowledge and discovering unknown imaginations (Avicenna, n.d: V. 1, 128).

Division is into two types:

a. Dividing the whole into parts (natural division): In this division, the parts are either rational or elemental or industrial or external.

b. Universal division into details (logical division): that is, division of the universal concept into the things which are under it; Such as the division of existence into material and abstraction and the division of

material existence into inanimate, plant and animal (Muzaffar, n.d: 104 and 109-110).

One of the functions of intellect that is important in philosophy; It is a dividing action. Philosophical intellect in its divisive action makes logical and intellectual divisions and does not use elemental, industrial and external divisions. For example, based on the function of dividing the intellect, some divisions of existence such as the division into obligatory and possible; accidental or eternal; single and multiple; complete and incomplete; Cause and Effect; mental and external; Strong and weak have been mentioned for the first time in Islamic philosophy.

#### **4. Synthesizing intellect**

In order to reach a new concept, intellect combines and synthesizes imaginary concepts, which also uses sense in this function (Tusi, 1982: 376); For example, it combines the concepts of animal and thinker to reach the concept of human, or it combines the concepts of horse and wing and reaches the concept of a winged horse.

As an example, Ayatollah Javadi Amoli, unlike some philosophers who defined man as a talking animal; He considers the concept of human as the result of the combination of the two concepts of "living" as a genus and "divine" as a differentia. According to this view, humans are "Divine livings"; That is, the divine life and the spiritual divine are institutionalized in the nature of all human beings (Javadi Amoli, 2005: 150-151; Javadi Amoli, 2000: v. 1, 370).

#### **5. Concept-building intellect**

Conceptualization is one of the functions and actions of the intellect, which is considered a productive and creative activity; Like the production of sensible secondary philosophy and logic, which is one of the innovations of Islamic philosophers.

after the mind acquires concepts such as human, animal, and tree that it received from outside (first sensible); it compares these with concepts

such as this human, this animal, and this tree, and creates new concepts such as general, partial, intrinsic, accidental, etc (sensible secondary logic). The sensible secondary logics are completely rational, the product of the mind's activity and the invention of the intellect and have nothing to do with the outside. There are also concepts that the intellect constructs according to the source of external abstraction and with the help of that external thing. These concepts are called sensible secondary philosophy (such as existence, absence, cause, effect, possibility, necessity, etc.) which do not have specific external examples, but are described by external objects; For example, an outsider human accepts the description of the possible, but does not accept the description of the whole (Mulla Sadra, 1981: V. 1, 332; Motahari, 1976: V. 9, 396-403).

another conceptualizations of reason in Islamic philosophy is the concept of the perpetual origination (Hudoos-e dahri: Coming into Being through Perpetual Duration or Eternal Creation). Mir Damad is faced with hadiths that shows the world's pre-eternality, and on the other hand, he is dealing with philosophers who considered the issue of the pre-eternality of the world to be a bilateral polemical issues, or only believed in the essential contingency of the world, and on the other hand, he faces theologians who used to excommunicate philosophers because of their belief in the world's eternity. He comes to a new opinion for the convergence of the mentioned views, and by using the conceptualization function of intellect, he presents the concept of the perpetual origination (cf.: Mir Damad, 1988; 2002-2006: V. 2, Al-Ofoq Al-Mobin and V.1, Al-Imazat).

## **6. Integrating intellect**

One of the functions of intellect is that it integrates related objects or related imaginations or related affirmations and separates them from unrelated ones. The meaning of integration; Collecting related objects or imaginations or affirmations and categorizing and arranging them in a logical order under certain headings. Intellect groups various objects,

imaginations and affirmations and puts them under a single concept. As an example, it places soul, body, matter, form, etc. as a subset of the concept of substance, or concepts of general, partial, intrinsic, accidental, etc., as a subset of the sensible secondary logic concept, or the propositions of “Socrates is intelligent”, “Flower has six letters”, “David is the author” and so on puts them under the concept of singular proposition.

For example, It could be paid attention to this content that the Peripatetic philosophers have been placed substance, quantity, quality, time, place, posture, state, relation, action, and affection under the concept of category. This is while Ibn Sahlan Sawi states that he considers substance, quantity, quality and relation (other accidents) as a subset of the concept of categories, and Suhrawardi also considers substance, quantity, quality, relation and motion under the category concept (Sawi, 2004: 103-131; Suhrawardi, 1994: v. 1, 11 and 146 and 279-280).

### **7. Affirming intellect**

After imagining the meanings and concepts, it is time to affirm them. affirming means imagining the two sides of the proposition and establishing a measurement and comparison, and actually understanding the connection or lack of connection between the two and to sentence this connection or lack of connection. Affirming is connected to giving a sentence, which is either the sentence itself or it concomitances a sentence (Mulla Sadra, 1981: V. 6, 257; 1992: 315-316 and 312). At this stage, the intellect sometimes sentences and affirms on its own, sometimes it seeks help from the senses; But the sentencer and affirmer is the intellect itself.

The human intellect can compare and measure the imaginations in relation to each other and then decide on the connection or lack of connection between them and then obtain new knowledge. Therefore, this function of intellect (affirming intellect) can be considered as comparing and sentencing intellect.

## 8. Inquiring intellect

When a human is faced with an event or a problem, he can easily pass it by or ask himself and others about the how, why, etc. of this event or problem and turn the problem into an issue. Passing from problem to issue is an important step that intellect achieves by using logical tools and issue formulation and detailed problem analysis, and questioning and issue-building are of the functions of intellect.

If a person is never surprised by anything and sees everything as "normal"; He will never ask questions and he will not have scientific and knowledge progress. In fact, until there is no question, the boundaries of science and knowledge will not increase. The problem amazes the intellect and the amazement of the intellect leads to questions and issues. If the action of questioning is not in philosophy, philosophical thought will not be active and philosophy will come to a standstill. Philosophical astonishment is issue-creating and philosophical issue is also astonishing. Questioning and wondering are both activities of the intellect, and philosophy without questioning and wondering is meaningless, empty and stagnant.

Some experts in Islamic philosophy are of the opinion that most of the issues in Islamic philosophy that form its backbone, including mental existence, is genuine existence and creditable nature, or is it original nature and creditable existence? Does the movement in addition to the width also flow in the ink? And...; There are issues that have been raised for the first time in the Islamic world (cf. Motahari, 1376: V. 5: 30-32).

Some experts in Islamic philosophy are of the opinion that most of the issues in Islamic philosophy that form its backbone, including mental existence, is existence original and quiddity mentally-posedness or vice versa? Does the movement in addition to the accident also flow in the substance? And so on; There are issues that have been raised for the first time in the Islamic world (cf. Motahari, 1976: V. 5: 30-32).

Based on the research that has been done; Avicenna seeks to face new issues and also by proposing obligatory and possible innovative topics

and issues, accidental and eternal, revelation and its branches and resurrection; has taken important steps in metaphysics change and evolution. It may be thought that the volume of these new topics in metaphysics is insignificant, but this is not the right idea; Because by looking at Aristotle's metaphysics, we can see that the volume of the main topics of Aristotle's metaphysics (by removing the history of philosophy before Aristotle and his criticism of Plato and removing repetitive contents) is also insignificant. The main topics of Aristotle's metaphysics are stated in ten sections, but Avicenna added at least four topics to it, which means that he has added 40% to its topics and issues. (cf. Kord Firoozjaee, 2008)

obligatory and possible; accidental or eternal

Another example is the subject of "mental existence" that can be seen among the works of Avicenna (Avicenna, 1983c: 34); But for the first time, this issue was presented independently by Fakhr al-Din al-Razi and then by Khwaja Nasiruddin. Here, the issue is whether, when we perceive external objects, an image of them is reflected in our mind? If it is reflected; What is the relationship between the mental image and the perceived object? Are they identical to each other regarding to their quiddity or not? (Raazi, 1990: V. 1, 41-43; Tusi, 1986: 106-107)

## **9. Descriptive Intellect**

In this field, the intellect is guided towards knowing what and how the subject is and what the phenomenon or thought is and how it is and reports it. Descriptive intellect examines the current state of the phenomenon or thought and explores its characteristics, processes, trends and the relationship between its variables and systematically describes them. Descriptive intellect is questioning the features, scopes, effects, symptoms of a phenomenon and its relationship with other phenomena - whether the relationship is direct or inverse. Also, if the phenomenon we are studying is text; Descriptive intellect seeks to introduce the completely accordance referent and clear implicated referent text.

Here, the intellect may try to identify the relationship of one phenomenon with other phenomena; But this identification remains at the level of reporting and describing these ratios (what it is) and does not investigate and identify the causes and proofs between these ratios. In other words, the role of intellect here is the role of mere observation and reporting and nothing more. In this function, intellect only reaches partial propositions and cannot reach general ones.

For example, Sheikh Eshraq describes the wise and its five types by using this function of intellect and says that some wises are strong and deep only in purifying the soul and revelation and intuition; Some people are only strong in arguments and debates, but they lack divine and purifying; Some are deep and strong in both branches of argumentation and intuition; A group is strong and deep in divine, but they are average or weak in discussion; And some groups are strong in the discussion, but they are average or weak in the divine. According to Suhrawardi, the divine caliph and worldly leader is a wise who is knowledgeable and profound in mystical and intellectual issues and gains positions (Suhrawardi, 1994: v. 2, 12).

### **10. Explanatory Intellect**

Explanation is a search and exploration to find the cause of a phenomenon or idea in the base of general laws. Causal mechanism is a series of events that have a legal order that starts with the explainer and ends with the explained phenomenon or idea. (Little, 1990: 13-15) Explanatory intellect pursues the why processing of phenomena or ideas; That is, the intellect seeks to answer the question why this phenomenon has been realized or why this thought is like this?

A cause in philosophy is an entity (non-argumentative causes and factors) without which the realization of another entity is impossible; It means any entity that another entity is somehow dependent on. Based on the explanatory function of intellect, Islamic philosophers have achieved significant initiatives, such as the separation of real causality and

preparatory causality, the separation between the cause of existence and the cause of quiddity, the criterion of the necessity of the effect for the cause, proofing about the necessity of the cause and effect, Proposing new arguments about the impossibility of infinite regress and circle in the causes, similitude and relevance between the cause and the effect, considering the material cause to be an accident (essential contingency), the discussion of the precedence or delay of the ultimate cause compared to the effect are among the new achievements of Peripatetic Muslims (Avicenna, 1983c: Al-Maghale 6, Al-fasl 1 and Al-Maghale 2, Al-fasl 4; 1996, V. 3, 67-78 and 194-202).

For example, Greek peripatetic philosophers have mainly dealt with causality in the meaning of genesis (takwin); But nothing can be found in their works about creation from nothing (creating something without previous matter). The meaning of takwin is the genesis of something from another thing, that is, something is made from the material that already exists. This is despite the fact that Muslim philosophers divided God's creations into two categories: accidental and eternal, and believed that accidental creatures are created from previous matter; But eternal creatures are created without previous matter. The first type of creation is called "takwin" and the second type is called "origination (Ibda)". Separation between origination and takwin is one of the innovative achievements of Islamic philosophers (Avicenna, 1996: Al-Namat 5, Al-fasl 10).

### **11. Interpretive Intellect**

Human actions (both written texts and visible human behaviors) indicate a specific purpose and target; Because man is a being with awareness, thought and will and has meaningful behaviors. Man does his work based on his awareness and needs, and he has a purpose for every voluntary action. Therefore, the subject of human sciences is the meaningful behaviors of humans, and the goal in these sciences is to interpret and discover the meaning of these behaviors. The explanation is to obtain the

common causes of an accident from accidents; While interpretation is the discovery of the meaning of an accident or action in a specific social context (Wright, 1971: 5-6).

Based on what has been said, the interpretive mind is faced with a set of meaningful elements that tries to reveal the meaningful links between them and to interpret the phenomenon or thought. In this action, the intellect has the text in its focus and seeks to interpret, understand and reveal its hidden angles through contemplation. In fact, the interpretive intellect seeks to convey the meaning of the text and approaches the referent that the text tells about.

As an example, Farabi in works such as *Resala Maghala fi Aghraz Maba'd Al-tabiaa*; *Falsafa Aflatun wa Ajzaaha*; *Sharh Resala Zinun al-kabir Al-yunani*; *Zohur Al-falsafa*, etc. by using the interpretive function of intellect, explained and interpreted Greek philosopher's views and used this function of intellect in order to give birth to Islamic philosophy. For the Islamic society's need for social systems, using the interpretive function of intellect and based on a religious approach, Farabi explains the views of Plato's political philosophy and presents a new reading of Plato's political philosophy (cf. Farabi, 1996; Farabi, 1991). Also, by writing the book *Aljamo Bayna Raa'ye Al-hakimayn* he explained the views of Plato and Aristotle and presented his view of the unity of philosophy and considered the differences of philosophers to be superficial. For example, Farabi regarding the issue of Plato's ideals, which Aristotle rejected in metaphysics book, but commented on its existence in the book *Uthulujiyya (Theology)*<sup>1</sup>; takes such a position that according to the appearance of these two views:

a) or these two views are contradictory; But considering Aristotle's greatness in philosophy and the greatness of the issue of ideals for him, this possibility is very unlikely and far from the mind.

b) or some of them are Aristotle's words and other parts are not his

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1. Farabi mistakenly considered this book among Aristotle's works.

words; But according to the books that cited these words, this possibility is more unlikely than the previous possibility

c) or contrary to the apparent contradiction, they have meanings and interpretations that lead to compatibility and adaptation; So, this possibility is correct and by stating the meanings and interpretations of these sayings, doubt and astonishment will be removed (cf. Farabi, 1984: 105-106).

## **12. Analytical Intellect**

Another function of the intellect is the analytical function. The analytical intellect is based on the analysis of a phenomenon or subject into parts and seeks to know its presuppositions, accessories and consequences. In this function, the intellect tries to find the simplest constituents of any phenomenon or subject, as well as its presuppositions, accessories, and consequences. Based on this action, in every compound issue we must find the extended elements that make up the absolute and pillar of the issue and give us the answer. For this, the complex issue must be broken down into simpler ones and again these into simpler issues, and in this way, completely extensive and indivisible elements that the issue depends on will be gotten. Therefore, the analytical intellect creates different states, parts and possibilities.

Avicenna has greatly benefited from this function of intellect. Based on this action, he defines the subject and separates and divides the different aspects, possibilities and divisions and analyzes, examines and compares them and criticizes and judges the different possibilities and situations. Avicenna rejects all the assumed states until finally only one state remains, and then he proves the truth of that state with arguments, and then he also answers the possible problems of his point of view (cf. Avicenna, 1983c: Al-Maghale 1, Al-fasl 1 and 2 and Al-Maghale 5, Al-fasl 1; Avicenna, 1984, 4-10).

For example, Avicenna, using this function of intellect, has analyzed the existence of universals as follows:

- 1 -First, it expresses different universal meanings;
- 2 -Then he specifies a meaning for discussion;
- 3 -Then he separates the two directions of the universal meaning;
- 4 -In the following, he states that the place of discussion of meaning is the essence on which the universal description is accidented on (that is, the place of discussion is natural universal, not logical universal).
- 5 -Then again, for the natural universal, he puts forward three different types of validity: negatively-conditional validity, non-conditioned validity, and conditioned-by-something validity.
- 6- Then he examines the sentences and accessories of each of these validities and in this way rejects the Plato's ideal's external existence (Avicenna, 1983c: Al-Maghale 5, Al-fasl 1).

### 13. Argumentative Intellect

Argument is an active epistemological function of the intellect in the sense of transferring the intellect from the known to the unknown and from the premises to the conclusion, and it consists of providing a series of propositions and arranging and composing them to achieve the desired (discovering the unknown proposition). With the help of argument, one can get a truth as the result of another truth.

Argumentative intellect when it encounters a phenomenon or an idea; It is faced with the question of why the phenomenon or thought is like this or why this phenomenon has been become into existence? And what is meant by this question, is the proof and justification that shows the validity of the statement - for example (why A is B?) Every answer given to this question has at least two premises (because A is C and C is B)-. In this action, it seeks to prove and justify the claim.

Arguments are of two types: immediate and mediated

a. Immediate argument: It is an argument that is based on only one proposition and the conclusion is made only through one proposition. The types of immediate arguments are mainly as follows: 1. Conversion; 2. Contraposition; 3. Obversion; 4. Contradiction in propositions. For

example, Argumentative intellect in the action of immediate; "Contradiction in propositions" derives from the falsity of a proposition, the truth of its opposite, and deduces the falsity of its opposite from the truth of a proposition.

b. Mediated argument: An argument that requires more than one proposition to reach a conclusion and consists of at least two propositions. Argumentative intellect in its mediated function is divided into three more detailed functions:

1- syllogistic intellect: an expression composed of several propositions which, when assumed to be accepted and certain, inherently requires another proposition. syllogism is a type of argumentation in which the mind reaches a partial conclusion from a general sentence; In fact, syllogism means deriving the sentence of a specific (partial) subject from a general sentence.

2- Inductive reasoning: Logical induction is the process from the specific to the general and the examination of examples and details to study generalities. It should be noted that induction is not just the observation of a few details; Rather, induction is the generalization of a sentence that is obtained after observing a few details, and the basis of induction is the generalization of the sentence (Bahmanyar, 1996: 187-187).

Islamic philosophers do not consider the validity of incomplete induction and consider it to be different from experience. They consider experience to be authoritative and they consider it to open the way to certain knowledge and knowledge as a general sentence. Achieving empirical propositions is one of the acts of comparative argument. experienced; They are self-evident propositions that are grasped by humans through repeated experiments and senses and hidden syllogism. (Farabi, 1987: v. 1, 271 and v. 2, 174 and 528; Avicenna, 1983a: 95-96; Avicenna, 1996: v. 1, 216 and 230-233; Suhrawardi, 1994: v. 2, 41; Tusi, 1982: 373-374; Mulla Sadra, 2003: V. 1, 29).

3- Analogical intellect: the analogical process of sentence is from part

to part; That is, to sentence two partial cases that are common in terms of the cause and have similarities, give them one sentence. In most cases, in one sentence, the sentence and the form are definite, and in the other one, it is missing, which means that the sentence is transmitted from the definite to the other. analogy is a psychological passage and does not have a logical and certain aspect.

According to our belief in the argumentative function of intellect; The functions of immediate argument are fully used in philosophy, but in the functions of mediated argument, only the function of argumentative syllogism has a certain place in philosophy, and the two functions of induction and analogy are not certain.

As an example, the arguments made by philosophers of transcendental wisdom to prove the originality of existence and derivation of quiddity are among the argumentative functions of intellect which have been made novel arguments on novel issue (cf. Mulla Sadra, 1981: V. 1, 38-39 and 43; Mulla Sadra, 1963, 9-18; Fayyazi, 2009). Also, in order to prove necessary-existants, Avicenna proposed the proof of necessity and possibility in a valuable innovation and called it "the argument of the truthful (seddighin)" (Avicenna, 1996: V. 3, 66); Of course, Mulla Sadra has presented another argument based on his philosophical principles and he is of the opinion that this argument deserves to be called Seddighin (Mulla Sadra, 1981: V. 6, 13-29).

Another example of the application of the argumentative function of intellect in Islamic philosophy is that Avicenna has rejected and criticized the existence of Plato's ideals by presenting arguments (Avicenna, 1983c: Al-Maghale 7, Al-fasl 2-3); However, Sheikh Eshraq, by supporting Plato's point of view, has presented a novel argument to prove the existence of the world of ideals (Suhrawardi, 1994: v. 1, 68, 457-461 and V. 2, 154-161). Then, considering Suhrawardi's reasons to be incorrect, Mulla Sadra put forward new arguments to prove the Platonic view and presented new explanations in this regard with his unique existential perspective (Mulla Sadra, 1996, 285; Mulla Sadra, 1981, v. 2, 46-81).

#### **14. Ideational intellect**

When a person faces a problem or issue; Intellect provides an initial idea, answer, and solution, and then, in the next step, this intellect, of course, with its other functions, can check whether it is correct or wrong. Here we are not dealing with theory; Rather, we are facing an idea and a possible answer. It can be said that in this action, the intellect is illuminative in a way; It is as if the intellect made an illumination an idea came out.

This idea may be based on previous thought and study; It may also be without context and previous thought, such as guessing. In fact, guess is one of the aspects of the ideational intellect. In guessing, there is no need to think and study, and as soon as the intellect encounters a problem, it presents its answer in the form of an idea. Avicenna considers guess in the sense that the human intellect without having the necessary prerequisites; it got the middle term and the result at once. it considers conjecture as a kind of divine revelation and intellectual connection (cf. Avicenna, 1983a: 59; 2021: 101-102 and 127; 1996: V. 2, 358 and 354-353).

As an example, Allameh Tabataba'i based on the same function of intellect put forth the idea that if we accept matter (primary tiny objects) they can be converted into energy and are actually a dense collection of energy particles; In philosophical discussions, we should consider "energy" as a supreme species that is after substance and before material (cf. Tabataba'i, 2008: V. 1, 166).

#### **15 .The theorist's intellect**

Theorizing is another function of philosophical intellect, which is very important in science and philosophy. Theory is a coherent set of concepts, assumptions and propositions that a. be methodical; b. reasonability, not based on the cause; J. Be competent in three things:

1 .Systematization between variables (that is, it can systematize different variables and create a system of variables through the relationships it establishes between variables)

2 .Responding to issues (responding to issues means predictive power; the more a theory has a range of responding to issues, the more successful that theory is)

3 .Explanation or interpretation or change of facts.

Creative thinking and theoretician's intellect play the main role in theorizing; Because theory is born of the intellect (Khosropanah, 2021: 10 and 19).

Islamic philosophers have greatly benefited from the theorizing function of intellect and have presented many innovative ideas in the heart of Islamic philosophy. One of these theorizations can be considered the metaphysical theory of light of Suhrawardi, which he considers to be the result of the stages and rays of divine light, and in which he explains and interprets the whole existence based on light and darkness. The system of illuminative philosophy bases itself on this theory (cf.: Suhrawardi, 1994: Hikmat al-Eshraq).

Another theory in Islamic philosophy is Bodily Origination and Spiritual Subsistence of the Soul of Mulla Sadra. He considers the soul as "Bodily Originated and Spiritual Subsistent" that the two pillars of substantial motion and gradation in the existence of the soul are extracted from this theory; In this way, the existence of the soul has several stages, which is physical in the first stage, and then, based on the substantial motion, it gradually goes through the stages of the plant, animal, and human soul while maintaining unity and becomes more intensive until it becomes wholly immaterial (Mulla Sadra, 1981, v. 8, 346-347 and 330 and v. 7, 126 and v. 5, 289; Mulla Sadra, 1996, 290-291 and 88).

## **16 .Critical intellect**

Based on this function, when a person comes across a description, explanation, interpretation, analysis, argument, idea or theory about a phenomenon or thought and sees it as flawed and disordered; Then, using the critic's intellect, he diagnoses, criticizes and refutes that claim. The main goal of the critic's intellect is to criticize and refute a point of view

or theory by identifying challenges, shortcomings, problems and inconsistencies that can be related to 1. Presuppositions and foundations of the point of view or theory; 2. The point of view or theory itself; 3. The function of the view or theory; and 4. The effects and results of the perspective or theory.

It can be said that inconsistency and incoherence are divided into two internal and external parts:

a. Internal inconsistency and incoherence: Sometimes a proposition in a point of view or theory may be inconsistency with the introduction or preliminaries or the conclusion of the same point of view or theory. It is as if the critic's intellect shows that the premises of the theory of substantial motion of Mulla Sadra are not consistent with each other.

b. External inconsistency and incoherence: Sometimes a point of view or theory or their premises may not be consistent with other points of view or theories or logical rules. It is as if the critic's intellect shows that the theory of substantial motion and its premises are not consistent with the anthropological theories or the views of new physics.

Islamic philosophers and thinkers have criticized the views of Greek philosophers, Islamic philosophers, theologians, Western philosophers, etc. by using the critical function of intellect, and by using this function, they have contributed to the birth of Islamic philosophy. Examples of this intellectual action can be seen in works such as Ghazaali's *Tahaafot Al-falaasefah*, Fakh al-Din al-Razi's commentary on Avicenna's *Al-esharat*, Talkhis al-Mohssal, Mosaree al-Mosaree, *The Principles of Philosophy and the Method of Realism*, etc. For example, Mesbah Yazdi has criticized some of the epistemological views of Western philosophers based on the foundations of Islamic philosophy in his book "Philosophy education" and proved his views (Mesbah Yazdi, 2015: Lessons 12-20).

### **Conclusion**

- The functions and actions of the philosophical intellect include: perception of ideas; Understanding and achieving general concepts;

dividing a concept or object into several different things; combining conceptual concepts; Creating new concepts, such as turning the present knowledge into an acquisition and producing secondary philosophical and logical sensible; Coherence between related objects or related imaginations or related affirmations; to affirming; questioning; describing phenomena or ideas; explaining phenomena or ideas; interpretation of phenomena or thoughts; Analyzing phenomena or ideas; argumentation of phenomena or ideas; ideation; theorizing; and criticizing the description, explanation, interpretation, analysis, argument, idea or theory.

-the functions of perceiving imaginations, finding general concepts, dividing, combining, conceptualizing, integrating and affirming; The first actions are the basis of human intellect and no human can enter the stage of understanding, science and philosophy without using these actions.

- Philosophical intellect in divisive function; It makes logical and rational divisions and does not use elemental, industrial and external divisions.

-in the argumentative function of intellect; The action of immediate argument is fully used in philosophy, but in mediate argument, only the function of argumentative syllogism has a certain place in philosophy, and the two functions of induction and analogy are not certain.

- If philosophical intellect does not have the functions of description, explanation, interpretation, analysis, argumentation, ideation, theorization and criticism; Science and philosophy did not come into being, and new scientific and philosophical views and schools were not proposed.

- The application of the functions of intellect in Islamic philosophy has led to many births, some of which can be called Bringing some universal concepts in Philosophy; Presenting some divisions of existence by Islamic philosophers; Definition of human as divine living by Ayatollah Javadiamoli; Conceptualization of the hudoos-e dahri by Mir Damad; Integration of four concepts under the concept of category by Saavi and five concepts under the concept of category by Suhrawardy; Presenting the issue of mental existence by Fakhr al-Din al-Razi; Description of wise

by Suhrawardi; Separation between origination and genesis by Islamic philosophers; A new reading of Plato's political philosophy by Farabi; Analysis of the existence of universals by Avicenna; The arguments made by philosophers of transcendental wisdom to prove the originality of existence and derivation of quiddity; The excellent spacious of energy by Allameh Tabataba'i; Suhrawardi's illuminated metaphysical theory (Nouri Suhrawardi's theory of metaphysics) and criticism of some epistemological views of Western philosophers based on the foundations of Islamic philosophy by Mesbah Yazdi.

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# Ontology of Human's Eschatological Observations from the View of Mulla Sadra

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### ABSTRACT

The afterlife (also the world to come) has been one of the major humans' concerns throughout history. Although heavenly religions and Islamic philosophy have recognized the very foundation of the Hereafter, there are questions surrounding the existence and characteristics of that world. In the meantime, there is a myriad of theories about it, and Mulla Sadra's view is a key theory here. This research analyzes the philosophical basics of Mulla Sadra's views to distinguish his perspective from those of others and to portray a different aspect of the world-to-come observations. The findings suggested that Mulla Sadra argues that man achieves actualization over time and transfers to the world to come by abandoning the matter. In that world, there are no objects for man to observe; rather, he will create all his observations by himself, with every human creating a more transcendental world made of imaginary perceptions which, unlike imaginary observations in this world, assumes an external reality which is also formed in the existence and life of the human psyche.

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**Introduction**

A major philosophical discussion surrounding life after death is the explanation of such issues as the existence of the world to come, type of the human existence in that world, humans' relations with each other and other creatures in that world, and the existence of things which are observed and perceived by humans, etc. Debates over the world after death is so philosophically critical that they can be regarded as a fruit of metaphysical and philosophical discussions, including Islamic philosophy; in this connection, Mulla Sadra bases his eschatology on the principles which result from all his philosophical discussions.

In this way, the spiritual (soul-based) and corporeal theory of human eschatology is what constitutes the foundations of analyses, though the ontology of human observations has received little attention. However, this subject is a critical point and discussed by people who believe in the afterlife. Having said this, man will observe gardens, rivers, wine, heavenly Huris, snakes, scorpions, fire, etc., when experiencing rewards or punishment for what he did in this world. However, the Islamic philosophy initially accepted the spiritual afterlife through interpretation and simile, as if they could serve as concrete mundane descriptions that God used to encourage man to another world where no word is ever able to convey their true senses. However, with Mulla Sadra's corporeal eschatology, this issue cannot be easily resolved as various principles should be put forward to explain what man will observe in the other world.

Although Mulla Sadra recognizes the corporeal afterlife, he denounces the materiality of that world in a way it dis-resemble the current mundane affairs. Thus, seeking to justify it based on the soul actualization. This aggravates this subject under study and raises serious questions: How can one regard his own eschatological observations as real while regarding them as immaterial and simply attribute them to soul actualization? How

does soul actuality work? Where is the place for these observations? And do these observations exist within the souls or outside them?

### **Theories on eschatological observations**

There are four major theories over eschatology.

1. What is entirely pertinent to eschatology is its concrete characteristics resembling those of this world (Bahrani, p. 157; Taftazani, 1998, p. 83; Helli, 1995, p. 405 and 406; Ershad Al-Talebin, p. 405), which is concluded from the theories of most Theologians (Motakallem). Consistent with this perspective, human observations of the afterlife will be exactly the same as his observations in the pre-death state; i.e., it will be another material world which man goes to and experiences the rewards and suffering of that world through his senses.
2. Some believe that the afterlife is intellectual and spiritual and consider partial man's observations, as demonstrated in the Koran, to be simply an expressive and figurative statement aimed at encouraging and warning people. Because the human mind cannot perceive the very essence of the problem, there is no choice but to follow a thinking style commensurate with the public understanding (Ibn Sina, 2003, p. 103). This is a perspective put forward by the Peripatetic School which maintains that the realm of reasoning only embraces the basics; thus, no partial observations will be available to man to experience partial rewards and agonies, such as gardens, rivers, wives; rather, there will be a general perception of agonies and pleasure.
3. Concerning the heaven and hell of undeveloped people, thinkers like Farabi and Ibn Sina argue that most people have illusory and imaginary happiness because they are mainly preoccupied with corporeal affairs and lack an understanding of what transcends them. They also provide theories in this connection (Ibn Sina, 1984, p. 114; Ghotb Al-Din Razi, 1996, Vol. 3, p. 356). This

eschatological view holds that there is some image that is not real, though affecting one's suffering and pleasure.

4. Eschatological affairs are immaterial and externally concrete affairs; however, they are corporeal affairs as stated by religious texts (Sadr Al-Din Shirazi, 1975; p. 402-407). According to this view, since eschatological affairs are immaterial, they cannot be observed with visual senses such as eyes as the mundane affairs are observed; this is because this kind of observation requires specifically incremental actions and reactions established between the visual senses and the to-be-observed object, and these reactions need changes realizable in material affairs. Hence, an immaterial affair is not necessarily to be observed by a material tool. Another key component is that these observations have an external objective existence which makes it different from the third view. However, as will be discussed, eschatological observations are, like the third theory, regarded to be imaginary observations; thus, these two views are considered to resemble each other. However, the *imaginary* which is put forward by these two theories is a completely different concept. For the third theory, imaginary denotes illusion and unreal, while for the fourth theory, it is a kind of real perception transcending Sensual perceptions.

Another component in this regard is the corporeality of the affairs. One may encounter the question of how one may regard an immaterial affair as based on the first component, but to assign it corporeality. To answer this, one would need to understand that materiality refers to changes a creature can achieve, whereas corporeality simply denotes the capability of triad dimensions of length, width, and depth that occur for a specific object and are distinguished from others. Thus, a creature with form may either have a varying essence, i.e., a material affair or a non-varying essence. In fact, Mulla Sadra's position holds that eschatological

observations, while being philosophical, should not be regarded as non-corporeal; because this may arise a wrong idea that God, who guides mankind, expresses unreal and fake discussions. This subject distinguishes it from the second theory.

**Table 1: Comparison of popular theories on eschatological observations**

Theories	Realm	Type of observations	Material perception	Partial or detail	Relation with religion
Most theologians	All people	Sensual observations	Material perceptions	Partial	Consistent with the religious text
Peripatetic proponents	Some people (using the second theory)	Intellectual observations	Abstract perception	Detailed	Inconsistent : using simile and metaphor to interpret religious texts
Thinkers like Farabi and Ibn Sina	Incomplete hell and paradise (held by most people)	illusory observations	Material perception through belonging to heavenly objects	Partial	Inconsistent : illusory and unrealistic ideas
Mulla Sadra and his proponents	Most people	Imaginary observations	Abstract observations	partial	Consistent with the religious text

### Essential principles

To explain his views on the world after death, Mulla Sadra provides basic principles in his various works. He predominately aimed to substantiate the corporeal afterlife and elucidate the objectivity of an identity that the eschatological being bears with its own mundane being, which is a different goal we have been looking for. Hence, the principles which pertain to our current discussion (commensurate with eschatological observations) are as follow:

- **First principle:** Every material being is potentiated with its form than with its matter, thereby remaining in its objectivity, assuming its separation from matter. The only factor which makes forms depending on the matter is their disconnection from a non-reasonable being, a being that requires a matter to convey its capability of change and lays the ground for the fulfillment of its talents under appropriate time and place.
- **Second principle:** Every object is identified by its own specific existence than by transforming identity-giving states (Avarez Mushakheseh).
- **Third principle:** Creatures in this material world lack a fixed existence, with their existential essence being inter linked and capable of potentiation. The more developed the existential essence, the more developed their conducts.
- **Fourth principle:** Imagination creates imaginary forms upon the will, without needing matter or previous predisposition when it creates these forms. These forms are non-existent in a place like a brain or heavenly objects (third view in Table 1) or illusory worlds like those of the ghosts; rather, they are self-consistent, though not reincarnating in it, as the beginning of the creation of the matter world by its transcendental causes took place without the matter and its previous predisposition. These imaginary forms have a poor existence but are capable of finding

externally stronger existence than material forms; thus, if man possesses the necessary ability in this world, he will be capable of creating externally self-consistent creatures.

- **Fifth principle:** Soul, falling under the imagination category, is an essence higher than the concrete body, which is also separate from the concrete body from an existential and action point of view, thereby remaining with the disintegration of the body.
- **Sixth principle:** Natural and real perceptions are not distinct phenomena of human essence and his existential identity. They exist within human essence. These perceptions in the world rely on the contribution of the matter and a specific situation due to the potentiality of the soul.
- **Seventh principle:** Psychic states are associated with external effects, which are substantiated with various factors such as changing facial color, anxiety, fear, wrath, and shyness. Now, if a soul belongs to decaying body because of weakness, it'll be influenced by the material body, but if a soul does not belong to a body due to its strength, it'll have the dignity of issuing a plan to the body, without the contribution of the material or being affected by body (Sadr Al-Din Shirazi, 1965, p. 245-249; Ibid, 2007, p. 342-346, Ibid, 2014, p. 161-171).

### **Post-death Human survival and his transforming observations**

The form of a being carries over its actualization and fulfillment, as based on the first principle, while the matter only embraces his later development capabilities, as the matter takes all of its existence through its form. This is a pervasive rule for all material phenomena. For instance, suppose an element like water. The form it has, i.e., being water, constitutes all its actualization and existence, though the water is capable of developing into vapor. However, this very capability enjoys a portion of existence through its own existence of water. Now, if a being lacks a development capability, i.e., one that gets out of being matter, will it

annihilate? This requirement does not certainly ensue and remains objectively. In his developmental process following acquiring the actualization, not necessarily all the actualizations, man will arrive at a stage where he must separate from the matter and the material body, and this arrival ushers in the stage of death, to be regarded as material-dimension death. After this stage, the human soul remains objectively, though different from a previous stage and in a specific world of its own beyond the matter world, which may affect all of its states, including its observations. Thus, different observations should be considered for this being with a different existential position.

The difference between human observations in the current world and the world to come does not ensue a problem and does not denote that the after-death human is the before-death non-human, because as consistent with the second principle, every being is identified with his own specific existence. However, the states and characteristics of his existence can change and disintegrate. That the human's eschatological observations differ from those of this world does not denote he has lost his identity; because he has preserved his existential principle and taken on specific states commensurate with the current existence.

On the other hand, as per the third principle, this difference is based on the developmental movement, which is a key principle in Mulla Sadra's theory. Creatures can take on existential development and transform into the plant from a lifeless matter and into an animal from a plant or into a human position from an animal state. They can develop into humanity in a way to abandon their material body and observations which do belong to the world outside but to create observations they have originated it.

The developmental movement also takes place in the transition from the world to the afterlife, and it is the man who achieves stronger observations than those of this world.

The example of this world to the afterlife human is the example of a child to an adult who, in his material world, needed a cradle called the place and a nanny called time, and when he developed his essence, he

came out of this worldly existence and moved to the afterlife existence. Mulla Sadra states: in this natural process, there is neither a difference between the just and oppressor nor between a happy and a wretch (Sadr Al-Din Shirazi, 1978, p. 411). This is because despite the fact there is no conflict between existential perfection and happiness or agony, this existential development results in the intensity of suffering and perception of the agonizing affairs.

### **Existential relation between mundane and eschatological observations**

Speaking of different observations, it is argued whether human's eschatological observations are of a completely new type or pertain to his mundane observations. This subject is elucidated using the fifth and sixth principles. First of all, imagination, which is the origin of eschatological observations, always accompany him in this world; this is because after the sensual relationship is severed from external objects, every human being will be able to imagine them and see, hear or even smell them while dreaming without using the senses.

Thus, his partial perceptions are not reduced to feelings alone; rather, he has some particle perceptions through imagination. Second, the human's real perceptions and observations in this world are not objects in the material world; rather, they are scientific forms of those objects which are observed and perceived by humans. The same is also true of the eschatological observations, i.e., man makes observations within his sensual levels. As long as the human soul belongs to the body, his feeling is beyond his imagination because he needs an external matter as well as some specific conditions for feelings; however, he does need none of which in imagination. In the meantime, when the man is out of this world, externality between imagination and feeling is annulled because the imagination, which is a reservoir for senses, gets stronger in the development process and then sees through imagination what can be seen with eyes (Sadr Al-Din Shirazi, 2014, vol. 9, p. 167; Ibid, n.d., pp. 133).

On the other hand, even though the eschatological human loses a material world-based feeling, this does not mean his perceptions suffer from defects, which may contradict the developmental movement. Thus, imagination replaces feelings, and imagination unifies in a transcendental existence; hence, imagination controls feelings at a more developed state.

### **Origin and external fulfillment of eschatological observations**

In this world, the human soul affects the surrounding environment to some extent, which was discussed with some examples in the seventh principle (e.g., effects from the human soul involve imaginary forms). As well, the fourth principle regarded the dependence of imaginary forms on the human soul to be an issuing rise. Although the soul's creative power for the creation of these imaginary observations is poor at first, the less the soul is preoccupied with corporeal affairs, and the more imaginary forms will be consolidated, thus, unifying its power, science, and wants. Thus, perception of its wants is its power over them and the way they are readied. The soul uses the imagination to create its eschatological affairs in the form of imaginary forms. Thus, the soul, having been separated from the body, imagines its essence exactly like its mundane form. It also imagines the affairs which are commensurate with rewards and punishment, thus revealing all the affairs (Sadr Al-Din Shirazi, 2014, p. 166-169; Ibid, 1984, p. 596 and 597, Ibid, 1978, p. 409 to 429).

Thus, human observations in the world to come is of imagination (however, few people have intellectual observations). Human's imaginary observations in the world will eventually rely on external observations and take form accordingly; because the soul in this world has potentiality in terms of imagination and requires actualization, with its internal characteristics established over time. When the soul enters another world, the same characteristics it already has will be revealed. Despite the fact that the human soul is the doer and origin of its imaginary observations in the world, it also requires other objects which are beyond its imagination to form its existence. On the other hand, the human soul actualization is

potentiated in the world to come and creates all of its observations in an imaginary way without help from its outside environment.

To sum up, for the Mulla Sadra School, eschatological affairs have perceivable existence, actually constituting the spiritual imagination and intellectual reasoning of humans. Eschatological observations are not the same as mundane observations. Whatever exists in the world has a corporeal matter which takes on an externally-mediated form or soul; in fact, living matter has an accidental life, as all eschatological affairs have essential life (Sadr Al-Din Shirazi, 2014, p. 258; *Ibid*, 1979, p. 178). For him, all these affairs rely on the human soul and take on all their existence from the soul existence. As a result, they are not like non-living creatures in the world who take on life through their developmental process; rather, they enjoy soul and life from the very beginning of their creation, and one would say that life is an essential component of them.

It is inferred that, according to this perspective, eschatological observations are a series of illusory and unreal affairs which are not externally existent, as imaginary affairs in this world have such states. Imaginary states are, by themselves, simply mental perceptions contradicting the external existence of objects; i.e., the effects resulting from the external existence of an outside fire conflict with those of an imaginary fire.

Mulla Sadra strongly dismisses this suspicion and argues that eschatological affairs are stronger, more intense, and influential than those of mundane affairs. The external existence of eschatological observations is the same as their imagination and illusory existence.

Human's worldly imaginary observations lack an external existence and a sensual presence because they have a weak existence. Thus, human enjoys sensual affairs more than imaginary affairs in the life before death because they are more accustomed to sensual objects and entertainment as they are made of matter; however, when a material death takes place, and this dependence is severed, imagination replaces senses and improves its efficiency; human is no longer in contact with weak material objects;

rather human is faced with objects which are present with all their existence, and it is human who has imagined these objects along with his demands.

### **The world of eschatological observations**

Where is the eschatological world? Is it a world parallel with this world that can be discovered by the advancement of technology? This is a major question that is ingenuously answered by Mulla Sadra. He argues that this question for the world to come is, in principle, nonsensical; because the Hereafter contradicts this world from an essential point of view and cannot be associated whatsoever. On the other hand, the Hereafter is a complete world with a perfect essence, and such a world has no place, as the entire world is not a place to be referred to from both inside and outside. A place is characterized by measuring objects together under different situations; however, assuming perfect conditions, there is no reason to ask place for it, which is null. It is a falsehood originating from analogy and wrong between the imperfect and perfect (Sadr Al-Din Shirazi, 1984, p. 601 and 602; Ibid, 2014, vol. 9. Pp.176-178).

This world has the potentiality of disintegration and destruction, whereas the Hereafter is indestructibly stable and is independent of matter; thus, each of these worlds embraces what is made of its own genus and thus creates a single world.

Thus, a complete concept should be introduced for the world. The world does not mean a set of stars, galaxies, and constellations with attractive and repulsive forces; distancing from another hypothetical set-as parallel worlds are simply a hypothesis. One may call each of these sets a world from an astrological point of view; however, Mulla Sadra considers whatever made of matter, though separate sets, to be under a larger world, a world larger than which cannot be perceived to have been made of matter. This is because the largest possible world may be assumed as the main world, which leaves no room for being called a place. This fact also holds true of the next world, which is the largest

world that cannot be called a place.

The situation for the happy and wretched in the world to come is ontologically different. The world of a happy person is materialized with what his soul demands, as nothing happens except for the soul wishes. Here, the Koran says, "*and you will have in it whatever your souls desire, and you will have in it whatever you ask for*" (Surah Fossilat, verse 31). For the happy ones, God gives the paradise, which is as vast as the heavens and the earth; however, for the wretched ones, they are engulfed by the fire and their feet in chains. The Koran also says, "*The hell shall engulf the unbelievers*" (Ankanboot, 54). For all humans, both good and bad, it will be a separate world, each larger than this current one.

For this, Mulla Sadra characterizes the mundane objects with turbulence and disarray, arguing that eschatological objects will experience no disturbance because each human will have a separate world based on his own spiritual perceptions (Sadr Al-Din Shirazi, 1965, p. 252, vol. 9; Ibid, 1978, p. 397). Thus, good or bad humans will all create a world distinct from each other, with the difference being that a good man will create a world consistent with his own demands via their own unconscious; however, a bad human will create a world with his own unconscious, i.e., characteristics founded on his wrong conduct. In the previous view, he believed that the entire hereafter was one world, and here, he believes that each person has a separate world. While these worlds are of the same genus, and according to the formula discussed in the previous discussion, everything that is of the same genus is affected by a world; there is no contradiction between these two views because one would suggest that the multiple worlds, while having different origins and are separate from each other, are falling under the main single world.

### **The in-soul and out-soul characters of the Hereafter**

To Mulla Sadra, anyone's world originates from his imagination. He suggests that eschatological imaginary observations are the same as externalities due to their existential intensity, thereby bearing the effects

of an external phenomenon. After death, every human soul begins to co-exist with existence and live with life and reflect different forms; imaginary observations are not outside of the human soul after death; they are forms present in his soul. In fact, the genus of eschatological observations is understood from the perceptions, as they enjoy essential life. For example, they make their living from a spiritual life that is understood by the soul.

First, a mild object is imagined like movement or writing; it is then practiced and then reimagined. However, the perceived objects appear when imagination without any contradictions, because action and perceptions are one thing in the Hereafter (Sadr Al-Din Shirazi, 2014, vol. 9, pp.191, 235-237; 257-258; 281, 297 and 302). It is thus concluded that Mulla Sadra believes that the eschatological observations of each human are materialized inside his own soul and considers affairs and objects to enjoy an external existence. It is their existential intensity that is associated with external effects; that does not mean being outside the soul; rather, the external existence of these forms takes shape inside the soul.

Here, it is important to pay attention to two points. It is true he stresses the out-soul character of eschatological observations with different interpretations; however, as discussed in the fourth principle, this relation is a kind of rising phenomenon, not of reincarnation. Because every object independent of the matter is cognizant of the other abstract, all the humans are always observed through his complete world, and this awareness helps them form a unified hereafter world.

<b>Criterion of measurement</b>	<b>Observations and mundane objects</b>	<b>Observations and eschatological objects</b>
Possession of life	Some with life and some without it	All with life
Life being essential or accidental	Life occurs to them	They essentially enjoy life
Priority and posteriority of soul over the body	The body has a dispositional priority over soul	Soul has an existential priority over the body
Ascension or descension	Objects move upwards to enjoy soul	Souls descend towards having a body
Finiteness and infiniteness	finite	Infinite
Interference and disturbance	With interference and disturbance	Without interference and disturbance
Unity or multiplicity of worlds	All are in a world	Every human's observations have a perfect world for itself
Wishes	Nothing is fulfilled simply by asking for something (unless the human soul is potentiated)	For a happy person, everything is fulfilled, while a wretched one suffers from his inner qualities
Impermanency	Essentially impermanent	Not essentially impermanent, and they last as long as man aspires

**Conclusion**

1. In his developmental process, man preserves his existential identity and transfers to the world after death in a way that he abandons matter and achieves actualization. This makes his existence more intense.
2. Eschatological observations are imaginary, with the difference being that imagination and senses in the world after death will be united, and the imagination takes on the functions of the senses.
3. The origin of eschatological observations is the soul itself, which creates for itself eschatological affairs and the Hereafter; this helps its power, awareness, and wishes be unified. That does not mean that there are objects outside the soul, and the soul observes them.
4. Eschatological observations possess perceivable existence, and they are, in fact, human's imagination after death.
5. Eschatological observations are externally existent and have external effects. However, their externality differs from that of this world.
6. The eschatological observations world cannot be conceived of having a place due to being a perfect world.
7. Eschatological observations have no interference or disturbance because they are made of spiritual perceptions.
8. Since eschatological observations possess an intense existence, their suffering and agonies reach a pure point and become more concrete and intense than those of this world, whereas mundane observations combine pleasure and suffering due to lack of purity. Thus, they are neither enjoyable nor agonizing.
9. Although happy and wretched humans are both creators of their eschatological observations, the happy ones enjoy an existential dominance over their own observations, while the wretched ones are affected by observations arising from his inner characters.
10. Eschatological observations of each person are fulfilled inside his soul, though this depends on the soul rather than being reincarnated in his soul.

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