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یادداشت مدیر داخلی مجله:

مجله تاریخ فلسفه اسلامی در بهار سال ۱۴۰۱ (۲۰۲۲م) در گروه فلسفه دانشکده علوم انسانی موسسه آموزش عالی آل طه تاسیس شد. مطابق تصمیم شورای تحریریه مجله، مقالات شماره بهار هر سال مجله به انگلیسی می باشد. خلاصه مقالات این شماره به شرح زیر است:

نقش ایمان در سعادت انسان از دیدگاه علامه طباطبایی: این پژوهش به این نتیجه منجر شد که سعادت از دیدگاه علامه طباطبایی در «قرب الهی» و رسیدن به «ولایت» است و نزدیک‌ترین راه برای رسیدن به این مقام، معرفت نفس است و ایمان مهمترین عنصر در تحقق سعادت انسان است. **طرحی برای فلسفه اسلامی آینده:** بر اساس این مقاله، راهبردهایی که می‌توانند فلسفه اسلامی آینده یا آرمانی را محقق کنند، عبارتند از: توجه فلسفی به علوم و فناوری‌های جدید؛ توجه به موج چهارم در فلسفه؛ پرداختن به «فلسفه»؛ اتخاذ رویکردهای ملموس در فلسفه؛ انجام تحقیقات میان‌رشته‌ای در فلسفه؛ و به‌کارگیری روش‌های جدید در فلسفه.

توسعه نظریه سیاسی (دولت برای فارابی در مقابل هابز): بر اساس این مقاله، در نظر فارابی - برخلاف هابز - دولت نه تنها منبع برخی مزایا است، بلکه باید منبع فضیلت و سعادت انسان‌ها نیز باشد و هست.

عدالت و وحدت اجتماعی و ارتباط آن با جامعه آرمانی از منظر ابوالحسن عامری: بر اساس این مقاله، عامری دیدگاه ویژه‌ای در مورد جامعه آرمانی و تحقق آن دارد. او اعتدال فردی و اجتماعی یا عدالت و وحدت فردی بین نیروهای درونی و وحدت اجتماعی بین اعضای جامعه را مطرح می‌کند.

نقش علم و عمل در سعادت انسان از دیدگاه صدرالمألهین: از منظر ملاصدرا، کمال عقل نظری (معرفت) عنصر اصلی سعادت نهایی است، در حالی که کمال عقل عملی چارچوب پشتیبان آن را تشکیل می‌دهد. در نهایت، قوای نظری و عملی در ذات الهی متحد و ادغام می‌شوند و به سعادت نهایی می‌رسند.

برخی عناصر غیرارسطویی در فلسفه ابن سینا: در این مقاله، به ترتیب مناسب و به اختصار، شرح و توضیحی از سه عنصر غیرارسطویی که تأثیر زیادی بر فلسفه ابن سینا دارند، ارائه خواهد شد: آموزه صدور؛ در مورد عقل و نفس و بدن؛ و در مورد ماده و صورت.

دانش منطقی: ضرورت یا امتناع (بررسی دیدگاه‌ها و دلایل موافقان و مخالفان مسلمان): مسلمانان از ابتدا با دو چالش درباره منطقی مواجه شدند: این علم چه ارتباطی با اسلام دارد؟ آیا مسلمانان باید در علوم دینی خود از همان روش ارسطو استفاده کنند یا از توجه به این علم اجتناب کنند؟ این مقاله نیز سعی دارد این دو دیدگاه را به هم نزدیک کند. نتیجه نهایی این پژوهش این است که بیشتر استدلال‌های مخالفان منطقی، هشدار است برای کسانی که ممکن است از این دانش به درستی استفاده نکنند یا درگیر اندیشه‌های فیلسوفانی باشند که از دین فاصله گرفته‌اند.



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The role of faith in human happiness in Allamah Tabatabaei's point of view

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ABSTRACT

Human happiness is one of important philosophical and theological discussions among thinkers and is the goal of every man who seeks it consciously or not, and explains and identifies it according to his view. Thinkers have not treaded the same course in their understanding of happiness. Some have perceived it to be material pleasures, some spiritual-intellectual and some a combination of the two. Allama Tabataba'i has defined happiness of everything as its attainment to its existential good thereby enjoying it. He has defined happiness for humankind as Divine proximity and approximating the Absolute Reality, and has defined the human ultimate perfection as "wilaya". He considers faith to be of the type of knowledge and practical observance, and highlights it in attainment to happiness. This study, by a descriptive-analytic method, led to the conclusion that happiness in Allama Tabatabaei's view consists in "Divine proximity" and attainment to "wilaya", the nearset way to reach this position is soul knowledge and faith is the most important element in realization of human happiness.

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Introduction

Analyzing the Nature of the world existence is one of the ultimate purpose of philosophy; human is one of the creatures in the world that contains many theoretical and practical issues and many scientific results are dedicated to him in the spiritual, psychological and corporeal dimensions, yet more than novelty scientific problems in those, Speech of about man is obvious and tangible.

The spiritual dimension of man has characteristics, that length history thinkers tried their best to enlighten and inquiry it; Still, anthropology speaks of a special complexity. Man's perfections - whether strong or weak - depend on his spiritual and transcendental affairs such as knowledge, apprehension, perception, piety, life and happiness all rely on the spiritual and nature aspect of man.

In fact, the physical body is a tool to realize the perfections of the soul. One of the perfections of man is his happiness and salvation, which includes the most basic part of his perfections, and this part is prevail on other perfections. The ultimate and final perfections of human are ended in happiness; As there is no higher perfection for man. In essence, the subject of happiness, common people and specific have something in common; However, there is a serious difference of opinion and deed in the consture and interpretation of happiness among everyone, especially between intelligentsia. Some have summed up happiness as sensual, material and fugacious pleasure, and some, like the sages of Masha believes happiness as intellectual, transcendental and permanent pleasure.

There have been important researches about happiness, and what is the role of faith in the acquisition and realization of happiness based on Allameh Tabatabai's point of view, it feels place empty among the researches. Filling this void is the mission of Author's, and we will say what is the nature of happiness and the ultimate perfection of human? Does it compend to the comfort of life and the physical body? Or is it be able to take a step superior it and search in a valley other than the elemental and material body? And more importantly, what role does faith

play in achieving happiness?

These are the essential questions of this paper and the forthcoming article investigates the answers to these questions in a descriptive-analytical method in Allameh Tabatabai's point of view.

a) Semantics

1. Faith

Faith is the opposite of fear, and the opposite of faith is atheism and it means to affirm, when someone believes in the affirmation of soul and tongue, he is a believer and theist (Ibn manzor,1992, vol.13, p.21). Faith has different meanings in the term; It is narrated from Imam Reza (a.s): Faith is a soul's acknowledgment(affirm) and a tongue's confession and action to the principals and self exertion (sadoq, 1956, vol.1, p. 221). Faith is also said to mean confirmation and categoricity that comes from the soul, in this case, if someone does not believe in confirmation from the soul, he is either a hypocrite or an ignorant person. And it is also used to express submission and accept the law of the Prophet (PBUH)(zobeydi, 1965, vol.9, p .73). And some believers, believe, that faith is the belief and acknowledgment of God, the prophets, the resurrection, or unseen things, and if a person has faith in these and a definite acknowledgment of the speech of the Prophet (PBUH) and is committed to them in action, he is called a "believer"(sobhani, 2006, p. 10). And faith is a knowledge that motivational and moves towards the sublime truth, as a result of which rational knowledge is found and flourishes in the light of practical experience and is manifested in a person's speech and behavior. It is also a belief that makes a person submit to a nation and saves him from the unfortunate consequences of atheism and misguidance (hamidi neya, 2017, p. 28 and 29). Allameh Tabatabaei also says: Faith is acknowledging and acknowledging something and adhering to its requirements (Tabatabaei, 1968, vol.15, p. 6).

2. Happiness

Happiness is helping people in divine affairs to reach the point of good,

and the opposite of happiness is misery, which is the greatest happiness, Paradise (Raghib, 1990, p. 410). Happiness means, good fortune, fortune, prosperity and victory, which is the opposite of misery and misfortune (moeein, 2007, vol.1, p. 859).

Happiness is one of the concepts that is very difficult to define philosophically, because this problem appears when happiness is interwoven and homogenous with the concepts of pleasure, desire, success and satisfaction; Schools of thought and worldviews also lead to differences in definition (mosavi, 2011, p. 11; mahmodabadi, 2008, p.139).

What is certain is that all schools and intellectual systems do not have a dispute over the concept of happiness, because it is the accepted principle in all systems; Basically, humans seek happiness by nature, and all the schools believe that all human activities and efforts in his life depend on it; Rather, it is a difference of opinion on the example of happiness. Because, happiness is not an external existence or a special spiritual-psychological phenomenon that can be easily achieved (mesbah yazdi, 2015, vol.1, p. 91-92). From Allameh's point of view, happiness is the achievement of everything to the good of its existence by which it realizes its perfection and enjoys it. Happiness about man, who is composed of body and soul, is the achievement of his physical and spiritual blessings, which are pleasant and enjoyable, may it be good (Tabatabaei, 1968, vol.11, p.18).

b) Happiness in allameh Tabatabaei point of view

This paper tries to consolidate the problem in the first step by looking at Allamah Tabatabaei's theoretical foundations in the part of ontology and anthropology, then, -since man and the realities related to it are involved- he examines briefly the dimensions of human existence; And then the explanation and refinement of happiness from Allameh Tabatabaei's point of view and as a end the effective and efficient paradigm of faith in the achievement of happiness from Allameh Tabatabaei's point of view is

studied and researched.

1. Theoretical foundations of happiness

In order to trace the essence of happiness in Allameh's intellectual system, it is necessary to mention the search and investigation of the fundamentals of ontology and accordingly his anthropology. Because, this subject becomes important when philosophers before Allamah, such as Ibn Sina, Sheikh Ashraq and Sadr al-Muta'allihin, each of them explained the truth of happiness based on their philosophical foundations. For example, in the philosophical system of transcendental wisdom, the role of "existence" is so powerful that it establishes the basis of Sadra's philosophical system; The discussion of the reality of existence, the unity of gradational and the simplicity of being are all appurtenance of the essence of being. From Sadrai's point of view, the discussion of being in all philosophical problems of transcendental wisdom is sluiced, and because of the importance of "existence" in his philosophical organism, he also considered happiness as existence (Mullah sadra, 1981, vol.9, p.121). And he considers knowledge to be same existence (Mullah sadra, 1981, vol.6. p.150). He makes the discussion of existence the basis of discussions of philosophy and divine subjects, he believes that existence is the pole around which the knowledge of monotheism and resurrection revolves (Mullah sadra, 1984, p.4).

In Allameh's philosophical system, discussion does not originate from being, but the structure and foundation of his discussion starts from "reality" and the beginning of his philosophical discussions. Allameh does not agree with Sadra about existence, and he does not accept his opinion, instead of "existence" he replaces the discussion of "reality", which is an original and new opinion (Mosavi, 2011, p. 28); Allameh says when he starts his philosophical discussions Man finds in himself, that he has truth and reality, and that there is truth and reality behind himself (Tabatabaei, 1992, p. 6).

On the other hand, unlike the philosophers of his predecessors,

Allameh divides existence into two types: one is limited and relative reality, and the other is absolute and independent reality (Mullah sadra, footnote: Tabatabaei, 1981, vol.6, p.14); While avicenna divides reality into necessary and possible, and for him, essence and being are two metaphysical things, which avicenna accepts the distinction between them, and places substance and accident as the dividing line (Akbariyan, 2007, p.110). In the previous philosophers, it was possible to discuss essence and non-essence in two steps; According to Allameh, necessary and possible are attributes of reality, all of other's God is viewed as a reflective and allegory theory (Tabatabaei, 2001, p.52; Mosavi, 2011, p. 29). Sadra has been able to overcome personal unity by designing the topics of distinction between existence and nature, originality of existence, constructive unity, independent existence and connection, while Allameh proves these topics at the beginning of his philosophy; Based on Allameh's foundations, it is not necessary for theism to be an appurtenance of ontology, and to reach the first theism we must go path of ontology; Because all beings are signs and in fact everything is God, we find eternal necessity from the ego of reality, not from existence. actual happiness, in Allameh's view, is nearing to the absolute reality (God) without intermediaries, which is the created by Sadra (Mosavi, 2011, p.30).

2. human existential levels

Tabatabaei did not explicitly use the word "precinct"; However, its similar and homogenous words such as dimension, potentialities of the soul, steps of human existence and existential affairs have been used many times in the compass of anthropology (Mosavi Moqaddam, 2011, p.57).

In Allameh's intellectual circle we can be investigatives human existence levels from several angles; Sometimes he analyzed the human being with a philosophical expression, sometimes with a mystical expression, and sometimes with religious and exegetical literature.

According to Allameh, anthropology has a high position and lofty place, so in order to grasp the perception of man and his fields, we will discuss some important indicators:

- a) **perceptual level;** One of the compass of existence is the soul, and its existence according to Allameh is natural, self-evident and parallel to all man truth (Mosavi Moqaddam, 2011, p.58); Man, because he has the force of thought, can be surrounded by events in a limited way (Tabatabaei, 1968, vol, p.71). Since the identity of man is superior the material world, his honor is also in his metaphysical character; And his intellect, as an indicator tool, has a strong relationship with the knowledge of facts, the perceptive compass, a foundational field, has a unifying role along with other fields (Mosavi Moqaddam, 2011, p.58). Tabatabaei's divides perception to knowledge and intuitive and also knowledge into four levels: sensory, imaginary, illusory and rational (theoretical and practical). and these perceptions have a longitudinal relationship with each other, and the source of all perceptions is sensory perception; According to he, the theoretical intellect is responsible for knowing the truth of everything, and the practical intellect's basic task is to call for benefit and avoid harm (Tabatabaei, 1968, vol.1, p.148; Tabatabaei, 2008A, p.65).
- b) **Divine level:** The most basic component of Allameh's anthropology is the theory of nature and the deep and precise explanation of this human existence. Meanwhile, nature is the model of human happiness and the metaphysical path and incorrigible of education and evolution; Based on Islamic beliefs, he believes that man has a divine nature, which defines good and evil in its realm, that is, it has both ontological, ethical and epistemological aspects(Mosvai Moqaddam, 2011, p.62); The role of functionalism of nature from Allameh's point of view was in districts such as: a) self-knowledge; b) Determining the correct path of life; c) regulation and management of social relations.

Therefore, by knowing ourselves and our potencies with our unique nature and collective requirements, the right law and plan based on our own inherent faculty, he should choose the most reasonable way to manage life (Tabatabaei, 2008B, vol.1, 27-106).

- c) **Action level;** This realm is one of the most basic areas of human existence according to Allameh. This step is important when it is the field of realization and manifestation of the quality of perceptual and innate areas (Mosavi Moqaddam, 2011, p. 68) and the purpose of the action (movements and quiescences) in Allameh's thought is that external and objective action purposed - having the title of good and evil - which is issued by human will and consciousness to achieve the goal, not movements and The quiescences are the effects of every natural body (Tabatabaei, 1968, vol. 2, p.18; Tabatabaei, 1996, p. 142).
- d) **the level of will and freedom;** Will and freedom are one of the levels of human soul and life. Allameh is confessor that man is a creature with consciousness and will according to his creation, he is the only one who can choose whatever work he wants, but in the principle of freedom, he is compelled (Tabatabaei, 2005, vol.1, p.553). On the other hand, there is a difference between consciousness and will, that is, the field of will is not necessary for the perceptive field of man, as a choice without will has no meaning and does not appear without perception (Mosavi Moqaddam, 2011, p.67).

3. the truth of happiness

The truth of happiness can be designed from Allameh's point of view in its common and proper sense; Sometimes Allameh's meaning in explaining happiness is absolute, it includes all beings, and the attribute of perfection is a correlate of happiness, and he considers the achievement of the existential good of every object as happiness, so that he can be filled with the perfection he deserves and enjoy it (Tabatabaei, 1968, vol.11,

p.18); and sometimes the meaning of happiness is the happiness of a special being called human being, this paper explores the second clause. Although in the general definition, man is one of the beings inside, but the story does not end here and the horizon of vision about man is wider than this aspect of commonality.

Allameh considers Regarding human happiness, physical and spiritual happiness; Existential good is the physical part of reaching worthy perfection according to the mechanism of development, and it can be acquired relatively in this world; And happiness which is the cause of the ultimate perfection of man, is not dependent on the body, but depends on the spiritual truth of man, and some of the effects of happiness can be seen in this world, but it will appear in a complete and true form in the hereafter. Happiness is finding anything that is good for existence (Tabatabaei, 1968, vol.1, p.183). Happiness about man, who is composed of soul and body, attaining good deeds, pamped and enjoying two aspects -whether physical faculies and or sensual faculties - leads to happiness achieve everytings was to itselfe existence good, in this cause, reciveed his prefection; it that be enjoyed, the opposition between happiness and misery is also a kind of opposition the habit and lack habit(Tabatabaei, 1968, vol.11, p.18); in the perspective of Allameh tabatabaei the true happiness of man is the divine proximity or approaching the same absolute reality without intermediaries(Akbariyan, 2007, p.30).

Therefore, according to Allameh's belief, true happiness is about the spiritual dimension and the rational life of man reaching proximity to God(Tabatabaei, 1968, vo.1, p.113). Of course, the meaning of proximity is not the proximity of a place, but this proximity can be seen as the transcendence and elevation of the soul towards its own supreme origin, which Allameh interprets as absolute reality, and Aristotle reminds of it as absolute good. Such happiness is only the crown of man's honor and his upward arc; and it is freely given to man with right insight and righteous actions; Of course, such happiness is blissful and pleasureing for a human being. It is even better when such happiness is enjoyed,

which is real, permanent and stable; and true happiness is definitely like that.

In order to explain human happiness, we have mentioned some things, now we are going to examine the role of the cornerstone of faith in the realization of happiness.

3-1. the role of faith in human happiness

Faith constitutes the truth of a unitary human being, and it has a special place in the Islamic tradition, and such a paradigm plays a life-giving role in the path to happiness. Faith is the key and indicator of human perfection. Of course, every faith is not associated with happiness; Because, heathens also believes in idols in the opinion of themselves, while real happiness can never be obtained from such a channel. Rather, faith is the criterion for approaching the happiness and eternal luckiness of man, which belongs to faith, God, His Messengers, and true truths.

3-1-1. essence of faith

Faith like happiness, has not had a special identity in the expression of thinkers; In the Islamic world, thinkers have presented different approaches in the perception of faith, and the difference in their views causes the emergence of important results and fruits in the life of human life; Some people like Sadr al-Muta'allihin consider faith to be the type of knowledge(Mullah Sadra, 1995, vol.1, p. 373); And he says that true faith is the knowledge to God, His attributes and actions, property and heaven, and resurrection(Mullah Sadra, 1981, p. 2) According to Sadra, not every knowledge is faith, but a knowledge that is certain and indestructible and is the companion of the believer in this world and the hereafter(Akbariyan & others, 2011, p. 24) Sadra does not consider action along with knowledge as the main driving force in faith, but rather sees it as a effecturater cause and subordinate and even believes that someone who has not done any action can achieve the truth of faith through the acquisition of knowledge(Akbariyan & others, 2011, p. 25).

In fact, paying attention to the basics of Sadra has not been ineffective in perception some education and deep beliefs and religious topics; Because, Sadra's all intellectual prism and philosophical base revolves around "existence". Certainly, the results finding from it, will be different from those who have a essenceial (not existential) perspective in the world. Because, Sadra considers faith to be the genre of knowledge, and since he considers knowledge to be the same being; then, the result is that faith also has a kind of existence, and in fact, faith is also the same existence.

Allameh Tabatabaie, with his own philosophical foundations, unlike some previous philosophers, has a different view to faith; He doesn't consider faith to be only from perception and knowledge source, and he doesn't accept Sadra's point of view, he considers faith to be from knowledge and action genre. Allameh considers faith along with perception, to be a kind of reception and acceptance by the soul towards perceived, such acceptance causes the soul to submit to perceived and the works it requires (Tabatabaei, 1968, vol.11, p. 354).

In Allameh's view, two indicators are essential in explaining the truth of faith, one is knowledge and perception, and the other is action, which Allameh interprets as "practical observance "(Tabatabaei, 1968, vol.18, p. 158).

According to Allameh faith there is no certainty of knowledge and acknowledgment(affirm), nor intuition and heart perceptions; Rather, faith is the occupancy of belief in the heart, the interpenetration and join of the heart with the product of the mental process, And faith gives safety to a person who has a true and pure belief, and creates such encouragement and assurance for him that he never doubts his belief, because the pest and antithesis of belief is doubt, and such a belief that penetrates the heart becomes the source of good deeds(Tabatabaei, 1968, vol.1, p. 45); From Allameh's point of view, faith in something is later than knowledge of that thing. Because, knowledge for the soul is created by the connection between the three components of the theorem, subject,

predicate and copula, which is superior idea and at the limit of acknowledgment(affirm), constant and indestructible. In fact, it is a contract between the soul and the three components of the case, faith in something is actually a second contract that is created between the soul and that theorem, and the soul finds knowledge about it and accepts it, an acceptance that causes the soul to submit to it (Akbariyan & others, 2011, p.25).

Therefore, from Allameh's statement that knowledge and practical observance are the nature of faith, the invalidity of the views of two groups is revealed, one is the who considers faith to be merely knowledge and perception; because, in this case, knowledge can be combinable with denial (atheism) and Others are those who consider faith to be only action. Because, in this case, the action can be combinable with hypocrisy. Because a hypocrite person acts on the appearance but does not faith in the heart (Tabatabaei, 1968, vol.18, p. 259).

3-1-2. faith, empirical or intuitive?

In Allameh's essay on faith, the infrastructures of faith, knowledge and perception were stated; He considered faith to be tissue with knowledge and practical commitment. The question remains, what kind of perception is meant by knowledge and perception? empirical or intuitive knowledge? In answer to this question from Allameh's point of view we will say, that Allameh deduces knowledge which is part of the nature of faith, in two ways: empirical and intuitive.

In the first ascendancy, where Allameh considers faith to be the essence of knowledge, which is concomitant with knowledge and confirmation, and he considers knowledge to be the comparison of the form obtained in perception with the form preserved in the mind (Tabatabaei, without date, vol. 2, p. 35); And the empirical knowledge is defined as affair abstract from matter for another abstract thing. He considered discovery as an inherent property of knowledge (Tabatabaei, 2008A, p. 29) And he divides it into empirical and intuitive knowledge,

and he considers knowledge of essence as empirical knowledge, and knowledge of existence as intuitive knowledge (Tabatabaei, 1994, p. 236-259) And he divides knowledge into idea and confirmation (Tabatabaei, 1994, p. 250) Allameh considers the knowledge that belongs to faith to be theoretical and not self-evident (Tabatabaei, 1968, vol.18, p. 261); It is very explicit that the division of knowledge into theory and self-evident is related to the empirical knowledge that is attained from confirmation path (Tabatabaei, 1994, p. 250).

Therefore, in this passage and the primary understanding of Allameh's statement, faith is considered to be the source of empirical knowledge and logical confirmation; But Allameh is not satisfied with this and has stepped into a higher level of explanation than faith and explains it as the intuitive knowledge, which is in fact complementary to the empirical knowledge by faith. Allameh describes faith in the second paragraph with interpretations, at the end of which the interpretations of the intuitive knowledge of faith are deduced. As Allameh does not consider faith to be only perception, but rather a special kind of acceptance from the soul's side towards thing; Because mere perception can be combined with denial and ignorance (Tabatabaei, 1968, vol. 11, p. 354).

Allameh has mentioned faith in *al-Mizan* with meanings such as "heart's contract" and "indwelled in the heart" and signifies this meaning which faith can be intuitive knowledge. On the other hand, Allameh considers faith to be a combination of "knowledge-affirm" and "practical commitment" and considers faith to be beyond logical affirm and calls it "categorical affirm" (Tabatabaei, 1968, vol. 15, p.45); Tabatabaei, 1968, vol. 18, p. 262); As the word "confirmation" is a commonality verbal, it usages to both the judgment and the totality of the theorem that contain the judgment. For this reason, in Allameh's view about confirmation, which made it is a part of nature of faith, in that case distinction we should accepted difference between judgment and confirmation. and the content of this distinction makes us not consider Allameh's speech about faith to be merely empirical knowledge, but senior that, it extends to

intuitive knowledge (osoli, 2011, p.48). According to Allameh, where faith is obtained from the process of reasoning and proof, and he considers that argument as intellectual proof (Tabatabaei, 2009, p.72-73). Faith is entailed on empirical knowledge, and where Allameh considers faith to be the absolute of perception, it is entailed on intuitive knowledge; Because, judgment is not only spiritual action, but it is a mental form and has the task of narrating from the outside (osoli, 2011, p. 49).

3-1-3. Steps of Faith

Allameh mentions four levels for faith, each step has its own burden meaning and action; and important results finding that. Allameh mentions four levels for faith:

first step: In this order, the goal of faith is to acknowledge (affirm) and synoptic believe in the content of the Shahadatin, which is a requirement of acting on the most accessory. This stage is actually opposite to the first stage of Islam, when someone apparently accepts God's commands and prohibits, and flowing the Shahadatin content on language (oral), whether it is in agreement with his heart or against it (Tabatabaei, 1968, vol.1, p.301).

second step: In this context, faith is a heartfelt and detailed belief in religious truths; And against that, there is Islam in the second stage, which consists of submission and resigned of the heart to the type of beliefs of the detailed truth and righteous deeds that do not conflict with some sins (Tabatabaei, 1968, vol.1, p.301).

third step: When a person has become familiar with the previous stages of faith and is acclimatized with supreme and better ethics, the animal and sensual faculties that are contrary with soul are automatically tamed and abediented for the soul, and he worships God as supposition he sees Him, and certainty and faith God sees him; Such a person does not see the power in his inner self to oppose God's commands and prohibits, or to be angry with God's predetermination; In fact, his entire existence is a wave of submission, in the against such Islam, faith is in the third stage, which

supreme and better ethics, patience in the against of God's will, piety, asceticism in all its meaning, love and hatred are all requisiteness for this stage of faith (Tabatabaei, 1968, vol.1, p.301).

and fourth step: This stage, which is the greatest and better stage of faith, and in which a believer person does not believe in any independent existence and true owner in the world other than God, and believes that other than Him is nothing and nugatory, and his existence is independent and wealthy by in essence; And there is no cause except God's will. When someone has such belief and certainty, he will no fidgety and saddened by disagreeable events. Of course, this is when he has accepted Islam for the fourth step, so that such a meaning can be found in his heart. The fourth stage of Islam is when providencenal from side God, diffused for person and he knows that the deity is his only and the ownship belongs to God only, non he is neither his own himself, nor his own other selft, unless God has owned him. This meaning is cast (diffusion) and a bounty that one's own will does not interfere in obtaining, which is better than the third stage of Islam (Tabatabaei, 1968, vol.1, p. 302).

Allameh Tabatabai considers faith to be of two types, faith before piety and faith after piety; And below the verse « Those who believed and those were pieted » (yunos: 63). In this verse, piety is precede to faith; People are invited to believe, while they were pious before. Because piety is avoiding what angers God. This piety is realized when he has faith in God and His Messenger before that; This faith is except from the faith that precedes piety (Tabatabaei, 2008C, vol. 2, p. 100). He says that the principle of faith is "acknowledgment" and compendium confession, which cannot be combined with polytheism and other sins, but this is not the complete order of faith, complete faith is not separated from the necessities of the principles of religion and its branches, and is always correlated and concomitaned with it, and its refer to obey and submit to all the commands of the grand Prophet (SAW) (Tabatabaei, 2008C, vol. 2, p. 101).

In Allameh's intellectual sy stem, faith is a gradational category,

because acknowledgment and belief, sometimes something is found in itself, and the only effect of the existence of that thing is founding the belief, and sometimes it becomes more intense, so that it belongs to some of its accessories, and sometimes it becomes more intense and belongs to all its accessories (Tabatabaei, 1968, vol. 1, p. 73).

4. the Relationship Between Faith and Happiness

Since in Allameh's view, happiness is adjacency to the truth and adduction to the absolute reality, faith with all its levels to totality form is a compatible spark to achieve happiness. Hence, happiness is not inherent to man, but acquired and optional, and faith is not inherent but optional to man. But, along with faith, righteous deeds are also considered to be valuable counterparts of faith in the genesis of happiness (Tabatabaei, 1968, vol. 11, p. 19); Allameh calls this happiness "pure life" (Tabatabaei, 1968, vol. 6, p. 186). Allameh considers obedience to be one of the elements in the genesis of happiness, which is the opposite of sin and entails misery; Obedience and sin are two categories of gradation that the greater the measure of obedience, the adjacency to happiness is achieved, and the opposite is also true; The happiness, special for believer to the truth religion is considered "perfection" for obedient; However, absolute happiness is not dependent on obedient to the right religion, but if it obeys and is subjugated, and does not have a bellicosity spirit, it is entitled to happiness according to the judgment of intellect (Tabatabaei, 2008C, vol. 2, p. 65); Allameh Tabatabaei considers the human ultimate life affairs to be happiness and misery, and considers these two based on the human statuses and sensual ethics, which include "obedience/righteous action" and "sin/vice action" (Tabatabaei, 1968, vol. 6, p. 166) hence, faith is the most important impeller among the different agents in human happiness in this world and the hereafter; inasmuch, faith has a formative role in the attainment of happiness, Mullah Sadra considers faith is the foundation of happiness (Mullah Sadra, 1981, p. 6).

Its apparent without saying, that faith is the criterion of getting

proximity to God and the criterion of achieving reality happiness, which is issued by human freedom and will; Not every faith, as everyone has faith whether they want it or not; optional faith is Acceptable the presence God and leads to the happiness of this world and the hereafter, and emergency faith is not like that; Because, emergency faith founds when seeing divine punishment, such faith does not cure any pain (Tabatabaei, 1968, vol. 10, p. 125). On the other hand, the relationship between faith and happiness can be explained in viewpoint logic is absolute general and specific; Because the circle of happiness is general and faith is more specific. hence, true faith decidedly consequents to happiness; So, happiness is faith and faith is happiness. With this difference, other components such as piety, asceticism, self-purification, sincerity, etc., also play a role in attaining happiness. However, the role of faith is more colorful and important than all of them.

hence, faith is not only a sufficient condition but also a necessary condition for achieving happiness in this world and the hereafter. According to Allameh's statement, faith gives for person security and pacification and creates encouragement and attraction for a believer and protects its owner from doubt and suspicion. When a person finds such a belief in the origin (first) existence (God), the intermediate of grace, angels and the doomsday, and is practically requisiteness to its observant, its output and consequent itself tales of the climax of human happiness and will inevitably output the adduction of God.

4-1. Faith, Criterion of Happiness

From Allameh's perspective, faith is a category composed of knowledge (categorical confirmation) and righteous action (practical observance to knowledge), and happiness is adduction of God and adduction to absolute perfection and absolute reality. Faith, as the axis and fundament of final perfection (happiness), plays the role of a criterion, so that if there is no faith, happiness will never be the profit of man. This category also has different levels, and how measure of the domain faith is comprehensive

and solid, it will have profit the same measure of true happiness.

Allameh tabatabaei says:

“The criterion of happiness is the reality of faith and good deeds, without claims” (Tabatabaei, 1968, vol. 1, p. 216).

In this Allameh’s statement, faith has been introduced as the criterion for achieving happiness; This expressive the importance of faith. Of course, the side that righteous action is mentioned to faith maybe for emphasis, because according to Allamah speech, faith is a combination of knowledge and action. That is, reality faith is knowledge and practical observance. According to Allameh, righteous action is under the category of inner faith.

He says:

“Happiness does not revolve around the name and there is no honor for anyone over God except through the reality of faith and servitude” (Tabatabaei, 1968, vol. 1, p. 258).

Happiness does not come on the road of name and sign; And no one has dignity in the presence of God unless he attainments faith in the divine pure domain and benefits from servitude to the one only essence(God). It seems that based on Allameh's speech, servitude as one of the examples of the practical part of the nature of faith opens its own special place in the attainment of happiness; In fact, specific mention is after common; Because the nature of faith consists of opinion and action. The opposite of the theoretical part of faith is atheism, denial and ignorance; While the practical part of faith is the opposite of polytheism, dualism, and hypocrisy. on the other hand, the criterion of human dignity in the language of the Qur'an is piety(hojarat:13). Allameh has expressed the criterion of dignity as "faith" and "servitude", in fact it is in conconancy and compatibility with this verse of the Quran. Because piety is explained under worship and worship is a practical part of the nature of faith. In fact, in theory, piety should be nourished and fattened by faith, and the start of its issuance is also faith.

He also says:

“only the criterion for the affair and the reason for dignity and happiness is the reality of faith in God and the doomsday and good deeds (Tabatabei, 1968, vol. 1, p. 193).

Allameh, in this trinary expresses the way to enter happiness; The role of faith, insomuch its important seeming, faith in his trinitism, opens up the first place.

first position: In the first paragraph, Allameh dependent that happiness is the faith, and next to it, he expressed righteous action, we said righteous action under the part of partial observance of faith nature; seemingly he said to important and emphasis cause.

second position: In this passage, Allamah, reliants the happiness and dignity of man on faith and servitude; that servitude itself is against polytheism, hypocrisy and dualism and it can be expressed under the practical commitment of faith.

third position: Here, He could happiness dependent on faith in God, the Day of Resurrection, and righteous deeds; we can be said that Allameh considered both opinion and action in this section; Because, this expression of Allameh appearances faith in the origin(God), religion(tradition) and the resurrection. Belief in God includes the affirmative and theoretic aspect, the opposite of which is atheism and denial. Righteous action is actually obedience to religious commandments, and it is more focused on the aspect of action.

Therefore, faith in the resurrection is also a theoretically correct point of view that the growth and effects of this belief have many practical consequences. The important thing here is that obeying, believing and acting on them leads to the salvation and happiness of man.

5. Conclusion

Happiness is one of the ancient lost human beings; Traces of it can be found among all nations and peoples. And we mentioned what is happiness and which components are effective in achieving it. In particular, we discussed the role of faith in happiness from Allameh's

perspective, and it is briefly mentioned.

- 1- Happiness is for all beings and they can enjoy happiness according to their existence, and there is no unique way to define the nature of happiness, Rather, everyone has provided definition of happiness inspired by their vision, worldview and worldornament.
- 2- Some summarize happiness in material, sensual and transient pleasures, they consider their perfection and happiness to be worldly comfort and welfare; While some considered happiness is to be rational life and connection to the world of nunmenon, and they consider it to be sensual, rational and everlasting. Allameh Tabatabai considers happiness to be proximity to God, ultimate perfection is the position of " wilaya", and the nearset way to reach ultimate perfection is soul knowledge.

It seems that Allamah's expression can be viewed from several dimensions, firstly, the mystical view, which we can understand from "Velayat" the mystical view of Allamah, which means the manifestation of man in relation to vicegerent-appointer(God) in the world. And when Allameh says "God's nearness", maybe he took an interpretive and religious view, because philosophy does not consider happiness as "nearness" and does not open the head of speech with nearness, but discusses about the connection to noumenon and active reason.

- 3- Some consider the container of happiness to be only in this world, while some accept the sum between this world and the hereafter. Some believe that happiness can only be achieved in the world of the doomsday(resurrection).
- 4- Allameh considers happiness to be synonymous with good and considers true happiness to be found in every object with the perfection and goodness of its existence. About man, who is composed of soul and body, happiness is considered to be the achievement of the good of existence of physical and sensaul faculties.

Allameh's speech in the definition of happiness is not very

explicit; Allameh has defined happiness in an absolute and public way, even about humans, the definition of happiness is so inconclusive; that what is objective by "existential good"? Is evolution rational? Or intellectual pleasure? It is not explicit about the soul, especially the text of "existential good", in which one of the origins and states the soul should be placed in order to achieve true happiness. Nothing can be achieved from this definition of Allameh. However, by arranging some introductions inspired from Allameh's explanatory and philosophical education, we will definitely reach the true definition of happiness.

- 5- faith from Allameh Tabatabai's point of view is a combination of knowledge and action. He does not consider mere perception to be faith, but considers the role of action to be important along with knowledge (empirical or intuitive), which Allameh reminds to as "practical obligation".

It seems that Allameh is moving his own interpretive foundation, because in the Qur'an usually, wherever a person is called(invited) to faith, alongside it or as a hidden introduction he is called to action. If we consider faith as belief, then belief is also a part(generator) of knowledge. If knowledge penetrates the heart in a real way, it will not perish no matter every hurricane. In this case, from doubt to certainty, it includes faith and is in the realm of faith; So, it can be said that faith is a gradation category, which is more congruity with the approach of transcendental wisdom. And if we do not consider faith to be of the nature of knowledge, but to consider it as something other than knowledge or superior knowledge, in this case it finds two states, either faith is pure of action, which is not this like, or faith is not knowledge itself, but is the result and fruit of knowledge; This assumption is also not true.

In the author's opinion, faith is a type of heart belief of a stable belief, which is fed from the source of knowledge, and ornamenting its owner requirement to action according to the same belief, For this reason, faith is not knowledge in the demotic mean, atheists had

knowledge of God and His attributes, but they did not have faith and did not obey to God's commandment. God says in Quran: "The Bedouins said, we believe, Say, you have not believed, Faith has not entered your hearts yet" (Hojarat: 14). From this is apparenting that faith is of the genre of interpenetrating and entering the heart and it is a matter (affair) of the heart, knowledge is a form of imagination and confirmation, it is related to the intellect.

- 6- According to Allameh, faith is the most central criterion in happiness, and he mentions multiple levels for it, and considers it as gradation category.
- 7- In Allameh's view, faith in the origin (God), resurrection, righteous actions are fundamental that have a special place in the genesis of happiness.
- 8- In Allameh's perspective, if faith is sheer perception, it can be combined with denial and atheism, but in addition to perception, there must be an acceptance from the soul's side.
- 9- From Allameh's vision, happiness is a sum between the body and the soul in a form of gradational; The happiness of the soul is nearness to God, but the happiness of the body is also about the goodness of existence in accordance with the device of its creation.

Of course, it should be noted that the true happiness of a person is the purpose, the happiness of his soul, not the happiness of his body. The happiness of the body is a provider cause, that is, the actualization of the body's faculty is in the service of the soul, but the soul has an evolutionary process to achieve real (true) happiness. From this point of view, it may be imagery to apply (predication) the word "happiness" to physical faculties, or relative happiness can be applied (used) to it according to its proportion of existence breadth. Since, true happiness is the last (ultimate) position of ascension of man; superior that, has not idea (imagination) the happiness of the physical faculties are "like inexistence" in proportion to the happiness of the soul.

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A Plan for the Future Islamic Philosophy

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Article Info	ABSTRACT
<p>Article type: Research Article</p> <p>Article history: Received 26 December 2024 Received in revised form 27 January 2025 Accepted 26 February 2025 Published online 21 March 2025</p> <p>Keywords: <i>Islamic philosophy, problem-solving, interdisciplinary, methodology, new science.</i></p>	<p>For several centuries, Islamic philosophy has been in a state of "isolation," meaning it has lost its contemporaneity; it neither solves "problem" nor, at the very least, actively and seriously engages with contemporary issues. This paper, while addressing the nature, possibility, and realization of Islamic philosophy; the achievements of Islamic philosophy; and the historical evolution of Islamic philosophy (in early, late, and contemporary periods), distinguishes three types of Islamic philosophy: Islamic philosophy as a concept; Islamic philosophy as an actualized phenomenon (Peripatetic, Illuminationist, Sadrian, and Neo-Sadrian); and the future Islamic philosophy. The future Islamic philosophy is an ideal one, could emerge later, contingent on certain conditions and prerequisites, such as addressing contemporary issues, particularly socio-cultural and practical issues. It seems that the survival of Islamic philosophy and its avoidance of becoming merely historical -in contrast to the idea of the "end of Islamic philosophy"- depends on this. Since the ideal Islamic philosophy is one that solves problem, this naturally requires problem-oriented philosophical research. Thus, highlighting the importance of problem-oriented research; the nature of a problem; and the differences between a problem, subject, question, and difficulty, the paper will propose the most important and central strategies that could actualize the future or ideal Islamic philosophy. These strategies include: philosophical attention to new sciences and technologies; considering the fourth wave in philosophy; engaging with "Philosophy of"; adopting concrete approaches in philosophy; conducting interdisciplinary researches in philosophy; and employing new methods in philosophy.</p>

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Introduction

For several centuries, Islamic philosophy has been in a state of isolation. By "isolation," we do not mean that Islamic philosophy has made no progress and remained entirely stagnant, but rather that it has lost its contemporaneity; because it neither solves "problem" nor, at the very least, actively engages with contemporary issues, and perhaps does not pay sufficient attention to them at all.

It seems that the emergence of a new philosophical movement or school, but in a fundamental way, the survival of a philosophy and its non-going down in history, depends on its contemporaneity and engagement with current issues.

A brief overview of the historical evolution of Islamic philosophy, as will be mentioned later, reveals that it has taken three to five centuries for a new philosophical movement or school (Peripatetic, Illuminationist, Sadrian, and Neo-Sadrian) to emerge in the Islamic world, which is not a short time. Apart from the fact that some researchers believe the historical progression of Islamic philosophy from the Peripatetic philosophy to the Neo-Sadrian school is a "regressive" process (although some philosophers strongly disagree with this point), it is undeniable that over the past four centuries, Sadrian philosophy has had complete dominance among philosophers; because the Neo-Sadrian school cannot be considered an independent Islamic philosophy, but rather it can be defined under the Sadrian movement (Hikmat Muta'aliya). This points mainly pertains to the status of Islamic philosophy in Iran, but the condition of Islamic philosophy does not appear better in other Islamic countries.

It is clear that the aforementioned four movements or schools emerged due to the engagement of previous Muslim philosophers with the current issues of their own time and place. Therefore, it is essential to examine why Islamic philosophy, "here" and "now", does not have a proper and defined engagement with new issues. Is the problem inherent in this philosophy, or in Muslim philosophers, or in the special conditions and difficulties of Muslim societies, or in all of these? This is an important

question.

However, the present paper does not aim to answer the above question. Instead, the main question of this paper is: What strategies should Islamic philosophy adopt to address contemporary issues or at least engage with them properly?

To answer this question, and as a preliminary step, we will first discuss topics such as the nature, possibility, and realization of Islamic philosophy; its achievements; and its historical evolution (early, late, and contemporary Islamic philosophies). Then, we will distinguish three types of Islamic philosophy (Islamic philosophy as a concept, Islamic philosophy as an actualized phenomenon, and the future or ideal Islamic philosophy). Then, while presenting a discussion about a problem (the importance of philosophical and problem-oriented research, some characteristics of a problem, and the difference between a problem, subject, question, and difficulty), finally, we will propose the most important and central strategies to actualize the future or ideal Islamic philosophy -a philosophy that will engage with contemporary issues.

Section One: Nature, Possibility, and Realization; Achievements; and Historical Evolution of Islamic Philosophy

It is essential to initially take a brief look at three important topics: the nature, possibility, and realization of Islamic philosophy; the achievements of Islamic philosophy; and the historical evolution of Islamic philosophy.

A. Nature, Possibility, and Realization of Islamic Philosophy

One of the most fundamental questions regarding Islamic philosophy is: What is Islamic philosophy? Specifically, what does the adjective "Islamic" mean in this context? Contemporary scholars have presented various and diverse viewpoints on this matter (for a brief summary of these views, see Khosrowpanah, 2005, pp. 97-108).

In summary, Islamic philosophy can be described as a philosophy developed, articulated, and investigated by Muslim philosophers. Its

"Islamic" nature is defined by its alignment with Islamic principles or its use of these principles to expand and enrich the philosophy (Abedi Shahroudi, 1995, p. 5).

If Islamic philosophy is correctly understood as being influenced by Islam to the extent that it would take a different form if developed in a context other than Islam, and not incorrectly understood as replacing the content of prophetic revelation with philosophical reasoning, it is both possible and actualized in reality (Oboudiat, 2003, p. 41).

The influence of philosophy by Islam can be examined from various perspectives. For example, Islamic philosophy is based on the principle of monotheism, which is the fundamental principle of Islam; methodologically, it is based on rationalism, and an emphasis on reason being one of the most important emphases in the Quran and Hadith; in terms of topics or, more precisely, issues, many of its issues are derived from or developed with reference to religion (such as the soul, resurrection, divine attributes, revelation, and inspiration); and in terms of outcomes and findings, it is often observed that Islamic philosophers adhere to religious beliefs, such as Ibn Sina's affirmation of "bodily resurrection" despite its non-demonstrability by rational means from his perspective (Abbaszadeh, 2019a, p. 16).

Based on the above points, it can be concluded that if philosophy were formed in a non-Islamic context and not influenced by it, it would certainly take a different form, given that the beliefs of other religions sometimes differ from those of Islam. However, this definitive influence of Islamic philosophy by Islam should not be understood as replacing the content of prophetic revelation with philosophical reasoning; as this would eliminate the essence of philosophical thought in the Islamic world, which is "rationality" (meaning the use of rational arguments in examining and solving issues) (Abbaszadeh, 2019a, p. 16).

B. Achievements of Islamic Philosophy

Some contemporary scholars have categorized the achievements of Islamic philosophy into four areas (Motahhari, 1994b, pp. 225-226):

1. Issues that remained almost in their Greek form, with minimal or no modifications or enhancements by Islamic philosophers, and the form of the issues did not significantly change;
2. Issues that Islamic philosophers completed, by strengthening their foundations and providing more substantial justifications for them, whether by changing the form of the arguments or adding new arguments;
3. Issues that were ambiguous in Greece but were clarified by Islamic philosophers, resulting in different forms of these issues;
4. Issues that had no precedent in Greece and were entirely new, even in terms of their names and titles.

Some examples of philosophical issues in these four categories are as follows:

"From the first category... most issues of logic, the ten Aristotelian categories, the four causes, the Aristotelian divisions of sciences, and the divisions of the faculties of the soul can be named... but in the second category: this part is extensive [and for example]... issues such as the impossibility of an infinite regress, the immateriality of the soul, the proof of Necessary Existence, the unity of Necessary Existence, the impossibility of the emanation of the many from the One, the unity of the intelligent and intelligible, and the substantiality of the species forms can be named... but in the third category, the relation between motion and cause, the relationship between God and the world, the well-known issue of Platonic Forms, and the issue of being "pure being" (Sifr al-wujud) of Necessary Existence can be named... issues that should be counted in this [third] category include... the explanation of types of priority, types of created-ness (Al-Huduth), types of necessity and possibility, and types of unity and multiplicity. But in the fourth category, which includes issues introduced for the first time in the Islamic world, these issues are numerous and more valuable and significant. These issues include major topics of existence, such as the primacy of existence (Asalat al-wujud), the unity of existence, mental existence, negative judgments of existence,

as well as the issue of creation (al-Ijad), the criterion for a thing's need for a cause, the principle of the simple reality (Basit al-Haghighah), substantial motion, the immateriality of the animal soul and the human soul at the level of imagination, considerations of quiddity, the judgments of nothingness especially the impossibility of the return of the nothing, secondary intelligibles, the principle of possibility of the nobler (Imkan al-Ashraf), the simple detailed knowledge of Necessary Existence, the possibility though preparedness (Al-Imkan al-Isteadadi), being a dimension of the time, agents by compulsion (Faeliah bi-Taskhir), the corporeal created-ness of the soul, bodily resurrection, the unity of the soul and body, the mode of composition of matter and form whether conjunctive or unitive, the analysis of the real connection of effect to cause, unity in multiplicity of the soul and its faculties..." (Motahhari, 1994b, pp. 226-229).

It should be noted that in most cases of the first category, although the form of the issues did not undergo significant changes, but many Muslim philosophers have occasionally provided other minor views (different from the findings of Greek philosophers) under these same issues. The examples of the second, third, and fourth categories are also far more numerous than the mentioned instances. As Seyyed Mohammad Hossein Tabatabai claims, all the philosophical discussions and issues transferred from Greece did not exceed "two hundred" items, and Islamic philosophers increased this to "seven hundred" discussions and issues (see: Rashad, 1998, p. 57).

C. The Historical Evolution of Islamic Philosophy

The history of Islamic philosophy can be divided into three distinct periods: early Islamic philosophy, late Islamic philosophy, and contemporary Islamic philosophy.

1. Early Islamic Philosophy

Early Islamic philosophy itself can be subdivided into two smaller periods: The Peripatetic (Masha'i) philosophy and the Illuminationist (Ishraqi) philosophy.

In the first period, which began in the 9th century CE (3rd century AH), philosophers meditate predominantly in the Aristotelian tradition, known as Masha'i. They utilized Neoplatonic interpretations of Aristotle's texts, aiming to advance philosophy with Islamic teachings. The primary method in the Masha'i tradition was rational argumentation and demonstration, which positioned these early Peripatetic philosophers as rationalists. Philosophers such as Al-Kindi, Al-Razi, Al-Farabi, the "Brethren of Purity" (Ikhwan al-Safa), Ibn Sina, Nasir al-Din al-Tusi (to some extent), Ibn Bajja, Ibn Tufayl, and Ibn Rushd belong to this period.

The early Peripatetic philosophers skillfully blended Greek-Alexandrian philosophical achievements with Islamic teachings. Relying on their strong thinking and genius, they founded a firm philosophical system, influencing both the Eastern and Western worlds (Rashad, 1998, p. 56).

The second period, starting in the 12th century CE (6th century AH), saw the emergence of Illuminationist philosophers. These thinkers sought to address the shortcomings of early Peripatetic philosophy by drawing on the ideas of some Greek philosophers, particularly Plato and the Neoplatonists, as well as ancient Persian wisdom, and the views of Babylonian, Egyptian, Indian, and Chinese peoples, ultimately combining these with the methods of mystics and Sufis. They believed the correct philosophical method was a combination of rational argumentation and heart intuition (=illumination), although they considered heart intuition superior to rational argumentation.

The founder of Illuminationist philosophy was Suhrawardi (Shaykh al-Ishraq). He critiqued early Peripatetic philosophy and established his own philosophical system based on the principle of "illumination." Through this principle, Suhrawardi replaced philosophical and epistemological notions based on "essence" (conceptual and acquired knowledge) with those based on "light" (intuitive and presentational knowledge), introducing new judgments and thus creating an innovative philosophical system (Abbaszadeh, 2019b, p. 18).

Suhrawardi's followers, especially Shams al-Din al-Shahrazuri and Qutb al-Din al-Shirazi, continued his path. Other philosophers such as Nasir al-Din al-Tusi (in some respects), Jalal al-Din Dawani, Ghiyath al-Din Mansur Dashtaki, Mir Damad (and his Yamani Wisdom), Mir Fendereski, Mohsen Fayz Kashani, and Abdul-Razzaq Lahiji, among others, were also generally considered "Illuminationist" in the broad sense, as they believed in combining rational argumentation and heart intuition in philosophy (Abbaszadeh, 2019b, pp. 20-21).

2. Late Islamic Philosophy

Late Islamic philosophy, which began in the 17th century CE (11th century AH), marks the era of Mulla Sadra and the Sadrian philosophers. Mulla Sadra, by integrating the views of early Peripatetic philosophers, Illuminationists, mystics, theologians, and also the transmitted discussions in the Quran and Hadith, created an independent philosophy known as "Transcendent Philosophy" (Hikmat al-Muta'aliyah). This philosophy was further developed by Sadrian philosophers, especially Hadi Sabzavari and others.

Mulla Sadra's influence from Greek, Peripatetic, Illuminationist philosophers, and mystics is evident. However, this influence should not be understood in a negative or passive sense:

"Sadr al-Muta'alliheen thoroughly assimilated what had been received from ancient Greek philosophers, especially Plato and Aristotle, and what great Islamic philosophers such as Al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, and Suhrawardi had explained or added themselves, along with what great mystics had found through their mystical insight, and he reestablished a new foundation on solid and unshakable principles. He made philosophical issues as demonstrative as mathematical principles, where each issue is derived and inferred from another, thus rescuing philosophy from the dispersion of argumentative methods" (Motahhari, 1994a, p. 30).

Mulla Sadra's philosophy is, from a philosophical perspective, the culmination of two significant currents: Peripatetic and Illuminationist. The Peripatetic tradition is attributed to Aristotle, while the

Illuminationist tradition is attributed to Plato. When these two currents reached the Islamic world, they became more extensive and profound; the Peripatetic tradition was especially pursued by Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina, and the Illuminationist tradition by Suhrawardi (Shaykh al-Ishraq). Numerous discussions and branches were added to the existing findings. Mulla Sadra stands at the end of these two currents. Thus, "Mulla Sadra's philosophy, besides being original and unprecedented in some respects, is the result of the efforts of great researchers over eight hundred years, each of whom contributed to the advancement of philosophy" (Motahhari, 1994a, pp. 30-31). He also incorporated mysticism and transmitted discussions (Quran and Hadith) into philosophy. For him, "the goal is to attain knowledge and certainty resulting from knowledge, and by placing the sayings of the Imams as a middle term, knowledge and certainty are achieved; this coordination of demonstration, intuition, and the Quran, or in other words, reason, intuition, and transmission (al-naghl), is one of the innovations of ... Sadr al-Muta'alliheen" (Javadi Amoli, 2005, p. 8).

3. Contemporary Islamic Philosophy

Contemporary Islamic philosophy, which began in the 20th century CE (14th century AH), primarily took shape as the "Neo-Sadrian Philosophy".

This philosophical movement, leveraging Mulla Sadra's Transcendent Philosophy (Hikmat al-Muta'aliyah), emerged as a response to Marxist materialism and atheistic trends in Western philosophy. It began with the works of Sayyed Mohammad Hossein Tabataba'i and his student Morteza Motahhari, and was continued by others such as Abdollah Javadi Amoli.

"If we call the revival and reconstruction of a philosophical and intellectual school [Transcendent Philosophy], corresponding to the sciences and challenges of the era, while preserving its fundamental principles and elements, as its renovation, we are entitled to name the new philosophical movement in Iran as 'Neo-Sadrian School' (Rashad, 1998, p. 60).

In reality, Neo-Sadrian philosophy can be considered contemporary

Islamic philosophy that has focused on explaining, interpreting, and developing philosophical views in the trajectory and horizon of Mulla Sadra's Transcendent Philosophy. Although defined under Sadrian philosophy and adopting the same method of Transcendent Philosophy, Neo-Sadrian philosophy has offered independent views, which can be regarded as a distinct school or philosophical discourse (Abbaszadeh, 2019b, p. 17).

Neo-Sadrian philosophy has managed to transform existing philosophy in three aspects: form and structure, method, and content. In terms of formal transformation, there is a shift in the structure and arrangement of philosophical discussions; instead of beginning with ontology, the focus starts with epistemology and the problem of human perceptions. Methodologically, Neo-Sadrian philosophy emphasizes avoiding the mixing of rational argument and heart intuition while acknowledging the unity of the paths and destinations of "rational argument, intuition, and Quran"; it also emphasizes the genealogy and historical evolution of philosophical issues, and the comparative study of issues between Islamic philosophy and Western philosophies, or among various schools of Islamic philosophy. Content-wise, it includes modernizing philosophy by discarding old natural sciences and focusing on new physics; providing new interpretations of some issues such as proofs for God's existence; theorizing about the conventional perceptions (Al-Idrakat al-I'tibariah) and paying attention to "Philosophy of" like philosophy of mind, philosophy of religion, philosophy of ethics, and philosophy of law; multiplying arguments in some philosophical principles and issues like the refutation of circularity and infinite regress; and expanding discussions introduced in new philosophies like motion, time, causality, and more (Rashad, 1998, pp. 61-62).

Section Two: Three Types of Islamic Philosophy

Islamic philosophy can be conceptualized in three ways: Islamic philosophy as a concept, Islamic philosophy as an actualized reality, and

future (ideal) Islamic philosophy. It is crucial to distinguish between these three types, especially the second and third types.

A. Islamic Philosophy as a Concept

Islamic philosophy as a concept refers to the various interpretations that philosophers have of "Islamic philosophy." Each philosopher or philosophical movement or school may have a particular understanding or definition of Islamic philosophy based on their perspective. A science or discipline can be defined based on its subject matter, method, purpose, function, utility and so forth. Accordingly, Islamic philosophy as a discipline can also be defined in various ways, including its subject matter, method, purpose, function, utility and more.

Earlier, we briefly addressed the nature of Islamic philosophy and the "Islamic" attribute in this descriptive compound, as well as the possibility and conditions for realizing this philosophy, noting that views in this area are diverse and varied. Studying and reviewing these views may take us away from the main goal of this writing.

B. Islamic Philosophy as an Actualized Reality

Islamic philosophy as an actualized reality or the existing and realized Islamic philosophy refers to Islamic philosophy as it has practically existed and manifested throughout history.

Previously, we reviewed the historical evolution of Islamic philosophy, including three periods: early Islamic philosophy (Peripatetic and Illuminationist traditions), late Islamic philosophy (Sadrian tradition), and contemporary Islamic philosophy (Neo-Sadrian school).

A brief glance at the historical trajectory of Islamic philosophy reveals that it has taken at least about three centuries for a new philosophical tradition or school to emerge in the Islamic world (with the exception that it took about five centuries for Sadrian philosophy or Transcendent Philosophy to develop):

- Peripatetic Philosophy: from the 9th century CE (3rd century AH);
- Illuminationist Philosophy: from the 12th century CE (6th century AH);

- Sadrian Philosophy (Transcendent Philosophy): from the 17th century CE (11th century AH);
- Neo-Sadrian School: from the 20th century CE (14th century AH).

Despite the fact that "three or five centuries of waiting" for the emergence of a new philosophical tradition or school in the Islamic world is not a short period, some researchers have considered the evolution of Islamic philosophy as a "regressive" trajectory due to its gradual departure from pure Peripatetic rationalism, inclination towards illumination, amalgamation with mysticism and theology, and ultimately gaining a transmitted flavor (Quran and Hadith):

"This philosophy [Islamic philosophy] became a coherent system with Ibn Sina. What Ibn Sina did, which should have been the first step of this movement, in practice became the last step. After him, nothing was added to the content of philosophy. What Suhrawardi and then Sadr al-Muta'alliheen did was nothing but mixing philosophy with Sufism, which is an irrational school. Of course, in this regard, Suhrawardi's work is not very significant; but Mulla Sadra's work is so serious that it can be said that with his efforts, theoretical mysticism triumphed over Peripatetic philosophy" (Yathribi, 2009, p. 170).

However, some philosophers consider the evolution of Islamic philosophy as "progressive" due to the gradual and increasing enhancement of its "Islamic" aspect, which is a fundamental and essential element in Islamic philosophy:

"Before Transcendent Philosophy, a division of religious sciences was applied based on the method used to discover the will of God the Almighty: if we understood the will of God through intuition, it was called mysticism; if through reason, it was called philosophy; and if through transmission, it was called jurisprudence and Hadith. However, Transcendent Philosophy expanded the epistemic method and, in addition to reason, also utilized intuition and transmission ... For the philosopher, transmission can also issue fatwas; just as reason can issue fatwas in jurisprudence. The criterion is to attain certainty, and if transmission is

definitive from the aspects of validity of source, context of issuance, and implication, according to Mulla Sadra, it can serve as a middle term ... Philosophy from its inception has had a religious origin ... Islamic philosophers have made divine philosophy an epistemological source of Islam ... Islam, in the sense of "Indeed, the religion in the sight of Allah is Islam," means that which originates from the eternal knowledge and will of God the Almighty" (Javadi Amoli, 2005, pp. 7-9).

What is particularly noteworthy here is the dominance of the Sadrian tradition among contemporary philosophers and the lack of fundamental philosophical innovation and theorization over the past four centuries:

"In the realm of philosophy, for 400 years we have insisted on one philosophical school [the Sadrian philosophy] and have merely subsisted on the leftovers of the rich table of ... Sadr al-Muta'alliheen Shirazi, and during this period, instead of any movement and transformation, innovation and theorization, we have only engaged in marginal commentary and expanding upon what the prominent philosophers of this period had produced" (Rashad, 2000, p. 22).

In reality, over the past four centuries, there has been no fundamental philosophical innovation and theorization, and thus no independent philosophy has emerged, because the Neo-Sadrian philosophy cannot be considered an independent Islamic philosophy but is rather definable as a school or philosophical discourse under the Sadrian philosophy (although there have been some minor and limited philosophical innovations, which should not be overlooked).

The above discussion mainly pertains to the state of Islamic philosophy in Iran, but in other Islamic countries, the situation of Islamic philosophy is not very favorable either. In these countries -especially after scholars and researchers became acquainted with Western philosophy- the primary focus shifted towards describing and explaining Western philosophy and its findings, and less attention was given to advancing Islamic philosophy. What practically happened was limited to the critical edition of Islamic philosophical texts, commentary and interpretation of

these texts, translation of these texts, and finally, the critique of some philosophical views, rather than fundamental innovation and theorization to the extent of creating an independent and new Islamic philosophy.

C. Future (Ideal) Islamic Philosophy

By "future Islamic philosophy", we mean the ideal Islamic philosophy that may emerge later. The present writing is primarily concerned with this third type, which is a type of Islamic philosophy that will solve "problem" or at least have a well-defined and proper engagement with contemporary issues, and such a philosophy naturally has conditions and prerequisites that must be considered to witness its realization in the future. Therefore, in this type of Islamic philosophy, we need a "future-oriented" approach.

Some believe that the task and preoccupation of philosophy is not to address issues; rather, the role of philosophy is higher than to lower itself to specific and minor issues. Philosophy ultimately responds to the questions or inquiries of humans, which are sometimes posed out of mere curiosity, and one of the benefits of philosophy is satisfying this curiosity. Others argue that philosophy's task is not even to answer questions; as answers philosophy provides are not definitive, and definitive and certain responses to philosophical questions would signify the "end of philosophy." Instead, philosophy's fundamental role is to pose questions (see Dadbeh, 1997, Introduction: pp. c-d and p. 59).

These views and beliefs contain some valid points; however, confining philosophy to its "ivory tower", isolating it from solving individual and social-cultural issues, and limiting it to satisfying curiosity and similar matters, do not seem entirely justified. While we acknowledge that Islamic philosophy should not be "entirely" and "completely" reduced to contemporary issues, including purely practical and social-cultural issues (the primary function of Islamic philosophy is to discuss the existence in the absolute sense and address broad and general topics such as God, human, and the universe), it is also necessary to recognize that if Islamic philosophy aims to be relevant in the world and have significant

contributions to offer, it must engage seriously with contemporary issues and define its relationships with them.

The reality is that contemporary Islamic philosophy has not had significant engagement with current issues and has not solved many problems, or if it has engaged and solved some issues, it has not been noticed globally. Meanwhile, the existing and realized Islamic philosophy possesses considerable potential and capacity for solving issues that have not yet been actualized, and we are still distant from the ideal situation; thus, we do not have a significant presence in addressing contemporary issues worldwide. One important indication of the absence of Islamic philosophy in the global context is that there are not many traces of Islamic philosophy in the contemporary philosophical works and books, whereas if we had serious and updated philosophical findings, it is likely that philosophers worldwide would refer to us.

Therefore, we must move towards future or ideal Islamic philosophy, and it seems that the survival of Islamic philosophy and its continuation - against the idea of the "end of Islamic philosophy", which posits that this philosophy has exhausted all its possibilities and has no new potential, thus has effectively ended- depends on this endeavor. We are currently distant from this situation, and reducing or eliminating this distance requires substantial intellectual and philosophical effort.

Examining the trajectory of philosophy in the West, perhaps reveals a different facet of philosophical endeavor. Westerners have brought philosophy into the realms of "culture," "society," and even "practical issues", achieving insights that are not strictly scientific. For some time now, culture, politics, economics, law, ethics, management, and other areas in the Western world have been structured based on philosophical approaches. The issues and problems faced by individuals and communities in the West are presented to philosophy and philosophical thought, receiving responses that align with philosophical work and activity.

Can we not have similar expectations from Islamic philosophy? It

seems that such expectations cannot be met by the existing and actualized Islamic philosophy, but they may be met by the future Islamic philosophy. Perhaps only in this way can we once again witness the presence and prominence of Islamic philosophy in the world.

Section Three: A Discussion on the "Problem"

It has been asserted that Islamic philosophy must address contemporary issues or appropriately engage with them to maintain its presence and relevance in the world. Naturally, this can be achieved through problem-oriented philosophical researches. But why is problem-oriented research significant? What are the fundamental characteristics of a problem? Moreover, how does a problem differ from a subject, a question, or a difficulty? In the following, we will attempt to answer these questions.

A. The Importance of Problem-Oriented Research

1. Research is not limited to a purely theoretical and abstract study of a topic or subject but has a fundamental relationship with solving problems. Various issues in cultural, social, ethical, political, economic, legal, managerial, urban, industrial, technological, and other fields are resolved through research. Therefore, if we aim to achieve scientific and effective solutions to fundamental problems, there is no alternative but to pursue these solutions through research.
2. Philosophy (as the theoretical basis for science, industry, and technology) and philosophical research (as a means of expanding and deepening philosophy) can play a unique role in addressing the cultural and social dimensions of various problems at both individual and social levels.
3. Research must possess certain characteristics to competently solve problems. One of the most important characteristics is "problem-orientation", which involves correctly and accurately identifying the problem and structuring the research accordingly.
4. In Islamic countries today, philosophical research is more

"subject-oriented" rather than "problem-oriented." Universities, research institutes, and faculty members typically select topics based on their expertise, interests, or perceived importance, directing philosophical research towards these topics. However, most of these studies do not address fundamental problems effectively.

B. Some Characteristics of Problem

1. A problem, in the precise sense, is an issue that has not yet been answered or has not received a satisfactory answer. A problem that has already been solved adequately and does not require updating is not a genuine subject of research (engaging with such issues reduces research to compilation, composition, collection, and similar activities).
2. Problem-orientation is necessary in all types of research, whether theoretical (fundamental research), strategic (strategic research), or practical (applied research). Each type of research requires appropriate problem identification.
3. Research should not involve "problem-making". A problem is something that exists potentially or actually and must be "discovered" and researched.
4. Problems arise at two levels: sometimes at the level of the "knowledge structure" of a discipline, which must be addressed individually to cover the entire structure of knowledge, much like completing pieces of a puzzle. Other times, problems arise at the "individual-society" level, which scholars then turn into research problems. The first level is a priori, while the second level is a posteriori. The first level is logical and sometimes abstract, while the second level is objective and concrete. Both levels are valuable and noteworthy, although it is essential to distinguish between them and consider the specific research requirements of each, such as research priority, importance, urgency, scheduling, and so on.
5. Problems should not be addressed solely through "single-

discipline" research. Contemporary issues are often complex and multifaceted, requiring "interdisciplinary" research.

6. The research methodology and the specific method appropriate for solving a problem will change depending on the nature of the problem. To effectively solve each type of problem, a suitable and specific method must be employed.

C. Differences Between Problem, Subject, Question, and Difficulty

One of the fundamental problems in philosophical research is the claim of problem-orientation while confusing problems with subjects, questions, or difficulties. Therefore, it seems necessary to clarify the differences between these terms to some extent:

Differences Between Problem and Subject

1. A problem is solved, whereas a subject is addressed. These two approaches naturally have different requirements. Solving a problem is the goal of real research, while addressing a subject is the goal of ceremonial research.
2. A subject is sometimes a broad title that either encompasses various problems or does not pertain to problems (in the true sense) at all. In the first case, the subject needs to be broken down into different problems, and research should focus on a specific problem or several related problems. In the second case, the research is not problem-oriented at all.
3. Research focused on a subject is usually easier than research focused on a problem, as a problem has newer, more serious, more targeted, finer, and sometimes more complex dimensions compared to a subject.
4. A subject might not necessarily engage the researcher's mind, whereas a problem (in the precise sense) is always associated with mental concern and engagement.
5. However, a subject can sometimes be "challenging" (issue). Such a subject is capable of being transformed into several problems through the process of problematization and then researched

accordingly.

Difference Between problem and Question

1. A problem requires resolution through research, whereas a question needs to be answered by consulting knowledge sources or references. These two necessitate different approaches and processes.
2. A problem is a sociological concept that arises from awareness and knowledge, often affecting scientists at the level of knowledge or the individual-society level. In contrast, a question may be a psychological concept stemming merely from curiosity or ignorance.
3. A problem generally has a collective identity, engaging a group of people, whereas a question typically has an individual identity, arising in the mind of one person.
4. In some disciplines, the distinction between a problem and a question is not always clear. Such disciplines are not always problem-oriented but can be question-oriented, like philosophy. However, it is believed that even in these disciplines, including philosophy, being problem-oriented takes precedence.

Difference Between Problem and difficulty

1. A problem is solved, while a difficulty is resolved. These two entail different requirements. In research, a problem is solved to resolve its corresponding difficulties.
2. A problem is inherently researchable, but a difficulty only becomes researchable when it is problematized and become a problem within the realm of knowledge and by scholars.
3. A problem is discussed within the scope of knowledge, while a difficulty exists at the individual-society, governance, and other levels.
4. A problem is subjective, forming in the minds of scholars, whereas a difficulty is objective, existing within individuals and human societies.

Section Four: Strategies for Realizing the Future (Ideal) Islamic Philosophy

In the following sections, we will discuss some strategies that could potentially create capacities for Islamic philosophy to solve problems or address contemporary issues.

It is noteworthy that the strategies for the growth, updating, and renewal of Islamic philosophy are more extensive than those mentioned here, and addressing all of them is beyond the scope of this text. Therefore, we will focus only on the most important and central strategies that seem to enable the realization of the future of Islamic philosophy. These strategies include:

- philosophical attention to new sciences and technologies;
- considering the fourth wave in philosophy;
- engaging with "Philosophy of";
- adopting concrete approaches in philosophy;
- conducting interdisciplinary researches in philosophy;
- employing new methods in philosophy.

A. Philosophical Attention to New Sciences and Technologies

Early Islamic philosophy engaged with the physics and astronomy of its time, particularly Ptolemaic cosmology, leading to beliefs in celestial spheres and a system of universal intellects and souls.¹ These beliefs were later disproved by scientific advancements, and thus, it is natural not to

1. The existence of the celestial spheres is a logical conclusion drawn by ancient philosophers from the assumption of the seven planets. The existence of these seven planets is, in turn, one of the established premises of the Ptolemaic cosmology. Based on this, the ancients posited nine spheres (seven spheres for the seven planets, one sphere for the fixed stars, and an additional empty sphere called the "sphere of spheres"). Similarly, the belief in the existence of celestial souls is also derived from theological findings based on ancient natural sciences and astronomy, which considered circular motion -distinct from the linear motion characteristic of terrestrial bodies- as the most perfect form of motion. This type of motion could not possibly originate from inanimate and unconscious matter; rather, it presupposed the existence of a living, self-aware soul. Consequently, the existence of the nine spheres necessitated the assumption of nine celestial souls, and accordingly, nine intellects were considered as the cause of these souls. Additionally, there was one more intellect, known as the tenth intellect or the agent intellect, which functions as the Giver of Forms and bestows souls upon earthly beings, including the rational human soul (Abbaszadeh, 2019b, p. 263).

expect Islamic philosophy to insist on such outdated beliefs:

"The transformations in empirical sciences are such that they are no longer comparable to the natural sciences of Aristotle and Ibn Sina. Therefore, issues designed based on ancient natural data lose their validity, such as the ten intellects, heavenly souls, the connection of the created to the uncreated based on celestial motions and particular and universal imaginations of heavenly souls, the voluntary nature of the motion of all bodies that have a circular motion, matter and form based on the non-composition of the body from parts, and so on" (Yathribi, 2009, p. 170).

However, a significant concern is that in late Islamic philosophy, the principle of engaging with new empirical sciences was forgotten and has not been pursued seriously and methodically in contemporary Islamic philosophy.

Based on the above points, it seems necessary for Islamic philosophy to pay attention to new empirical sciences and technologies and the philosophical issues they generate, particularly fields like physics (especially Quantum physics), astrophysics, biology, biotechnology, etc. This is a crucial strategy for updating and maintaining the relevance of Islamic philosophy globally, facilitating the realization of a future or ideal Islamic philosophy.

B. Considering the Fourth Wave in Philosophy

Throughout history, philosophy has experienced four major waves or trends (not to imply that other trends have not existed, but rather that the dominant discourse or paradigm has largely been influenced by these four). These four trends are:

- Ontology;
- Epistemology;
- Logical-Linguistic Studies;
- Philosophy of Cognitive Sciences.¹

1. It might be possible to predict the likely nature of the fifth wave or trend in global philosophy through precise future studies.

1. Ontological Trend

The first trend is the dominance of ontological discussions in philosophy. From the inception of classical philosophy in ancient Greece, encompassing pre-Socratic philosophers to Plato, Aristotle, and Neo-Platonic philosophers, followed by medieval philosophers, scholastics, and both early, late and some contemporary Islamic philosophers, the primary concern of philosophers was engaging with ontological and metaphysical issues. This is not to suggest that classical philosophers did not address topics such as knowledge, ethics, art, politics, etc., but rather that their main preoccupation was with the concept of "existence" and particularly "existent".

2. Epistemological Trend

The second trend is the dominance of epistemological discussions in philosophy. From Descartes, Locke, and Hume to Kant and then into the twentieth century, epistemology became a serious topic of philosophical inquiry. With Descartes, human was considered as knowing subjects facing the world and things as the object of knowledge that needed to be understood. With Kant, philosophy focused on studying the a priori conditions of human understanding and knowledge, determining its limitations. This trend reached its peak with the emergence of twentieth-century Western epistemologists, reducing philosophy to epistemology. These philosophers argued that one must first investigate what human can know and the boundaries of his/her knowledge before discussing existence and existent if the capacity for such knowledge is determined to be sufficient.

3. Logical-Linguistic Studies Trend

The third trend is the dominance of logical and linguistic studies in philosophy. The main claim of this trend was that many philosophical problems stem from the inadequacy and lack of clarity in the logic and language used by philosophers throughout history. Thus, before engaging in any philosophical endeavor, one must codify and establish appropriate and clear logic and language. This led to the emergence of analytical

philosophers and logical positivists in the twentieth century, who reduced philosophy to logical and linguistic discussions. Notably, continental philosophy and its schools, such as phenomenology, existentialism, structuralism, post-structuralism, critical theory and others also emerged in the twentieth century and should not be overlooked.

4. Philosophy of Cognitive Sciences Trend

The fourth trend, which philosophy currently resides in, is the dominance of philosophical discussions arising from cognitive sciences, sometime termed "philosophy of cognitive sciences". This branch of philosophy examines the philosophical issues and challenges that emerge from the scientific study of human cognition.

Cognitive sciences arose from significant scientific and technological advancements in the West, especially in neuroscience, computer science, and artificial intelligence, from the early twenty-first century. Cognitive sciences involve the study of the brain, mind, intelligence, and related processes. This field encompasses at least six disciplines and sciences: philosophy of mind, artificial intelligence, cognitive neuroscience, cognitive psychology, cognitive linguistics, and cognitive anthropology, with some also including computer science. Cognitive science issues include processes related to the brain, mind, and intelligence in human, such as thinking and reasoning, perception, consciousness, memory, attention, language, learning, decision-making, prediction, analysis, problem-solving, and more. Cognitive sciences are inherently interdisciplinary.

On one hand, many of the fundamental insights and concepts of cognitive sciences are derived from philosophy, particularly the philosophy of mind. On the other hand, cognitive science findings offer new approaches for philosophers to understand human cognition and its complex processes, potentially steering philosophy away from abstract thinking and pure theorization towards concrete thinking and practical application. Thus, in research, both cognitive sciences need philosophy, and philosophy needs cognitive sciences. This applies to the relationship

between Islamic philosophy and cognitive sciences despite their significant methodological, approach, and finding differences (Abbaszadeh, 2021, pp. 225-226).

It appears necessary for Islamic philosophy to pay attention to cognitive sciences and related topics, such as brain and neuroscience studies, mind and psychology, language, artificial intelligence, and more. Cyberspace is also closely linked to cognitive sciences, as it emerges from computer science and artificial intelligence; hence, Islamic philosophy must give special attention to related issues.

Early and late Islamic philosophy remained focused on ontology, and contemporary Islamic philosophy, in addition to ontology, has somewhat engaged with epistemological discussions. However, it has not pursued logical and linguistic discussions from a philosophical perspective as thoroughly as it should have and has not delved into the philosophy of cognitive sciences or the philosophical issues arising from cognitive sciences. Therefore, a strategy for realizing the future or ideal Islamic philosophy involves special attention to the fourth trend of philosophy and addressing the significant issues presented in this trend.

C. Engaging with "Philosophy of"

Another significant strategy for updating and making Islamic philosophy more relevant and practical and applied is to engage with "Philosophy of" (al-falsafah al-muzaf):

"The nature of philosophy as the 'science of sciences' (Ilm al-Ulum) enables the conversion of various subjects within Islamic philosophy into specialized branches, similar to what has been done in contemporary Western philosophies. The rationality of Islamic religious teachings, along with the intellectual richness and robustness of Islamic rational disciplines in terms of rational and epistemic perspectives on sciences and matters, among other reasons, establish the possibility of creating Islamic 'philosophies of'. ... It must be acknowledged that the world and humanity have changed and updated, and the sciences and disciplines derived from (and constructed upon) the propositions and teachings of ...

Islamic philosophy ... also need to be revisited and renewed to correspond with the emerging views and needs of the modern world" (Rashad, 2019).

"Philosophy of" can be defined as "philosophical reflection on various sciences and matters from an external perspective".¹ Such reflection, as the definition suggests, is necessarily conducted with a "philosophical approach," making it a branch of philosophy. It also examines any science or matter from a perspective "outside the realm of the subject and issues of that science or matter," rather than an internal perspective, making it a second-order knowledge (as opposed to first-order knowledge). "Philosophy of" is divided into two types: Philosophy of matters or categories, such as philosophy of politics, philosophy of language, philosophy of technology, philosophy of mind, etc., and Philosophy of sciences or disciplines, such as philosophy of medicine, philosophy of social sciences, philosophy of political sciences, philosophy of logic, etc. Western thinkers addressed "Philosophy of" centuries earlier than Islamic thinkers, thereby moving their philosophy from the realm of pure theory (abstractness) to the realm of practice and application (concreteness) (Abbaszadeh, 2019a, pp. 8-9).

If Islamic philosophy turns its attention to "Philosophy of", new discussions, such as the philosophy of technology, philosophy of media, philosophy of cyberspace, etc., with an Islamic approach will also emerge. This significant aspect is currently almost neglected in Islamic countries and could be a crucial strategy for realizing ideal Islamic philosophy in the future.

D. Adopting Concrete Approaches in Philosophy

Islamic philosophy, particularly in its early and late stages and even sometimes in contemporary times, has largely maintained an abstract approach. However, it seems necessary for this philosophy to also

1. Additionally, "philosophy of" is defined as "the rational and higher-order study of a particular science or scientific field, or a systematic-consideration matter (real or conventional, epistemic or non-epistemic), to attain universal judgments (overarching and specific) related to the subject matter" (Rashad, 2015, p. 27). Although this definition may appear somewhat complex and difficult to grasp, it generally meets the criteria for an accurate and robust definition.

consider concrete approaches to address the issues faced by individuals and societies today. The reality is that contemporary human problems are primarily not of an abstract nature but are cultural and social issues (at the societal level) and personal daily concerns and anxieties (at the individual level).

Islamic philosophy is similar to classical rationalist Western philosophies in this regard, which generally think abstractly. However, in the West, from the late nineteenth century and especially in the twentieth century, some continental philosophies, such as phenomenology and particularly existentialism, emerged that distanced themselves from classical, especially abstract, approaches and pursued concrete approaches relevant to contemporary human issues:

"This school or trend [existentialism] focuses on the individual not as a knowing subject possessing abstract general qualities, but more as an acting being, with feelings, lacking predetermined essence, and unique. Some existential philosophers seek to understand the existence and the meaning of it concretely through human analysis. Thus, existential philosophy often follows two paths: analyzing human and his/her qualities and discovering the meaning of existence; although, in this pursuit, they do not use speculative reason and metaphysical systems, but rather oppose them and suffice with concrete analysis and phenomenological description of matters" (Abbaszadeh, 2017, p. 14).

Islamic philosophy needs to distance itself somewhat from its traditional abstract approach and adopt a concrete approach to issues, which seems to be an important strategy for renewing and making this philosophy practical, ultimately achieving the future ideal Islamic philosophy.

E. Conducting Interdisciplinary Researches in Philosophy

Currently, the boundaries of different sciences are determined by "interdisciplinary" researches. Based on this, solving modern issues sometimes requires enlisting the collaboration of several other sciences and organizing interdisciplinary researches.

Interdisciplinarity in contemporary knowledge refers to the field of study and research in which issues are examined using the foundations and methods of several specialized sciences (Matin, 2013, pp. 111-119).

Interdisciplinarity has various types, among which three main types can be mentioned: cross-disciplinary, multi-disciplinary, and trans-disciplinary (Darzi, Faramarz Gharamaleki, & Pahlavan, 2013, pp. 74-76).

Attention should be given to interdisciplinary studies in Islamic philosophy and the interrelationship of this philosophy with contemporary matters and subjects. With such attention, studies like philosophy and technology, philosophy and civilization, philosophy and culture, philosophy and cyberspace, etc., will take shape with an Islamic approach.

Islamic philosophy has so far limited itself to single-discipline research. Therefore, an important strategy for realizing the future or ideal Islamic philosophy, which can have something significant to say in the modern world, is conducting interdisciplinary researches in philosophy.

F. Employing New Methods in Philosophy

Regarding the importance of methodology, it can be said that science is enriched by issues, and issues are presented in systematic studies and are analyzed and answered through "methodological" research (Faramarz Gharamaleki, 2001, p. 22).

Methodology is a theory about method. The historical trajectory of Islamic philosophy's methodology shows us that Peripatetic philosophy adopted the rational and demonstrative method; Illuminationist philosophy followed a composite method of rational and intuitive (=Illuminationist) method; Transcendent philosophy, in the general sense, is also Illuminationist because it utilizes both reason and intuition, although it sometimes adheres to the transmitted method. Therefore, in the history of Islamic philosophy (early, late, and contemporary), not many diverse methods are observed.

In contemporary Western philosophy, particularly since the twentieth

century, there has been a proliferation of methodologies and the application of new methods. Consequently, a variety of schools and philosophical perspectives have emerged. Western philosophy, depending on the issues it addresses, employs not only traditional philosophical methods but also methods such as dialectical, empirical and positivist, pragmatic, logical and linguistic analysis, genealogical, phenomenological, interpretive-hermeneutical, semantic, and more. For example, regarding the importance of logical-semantic analysis and the necessity of employing it in Islamic philosophy, one can state:

"Critiquing a theory, that is, the effort to evaluate and determine its value, depends on clarifying the concepts involved in that theory, which in turn depends on having a method for defining and clarifying concepts ... This method is produced by philosophers ... If we take analytic philosophy, one of the influential schools in our time, as a model, Islamic philosophy is very poor in this regard and needs serious work" (Alizadeh, 2010, p. 7).

Therefore, it seems necessary for Islamic philosophy to also pay attention to new methodologies and utilize up-to-date and effective methods in its research to address issues effectively. This, too, can be considered a fundamental strategy for the flourishing of this philosophy and the realization of a future or ideal Islamic philosophy.

Conclusion

In this paper, we first addressed topics such as the nature, possibility, and realization of Islamic philosophy; the achievements of this philosophy; and its historical evolution (early, late, and contemporary Islamic philosophies). Then, three types of Islamic philosophy (as a concept, as an actualized reality, and future or ideal) were differentiated. While discussing the "problem" (the importance of philosophical research and problem-orientation, some characteristics of the problem, and the difference between a problem, subject, question, and difficulty), the most important and central strategies for achieving the future or ideal Islamic

philosophy -a philosophy engaged with contemporary issues- were proposed and emphasized:

1. It is very important for Islamic philosophy to focus on empirical sciences and new technologies, and the philosophical issues that these sciences and technologies create, especially sciences and technologies such as physics, astrophysics, biology, biotechnology, artificial intelligence, etc.
2. Philosophy has gone through four major waves or trends: ontology, epistemology, logical-linguistic studies, and philosophy of cognitive sciences. The fourth trend, is a branch of philosophy, examines the philosophical issues and challenges arising from the scientific study of human cognition. It seems necessary for Islamic philosophy to pay special attention to this "fourth wave".
3. Another significant approach for modernizing and making Islamic philosophy more relevant and practical is to engage with "philosophy of". This can be defined as "philosophical reflection on various sciences and matters from an external perspective".
4. Islamic philosophy, particularly in its early and late stages and even sometimes in contemporary times, has largely maintained an abstract approach. However, it seems necessary for this philosophy to also consider concrete approaches, such as phenomenology and existentialism, to address individual and social contemporary issues.
5. Currently, the boundaries of different sciences are determined by "interdisciplinary researches". Solving modern issues sometimes requires enlisting the collaboration of Islamic philosophy and several other sciences and organizing interdisciplinary researches.
6. Islamic philosophy can benefit from new methodologies and utilize up-to-date and effective methods, such as genealogical, phenomenological, interpretive-hermeneutical, semantic, etc., in its researches to address issues.

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Developing Political Theory: The State for Farabi vs. Hobbes

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ABSTRACT

According to Thomas Hobbes, public should and they normally accept what they find in place just because the alternative is destabilization and chaos. In this paper, I will argue that in Farabi's theory the government actually would put its pace forward. As Farabi saw it, the state not only is the source of some benefits but also should be and is the source of human beings' virtue and happiness. For Farabi, the first governor of the state resembles the heart in a body, or a physician in a city. Farabi's utopia literally meaning 'the excellent state', consists of five levels. On the first level stands the philosopher or the prophet. The second level includes poets, music composers, writers and the likes of them. Farabi strongly believes in the power of imagination and that most people are under the influence of their imaginative faculty. This notion has an important outcome which influences his view on religion, prophet, and their relation with the public: images, in his view, are the most powerful means of influencing the public.

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Introduction

Mentioned in mythology also in theology, the Leviathan sounds a sea snake demon referred to in the Book of Psalms, the Book of Job, the Book of Isaiah, and the pseudepigraphical Book of Enoch. As a personification of chaos, the Leviathan usually threatens to consume the damned – who are condemned by God to suffer from everlasting punishment in hell - when their life is over.

According to Christian theologians Leviathan is exemplified by the demon of envy, the deadly sin. For Ophite diagrams, the Leviathan could be regarded as a truncated version of the space of material world.

As a parable and analogy, Leviathan is used in the political philosophy of English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) among others. I will argue Hobbes philosophical vantage point on this biblical parable and then Farabi's philosophical theory regarding the issue.

The Parable of the Leviathan in Thomas Hobbes's Political Philosophy

Leviathan or *The Matter, Form and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil*, is a book authored by Thomas Hobbes, one of the founders of modern political philosophy, and published in 1651 (Williams 2023; Sheldon 2003, p. 253) In this book, he developed a powerful and influential formulation of social contract theory (Lloyd and Sreedhar 2022) As Rescher sees it, in Hobbes theory the state lives a life of its own. It is an organism of sorts: the populace is its body politic and the governing apparatus its head. And people should and they generally do accept what they find in place because the alternative is destabilization—chaos, a war of all against all (Rescher, 2015, p.107) The following excerpt of Hobbes *Leviathan* clearly shows the core of his political theory:

A time of Warre, where every man is Enemy to every man; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other

security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withall. In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth; no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short (Hobbes, 1991, part 1, chap. 13; Rescher, 2015, p.106-107)

Rousseau's view of the government was somehow the contrary to that of Hobbes's. Because Rousseau believes that the state is not the restrictor of social discord but its source (Rousseau, 1954, book 1, chap. 1; 1979, p. 37; Rescher, 2015, p.108) However in his political philosophy, Hegel (1770–1831) added a positive side to the state. As he addressed the issue, the government is not merely the best alternative of destabilization, chaos, and the war of all against all. Instead, the government is an indispensable source of constructive resources for the benefit of its people. Put in other words, the state exists not only to reduce harm as per Hobbes, but also to provide many positive benefits (Rescher, 2015, p.108)

Farabi's Political Philosophy

In Farabi's theory the government would put its pace forward. As Farabi saw it, the state not only is the source of some benefits but also should be and is the source of human beings' virtue and happiness. For Farabi, the first governor of the state resembles the heart in a body, or a physician in a city (Farabi, 2003; 2013, 116-117; 1991, 56-58; 2004, 6-7) I will argue his notion analyzing the structure of Farabi's utopia.

Farabi's utopia (al-madīnat al-fāḍila), literally meaning 'the excellent state', consists of five levels. On the first level stands the philosopher (filsūf) or the prophet (nabī). The second level includes poets (shu'arā),

music composers (mulaḥḥinūn), writers (kuttāb) and “the likes of them” (Farabi 2004: 54-55) Why does Farabi put poets and writers right after the prophet and the philosopher? Why does he name them as “carriers of religion” (ḥamalāt al-dīn)?

Some contemporary studies have focused on Farabi’s poetics, analyzing his logical writings on the subject (Kemal 1991) while more recent studies have marked out the notability of artists in Farabi’s utopia from a philosophical perspective (Maftouni 2007). Both approaches have speculated, to some extent, the process of mimesis (muḥākā) and how it could be used to affect the audience, but a general axiom in Farabi’s philosophy might have been overlooked. Farabi strongly believes in the power of imagination (khīyāl) and that most people are under the influence of their imaginative faculty (al-quwwat al-mutakhayyila). This notion has an important outcome which influences his view on religion (milla), prophet, and their relation with the public (jumhūr): Images, in his view, are the most powerful means of influencing the public. Regarding this principle, it could be concluded that there is a shared function between the poet and the prophet. In other words, Farabi’s prophet performs, in part, a poetic task. An examination of Farabi’s utopia is essential in deriving such a conclusion.

Levels of Utopia

Farabi’s hierarchical structure for his utopia consists of five ranks, first of which belongs to the head of state who is primarily the philosopher or the prophet. But who is the prophet and what is the religion? In some instances, Farabi has spoken of the philosopher and the sage (ḥakīm) as the head of utopia without mentioning the prophet (Farabi 2004: 55) What view leads him to use these ascriptions alternatively? How does he define philosopher and prophet? What is the relation between them? And how are they linked to the second rank? How these questions relate to the power of images?

On different occasions, Farabi introduces the head of utopia to be the

philosopher or the prophet or the lawmaker (wāḍe' al-nawāmīs) (Farabi 2003: 121; 2005: 92; See also: Nuri 2019: 92) These are three characteristics of the same entity. Considering the notion of achieving the intellectual truth (al-ḥaqā'eq al-aqlīyya) from the active intellect (al-aql al-fā'āl), he is the philosopher (Farabi 2003: 121) His translation of the intellectual concepts into words understandable for the public makes him the prophet (Farabi 2003: 121) And the laws (nawāmīs) he designs to set rules for the society makes him the lawmaker (Farabi 2005: 92) The second rank of Farabi's utopia is not limited to poets but includes music composers and writers near the orators (khutabā) and preachers (bulaghā). Describing them all as "carriers of religion", he leaves room for similar fields by adding "and all those who are in the same pattern and are counted among them." (Farabi 2004: 54) The third rank consists of those who deal with calculation and measurement (muqaddirūn) like architects and physicians. The fourth rank includes strivers (mujāhidūn) like fighters and guards. And the last rank belongs to those who deal with capital (mālīyyūn) like merchants, businessmen, farmers and peasants (Farabi 2004: 54-55) There should be close ties between the first two ranks of the utopia since the first belongs to the prophet and the second to the carriers of religion. But what point defines the relation between these two ranks? How does the second rank carry the religion defined by the first rank?

An examination of Farabi's regard to poetics and how he describes the capabilities of, not only poets, but music composers, sculptors and painters whom henceforward we loosely call artists, would benefit the understanding of the first rank of utopia and its relation to poetics.

Perceptual Faculties of the Soul

Farabi introduces the concept of perceptual faculties which should be regarded as a prerequisite to further topics. According to him, there are three perceptual faculties in the soul: the sensory faculty (al-quwwat al-ḥāssa), the imaginative faculty and the intellectual faculty (al-quwwat al-nātiqa). The sensory faculty is in charge of the five senses, while the

intellectual faculty conceives the meanings without any attachment to imaginary or sensory forms. The sensory faculty is realized in every living human being and also in animals while the intellectual faculty is exclusive to human beings and is realized in very few of them. But the imaginative faculty, which is in an intermediary position, is the one that Farabi focuses on when dealing with the public. He marks out three functions for the imaginative faculty first of which is saving the forms received by the senses as the senses lose touch with those forms (e.g. being able to review one's appearance after the eyes are closed). The second function is composition and decomposition of such forms. In some instances, the outcome matches with the things in the sensible realm and in some instances it does not (Farabi 2003: 84, 95) (e.g. attaching the wings of an eagle to a lion and creating a flying lion). The third function of the imaginative faculty is mimesis (muḥākā). It is solely this faculty, among the three faculties, which has the ability of creating alternative images for sensible objects (maḥsūsāt) (e.g. likening the beloved to a flower) or creating allegorical images for intellectual ideas (ma'qūlāt). The latter function, besides dealing with poetics, has a role in Farabi's theory of prophethood (nubuwwa) which will be discussed later. But as an instance, Farabi mentions that Plato in his *Timaeus* has implemented the rendering of intelligible concepts into their allegories from among sensible entities "like the one who likens matter with desert or nothingness with darkness." (Farabi 2005: 70)

Farabi's Poetics and the Power of Images

The main focus of this writing is the relation between prophethood and imagination, and a discussion on Farabi's poetics and its relation to imagination needs extended examination. Here are merely some instances where he stresses the importance of creating images for the audience of art.

In his definition for poetic accounts (al-aqāwīl al-shi'rīyya), Farabi expresses that, first and foremost, he believes in the effectiveness of

images: “A poetic account consists of words that arouse emotions in the listener, or represent a thing at a superior level compared to what it is in reality or at an inferior level. It consists of the description of elegance, ugliness, grandeur, pudency and so forth. As we hear a poem, the feeling that we perceive is similar to that which we perceive when we observe [for instance] a disgusting object” (Farabi 1996: 42; 1949: 67-68) In this definition he underlines the stimulation of feelings which is caused by perception of effective images. In his *The Grand Book of Music* (kitāb al-mūsīqī al-kabīr), Farabi classifies melodies and songs into three types. He firstly mentions songs that cause tranquility and delight for the soul without having any additional function. He then marks out songs that, besides causing comfort, create images and imaginations in the soul. The third type includes songs sung by a person affected by agony and ecstasy (Farabi 1967: 62-63) His classification of songs to passive, imaginative and comforting is again mentioned further in the same book (Farabi 1998: 19-20)

When describing the intentions of those who sing songs or perform music, he marks out that some implement a melody in order to make a statement more imaginable and more comprehensible (Farabi 1998: 24) In another classification aimed at paintings and statues, he puts them into two categories of advantageous and less advantageous. The latter type merely intends to cause joy (ladhdha) for the senses without any additional benefit for the soul while the former type, in addition to causing joy, creates imaginations and depicts other meanings through mimesis (Farabi 1967: 1180) This function, besides being a task done by a painter or a poet, is the one he emphasizes when dealing with the relation between revelation, the prophet and the public.

Prophethood and Mimesis

Farabi’s theory of prophethood is based on his views regarding functions of the imaginative faculty. The process of revelation (wahy) is explained by Farabi in two aspects, both springing from his theory of imagination:

First, pertaining to perception of the revelation from the active intellect and second, transmission of the revelation to the public. Farabi believes that the prophet is a person who has accomplished the levels of perfection and has reached a connection with the active intellect (Farabi 2003: 115) Such a connection is established when one's imaginative faculty reaches the utmost perfection (Farabi 2003: 110). What is bestowed from God (Allah¹) to the active intellect reaches the prophet's intellectual faculty and then it reaches his imaginative faculty (Farabi 2003: 121). This faculty in the prophet has the utmost power which makes sensible objects and sensory forms less effective in occupying it. It is not entirely submissive to the intellectual faculty either. As a result, at the same time that the imaginative faculty of the prophet is busy dealing with the intellectual faculty and the sensory faculty, it still owns a wide empty space and an enormous power for its internal functions. The imaginative faculty of such a person is similar to that of an ordinary person while being asleep. The imaginative faculty of a sleeping person is free from both intellectual and sensory faculties (Farabi 2003: 110)

What is the role of the imaginative faculty in this theory? Why isn't Farabi satisfied with the intellectual faculty alone receiving all the intellectual concepts from the active intellect? It seems the main reason Farabi has for the inclusion of the imaginative faculty in his characterization of the prophethood is that prophet's role is basically transferring the ultimate truth gained from the active intellect to the public. Such intellectual concepts are not perceivable by the public since the majority of people ('āmma) are unable to implement their intellectual faculty whether because of natural limitations (ṭab') or because they are not accustomed to it ('āda) (Farabi 2013: 89) Emphasizing such inability in perception of intellectual concepts (ma'qūlāt), Farabi concludes that the

1. Aside from mentioning Allah as the primary cause, it is hard to trace any reference to a particular religion or prophet in Farabi's discussions on revelation and prophethood while there are direct remarks on how various religions can function in different utopias (Farabi 1997: 226) since he, like Plato, believes that the idea is one, and then asserts that the examples that prophets issue for every society might vary based on people's diverse perceptions. (Farabi 1997: 226)

prophet, or the sages of the utopia, who are most aware of the intellectual truth, convey it to people's imaginative faculties through allegories and examples (Farabi 2013: 89), that is, by means of an imaginable form. As an instance, Farabi mentions that there are some degrees in the existence which are not space bound or time bound and therefore these degrees are not easy to imagine for the people which makes it inevitable to make time-and space-bound allegories to make them understand those degrees (Farabi 2005: 70-71) Although the head of utopia is intimate with argument and reasoning, he uses tangible allegories dealing with the masses and tries to persuade them by using their imagination (Farabi 2005: 79; 1986:152) He mentions that the imaginative faculty, through mimesis, has the power of creating images for the most inexplicable and intangible intellectual ideas like the primary cause (al-mabda' al-awwal) and separate substances (mufāriqāt) (Farabi 2003: 106-107) In one instance, when describing the advantageous type of music, Farabi mentions the rendering of intellectual concepts into imaginable forms and then offers an unexpected example:

Like the way of the ancient statues which were revered by the public in the old days given that they were exemplifications of the deities they were worshipping besides Allah, be he glorified, or apart from him. Because they were depicted based on characteristics which informed the deeds, behaviors and sentiments they attributed to those deities. Like what Galen has recounted of the idols he saw, or like what is now present in farthest sites of India (Farabi 1967: 62-63)

The remarkable point about this example is how he shifts from music to faith and ideology. Can we conclude that he has the same believe about what his ideal philosopher-prophet does? Is his religion, in the same way, consisting of allegories that, through mimesis, tend to render the intellectual concepts into imaginable forms?

Religion as the Artistic Creation of the Philosopher

As we mentioned in prophet's case, Farabi marks out that the active intellect bestows intellectual concepts to prophet's intellectual faculty and then these concepts are transmitted to his imaginative faculty. Whether the latter part, i.e. the transmission of intellectual concepts to the imaginative faculty of the prophet, is done by the active intellect or by the prophet himself, is a subject of controversy (See: Ibn Taymīyya 1955: 361-362) Some have assumed that Farabi believes this transition could not be done by the active intellect since what he transfers is merely intellectual and immaterial (*mujarrad*) and the active intellect has no relation with imaginable or sensible arenas. If this leads to the conclusion that prophet himself is converting the intelligible concepts into imaginary forms, there will be a byproduct. Based on such a conclusion it could be said that many verses in the scripture (i.e. Quran), at least the verses that deal with imaginable details, are not actually the contents of revelation, but are the result of prophet's effort in rendering the intelligible into imaginable. So, is Farabi saying it is the prophet who creates these images about afterlife, heaven and hell, or are these the exact images transmitted by the active intellect to the prophet and the prophet has not altered or created anything? If one concludes that Farabi believes it is the prophet who does the conversion of intellectual to imaginable, it would necessarily mean that, Farabi believes the contents of the scripture, unlike what is stated in it, are not untouched narration of the revelation, but the prophet's representation of the intellectual ideas he has received from the active intellect. Farabi doesn't give a direct reply to this question while his succeeding philosopher, Avicenna, mentions in one instance that what prophet receives from the active intellect is merely intellectual (*al-'aql al-mahḍ*) but he has been allowed to implement imagination to render these intellectual ideas understandable for the public (Avicenna 1952: 17) That debate aside, it is a fact that Farabi believes the head of state, in case of his own words, uses imaginary ways to simplify intellectual concepts and teach them to the public (Farabi 1995: 85) He also believes that the lawmaker, which is another feature of the head of state, has a

responsibility of teaching the laws to the public with persuasive (iqnāʿī) skills and depicting it with imaginary forms (Farabi 1986:152) While mentioning the use of persuasion (iqnāʿ) and imagination (takhyīl) in dealing with the public, Farabi underlines that the public are more compliant with imagination rather than persuasion. These points explain why Farabi assigns a poetic feature to the prophet spelling out how the second rank of the utopia should include artists as carriers of religion.

Conclusion

in Hobbes theory the state lives a life of its own. It is an organism of sorts: the populace is its body politic and the governing apparatus its head. And people should and they generally do accept what they find in place because the alternative is destabilization—chaos, a war of all against all. Rousseau's view of the government was somehow the contrary to that of Hobbes's. Because Rousseau believes that the state is not the restrictor of social discord but its source. However, in his political philosophy, Hegel added a positive side to the state. As he addressed the issue, the government is not merely the best alternative of destabilization, chaos, and the war of all against all. Instead, the government is an indispensable source of constructive resources for the benefit of its people. Put in other words, the state exists not only to reduce harm as per Hobbes, but also to provide many positive benefits.

For Farabi, the first governor of the state resembles the heart in a body, or a physician in a city and the state is and should be the origin of individuals' virtue and happiness. Farabi designs a hierarchical utopia consisting of five levels, first of which belongs to the philosopher or the prophet. The second rank includes 'carriers of the religion' who are preachers, orators, poets, music composers, writers and so on. There is a shared task between the first two ranks which is the translation of intellectual concepts into imaginable forms in order to make them understandable for the public. The philosopher, on the first level, uses allegories to render the intelligible into imaginable and it is this regard

towards the public that makes him the prophet. The artists' duty, on the second level includes, but is not limited to, the same task of simplification of intellectual concepts. This is what makes them the 'carriers of religion'. An interpretation of Farabi's discussions on philosopher, prophet and utopia could lead to the notion that religion is nothing but the artistic creation of the philosopher, a product which tends to approximate the public to the intellectual truth.

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Social Justice and Unity and Its Relationship with the Ideal Society from the Perspective of Abolhasan Ameri

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ABSTRACT

Ameri has a special perspective on the ideal society and its realization. He proposes individual and social moderation or justice and individual unity between internal forces and social unity among the members of society. Ameri believes that moderation, as the main component of virtue and happiness, acts at both the individual and social levels. At the individual level, moderation of the forces of the soul leads to the realization of the virtue of unity and ultimately causes the perfection of the human form and individual happiness, and at the social level, moderation is the factor that unifies society. Unity in society is the factor that keeps it Durable and differentiation in it causes its corruption and ruin. This unity is achieved from total justice and can be considered, from Ameri's perspective, an effect or characteristic of culture. This moderation and unity are not only raised in the individual and total dimension, but also include other dimensions such as the geography of the earth. Religion, with its individual and total moral and juridical commands, reason, with its sovereignty over powers, and love, with its unification of similar matters, play a fundamental role in achieving total moderation or justice and social unity.

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Introduction

One of the central concerns of Islamic philosophers has been the conditions and causes of the realization of a desirable society. One of the positions from which Islamic philosophy entered the discussion of civilization and culture has been the issue of a desirable society or the valuation of societies, which has been accompanied by the examination of what social virtue is. One of the most important periods influential in this study is the third and fourth Islamic centuries, during which culture and civilization - after a period of decline in Iran - regained their independence and were maturing, and for this reason, in those centuries, the real need of these categories to basic theories had become more apparent than ever.

The famous philosopher of that period, Abu Al-Hasan Ameri (381 AH), was one of the central thinkers who, while presenting a philosophical account of moderation and justice¹ that occurs in the context of Islamic culture and civilization - in the true sense of the word -, is led to the element of unity as the main effect of moderation and the factor of stability of society. Before Amiri, the second teacher, Farabi, had extensively entered into such discussions, and it can be said that Farabi, in his time, devoted his main attention to theorizing about civilization and culture (of course, in accordance with the Islamic environment) (for example, see: Farabi, undated, p. 46). After him, Ibn Sina (for example, see: Ibn Sina, 1953, p. 112) and Miskawayh al-Razi can be considered as examples of figures who have given philosophical thoughts in this area. Amiri's view, which presents a kind of moderate and unity-oriented value, reveals a virtuous person in the individual sphere and a virtuous society in the social sphere, but the relationship between

1. Given the diverse and irregular use of the two terms moderation and justice in Ameri's works, while paying attention to the possibility of distinguishing between these two terms in philosophy, in this article we have used them almost in the same sense. We may consider moderation to be a lower degree or a precursor to justice. However, due to the lack of centrality of the difference between these in the subject of the present article and the lack of terminological recording of this difference in Ameri's work, I have not committed myself to respecting it in this article.

the two (individual and society) is not a necessary relationship or a ratio of part to whole. In other words, a virtuous and desirable society does not necessarily arise from the gathering of moderate people. However, in Islam, a framework has been designed to pave this path – that is, the journey from gathering virtuous individuals to forming a virtuous community.

The central point of the present article is that moderation and its unification are the factors that sustain society, while avoiding moderation and achieving differentiation cause corruption and ruin in society. The aforementioned moderation in the context of society is such that, considering the type of Ameri's encounter, it can be considered the main attribute of a desirable culture from his perspective. In other words, it can be said that the moderate direction of society that the complete form of which is the unity of society and is considered the underlying pillar of society, can be considered by him as culture, or in a better way, the moderate context of which the aforementioned unity is the main and central effect, can be considered as culture from the perspective of our philosopher. Another main principle in this research is that this moderate context or culture, in its desired state, has a result or fruit called unity. In other words, the formation of a desirable culture has stages that can be drawn in a continuum, from moderation to unity and from mere society to civilized society. The importance of moderation in this discussion is so central that it also has a serious impact on geographical, behavioral, and outward aspects of human beings. Love is also an effective category in this process that should be given serious attention in this research.

1. Virtue, justice, and its role in the formation of unity (unity) in the two sphere individual and society

Human happiness has been a very concerning issue in Islamic philosophy. Ameri considers happiness to be the perfection of the human "form" (reason) in both theoretical and practical aspects (Ameri, 2019, p. 52). Islamic philosophers have considered this happiness to be the result of

acquiring theoretical and practical virtues. From Ameri's perspective, this perfection is achieved through the acquisition of the three virtues of chastity, courage, and wisdom, and of course, the highest virtue is justice (ultimate moderation), which includes the other virtues (Ameri, 2019, p. 160). It is worth noting that the inclusion of justice over other virtues is not the inclusion of a set; rather, it is a union in which the Included object, is the effect or result of multiple things and somehow belongs to a higher and more complete level of those parts. Ameri believes that this value, which "includes" other values, is "born" from the intermediate state of the soul among those other virtues. (Ameri, 2019, p. 289). The expression of birth in Ameri's language refers to the realization of a new thing called justice, which is a specific and distinct entity, not a collection or mixture of virtues. In other words, the perfection of the form, which is considered by Ameri as human happiness, is the other feature of justice, and until justice resulting from the moderation of the three powers is formed, this unified "form" will not be completed. In other words, as a result of the moderation of powers, a new being is produced, which is called the human "form" with the characteristic of justice, and before this form or justice is achieved, a personal and unique form for man cannot be assumed - except in a very weak way.

In support of the above conclusion, Ameri believes that the survival of every real thing, including the survival of man, is linked to justice (Ameri, 2019, p. 188), and eternity is linked to justice, and corruption and decay are linked to lack of moderation (Ameri, 2019, p. 152). In other words, the greater the justice – which is the unifying aspect of other virtues – the greater the survival of the thing that has justice, and the greater the lack of moderation, imbalance, and plurality of virtues, the greater and sooner the corruption of the thing characterized by injustice will come. Also, in confirming the point that injustice is accompanied by more plurality and differentiation, Ameri attributes another negative attribute called harm, which means suffering and torment, directly to differentiation and plurality, which is the opposite of unity and oneness (Ameri, 1398, p. 71).

He states explicitly: The more the separate powers of man gather and unite, the higher their rank and become stronger, and the more they separate from each other and become more numerous, the lower their existential degree and become weaker (Ameri, 1375, p. 369).

Therefore, it should be emphasized that from Ameri's perspective, justice does not result from the juxtaposition of chastity, courage, and moderate intellect; rather, Ameri considers this juxtaposition to be only the joining of separate matters to each other (and not the achievement of justice), and its opposite is the splitting of the parts of a connected matter (Ameri, 2019, p. 71). Similarly, the moderation of a power does not mean several good and several bad things that have a moderate outcome; rather, it means a single virtue that has all those qualities in a unified way (Ameri, 2019, p. 99); not simply their combination with each other.

The same situation is true for society. The explanation is that a blissful society is a society that has virtue, the necessary condition of which is the virtue of the individuals of that society - such as moderation in the existence of the individual, the necessary condition of which is the moderation of his powers - and in other words, the prerequisite for the virtue of the community is the virtue of the individuals; but just as the virtue of the individual means the unity of powers and the achievement of a unified matter that encompasses all the virtues of powers, the virtue of the community is also the result of the emergence of a unified just matter that is not simply the aggregate of individual justices, but a single justice that is comprehensive in relation to different individual justices and gathers all justices in the same unity. In other words, social justice is not simply the result of the sum of individual justices. Ameri believes that the unvirtuous Medina and the people of sin and error are a Medina that cannot be considered a unity and should be considered as multiple Medinas (Ameri, 2019, p. 215). Thus, he equates an unhappy Medina with a lack of unity, which shows that from his perspective, the enjoyment of social virtue, which is collective justice, cannot be achieved except by achieving unity in society. Of course, he does not consider this

virtue to be independent of individual virtues and believes that collective virtue cannot occur unless there are individual virtues (as a necessary but not sufficient condition) (Ameri, 2019, p. 215). Quoting Plato, he says: A happy society is a wise, courageous, and chaste society, and it does not have to be populous and wealthy; rather, it must be a single united society (Ameri, 2019, p. 217). This statement means that a blissful Medina, while possessing all the perfections (such as wisdom, courage, and chastity), must have unity, and having those perfections in a dispersed form – or in other words, in different parts of society – is not enough, and the aforementioned perfections can be considered a necessary condition for the realization of a blissful society. In this way, just as individual justice brings about a unity in man that is inherent in the human form, and the perfection of this form determines the ultimate happiness of the individual, social moderation also brings about a unity in society that is a form for society, and society, without this unified form, is not considered a society - in the idiomatic sense of the word. Given that in contemporary cultural sciences, culture is considered the main factor in the formation of society and the agent that forms unity in it, this form of social unity in Ameri's view - which is also considered the invisible factor in the formation of society - can be considered by him to be the same "culture" - despite the fact that he himself did not mention culture or a word with its meaning.

2. The design of justice and unity at the three individual, social and geographical levels

Considering the previous discussions, it became clear that moderation is the component of justice and that is the component of culture - the same single platform whose essence is the unity of society. Also, the moderation of the three forces in the individual and society was mentioned earlier. Ameri also adds another level to the representatives of moderation, which is called geographical moderation. While accepting the element of geography in moderation, he considers the example of social

moderation as "Iranshahr" (Ameri, 2006, p. 65 and Hamo, 2010, p. 16). This is because, in his opinion, material geography, like the human body and soul, as well as society, accepts a moderate state, and the interpretation of this state in geography is a point or region of the world that has the most moderate climate and animals and humans. Of course, in this case too, the most important axis for realizing a moderate state in geography is reason (Ameri, 2006, p. 66), and it is the reason of humans that primarily causes the formation of moderation in a geographical area, and other factors are in a secondary position. It is because of this subordination of moderation to reason that animals do not possess culture and its necessities (Ameri, 2010, p. 76).

Therefore, from Ameri's perspective, moderation can be realized not only in the human body and soul and in the structure of society, but also in the environment and even geography, and this is what creates a unified whole from the set of components involved in human life, in which each thing is placed in its proper place. It is worth noting that references to "Iranshahr" were also reported before him, including Ibn Rosteh in the third century (Ibn Rosteh, 1892, p. 96). Mas'udi also mentioned Iranshahr in the first half of the fourth century (Mas'udi, 1381, pp. 36-37). Also, Maqdisi (381 AH), who was contemporary with Ameri, has clarified this matter and the term Iranshahr (Maqdisi, 1906, p. 47), and after Ameri, people such as Yaqut Hamavi (624) (Hamavi, 1995, p. 289) and Mostofi (750 AH) (Mostofi, 1381, p. 19-22) have referred to Iranshahr and its moderation. It is also worth mentioning that the issue of the influence of geography on civilization and culture (beliefs, customs, etc.) other than Ameri was expressed by philosophers such as Farabi in the period before Ameri and by Ibn Sina in the period after Ameri, and this matter has been expanded in detail by the Ikhwan al-Safa. Another type of expansion of the axes of moderation to matters outside the category of ethics can be seen among researchers of that period, such as Ibn Meskuyah, in response to Abu-Hayyan Tawhidi, examining the relationship between virtue and the physical condition of its owner (Tawhidi, 2019, p. 106).

3. How to achieve the ideal society from Ameri's perspective

After analyzing unity as the main characteristic of the ideal culture from Ameri's perspective, we will discuss his view on how to achieve the ideal society.

In the individual dimension, following his predecessors, he enumerates the types of virtues that are formed on the basis of dividing the soul into its powers; with the difference that he also refers to its objective requirements. For example, he deals with "will" (*hemmah*) as a moral description, explains its middle ground, examines its object, and considers its difference from its corresponding concepts, and then pays attention to its practical realization (Ameri, 2019, p. 122).

Ameri follows the same path in the social dimension; he proposes the centrality of justice in society and discusses it (Ameri, 2019, p. 197). Similarly, as with the individual aspect of justice, he also proposes the opposite situation of justice in the social dimension, namely, oppression. It is worth noting that this type of dealing with justice by Ameri is different from his aforementioned philosophical analysis of justice. He mentions Amir al-Mu'minin Ali (AS) as a symbol of social justice, who advised Malik al-Ashtar to refrain from oppression and introduced the oppressor as doomed to destruction in this world and the hereafter (Ameri, 2019, p. 200). The concept of harm (harassment) versus justice was previously mentioned, and it was made clear that the former is divisive, corrupting, and destructive, while the latter is sustaining and creative; in a social context too, oppression is destructive, while justice is unifying and sustaining. According to Ameri, social injustice destroys the unity resulting from social justice – which is a characteristic of a desirable culture – and in other words, injustice destroys the desired cultural situation. The agency of justice in relation to survival is something that Islamic philosophers have long paid attention to. For example, Khwaja Nasir al-Din Tusi says that individual and personal moderation will lead to the survival of the body (Tusi, 2004, p. 163).

Amiri enumerates the causes of unity (*ittihad*) and separation (*forghah*)

and considers it the duty of the ruler to care for this unity and its causes. This unity is so strong in his opinion that it leads to a situation where the property of each individual is as if it were the property of another individual: “It is essential that whatever one person has, belongs to another... to the extent that they become one body” (Amiri, 1398, p. 201). He introduces this unity as the unity of the different parts of a single body and in explaining this single body he considers it a plural unit that, while being one, contains a plurality within itself (Amiri, 1399, p. 36). The analogy of the unity of society to the unity of the body is also found in the words of Farabi (Farabi, 1364, p. 42). Farabi believes that the ideal society (utopia) is like a body whose powers and functions are complete and perfect, and which functions correctly and orderly, and is not subject to defects or damage. Just as the members of a single body serve the function of a main member and have a unity in this way, the virtuous society also has a unity similar to the aforementioned unity (cf. Farabi, 1995, p. 114).

Just as Amiri, on the individual level, considers justice to be a branch of moderation in the three faculties of the soul, a society that has become unified and has acquired culture on the collective level must be wise, steadfast (steadfast and courageous), and chaste. He explains the three aforementioned characteristics by emphasizing that society is not a collection of individuals and must have a single identity – which can be called culture (Amiri, Al-Saadah, p. 217).

It is worth noting that the connection between moderation and unity is seen in the works of other Islamic philosophers such as Ibn Sina (for example, see: Ibn Sina, Bayta, p. 386). He says in Nejat: “All moderation is in the abundance of composition or temperament, and unity occurs in its abundance” (Ibn Sina, 1379, p. 590 and Hamo, 1363, p. 17), which clearly indicates the causality of moderation with respect to unity.

4. Factors for the realization of social justice and unity

4-1. The role of religion (Islam) in the realization of social justice and unity

One of Ameri's special views on this subject is that Islam guides and manages this process of social unification as a process of society-building and culture-generating. In other words, by proposing individual virtues and personal justice and moving from these virtues and justice to collective virtues and justice, Islam provides a platform in which, by achieving individual virtues and justice in a planned path, social virtues and justice – not the sum of individual virtues and justice, but the production of those individual traits in the path of forming a moderate and unified collective identity – are achieved. Society naturally has classes such as noble and lowly, strong and weak, friend and enemy, etc. Islam has given individuals in each class instructions that, if followed, will result in individual virtue, and at the same time, these actions are designed to play a role in others (Ameri, 2006, pp. 62-63). For example, Islam has ordered the rich class to free themselves from financial dependencies by giving to the poor class in order to refine themselves and achieve individual happiness, which at the same time, these gifts play an important role in others, and therefore, by ordering forgiveness and charity, etc., in Islam, both individual virtue occurs and a collective virtue (relative wealth at the community level) prevails, which ultimately leads to social balance and justice (Ameri, 2006, pp. 63-64). In fact, just as religion initially uses promises and injunctions to individuals to lead them on the path of righteousness and righteousness, and then tries to transform this entry into physical traits and inner virtues, in the case of society, it also starts with individuals to lead the community at a basic level through guidance, and then tries to transform these individual virtues into a single collective virtue (Ameri, 2010, p. 76).

4-2. The role of reason in creating justice and unity

Unity as a product specific to man - from Ameri's perspective, within the

framework of human internal powers, it is the product of reason (Ameri, 2019, p. 52). In other words, it is reason that ultimately, as a power that moderates other powers on two theoretical and practical levels, establishes a balance and unity between those powers and their virtues. In fact, reason prevents excess and deficiency in each power and gives each power a moderate attribute and ultimately establishes a moderation and balance between the powers, which is interpreted as the justice of the powers, which is the whole situation of the rulership of reason over the other powers. Therefore, this general moderation of the powers is the same rulership of reason over the powers that causes all powers to move towards the completion or perfection of one thing, which is reason, and this perfection leads to human happiness. Thus, the aforementioned situation will be the same situation of unity and it became clear that this situation is achieved by reason.

It is noteworthy that for philosophers, it is this reason that, as a distinguishing feature of man from animals, realizes the culture that other animals - who are devoid of reason - lack. Therefore, social unity from Ameri's perspective, like culture from the perspective of many philosophers, is a specific product of human reason, and this is also a confirmation of the necessity of unity and culture.

4-3. The role of love in creating unity

As mentioned above, the coexistence of virtuous individuals in society is a necessary condition for the realization of a virtuous community, and its sufficient condition is that this coexistence turns into unity, which is different from the mere inclusion of disparate things. It was also mentioned that this aspect of unity or the basis for its formation can be considered behalf of Ameri to be culture.

From his perspective, what is considered the cause of this unity is love. He says: "Love unites souls" (Ameri, 2019, p. 134). In fact, it is love that causes the true connection of human souls in society and makes them a true unit. Because love is an inner and heartfelt state and at the same time

a real connection - between several people - and therefore it gives a real connection to the real existence of humans or human souls. With this real connection between the real existences of humans, a genuine unity occurs in the field of human interaction. He explains how love occurs in human relationships as “similar loves similar” (Ameri, 2019, p. 70). In fact, he speaks of an ontological principle that similarities in the realm of reality cause the convergence of similar things and this similarity in the human realm appears in the form of love in the real existence of humans, that is, human souls. The opposite of such a unity in society, which Ameri considered to be the result of the love of souls for each other, is the state of hatred and aversion that arises when beings with different and contradictory existential structures are confronted (Ameri, 2019, p. 136) and is called “harm” in the individual sphere and is the opposite of love (Ameri, 2019, p. 70).

It is worth noting that prioritizing love for the formation of society is also seen in the expressions of Farabi before Ameri (Farabi, 1985, p. 71) and also after him in the works of Ibn Sina (Ibn Sina, 1997, p. 498) and Khawaja Nasir (Tusi, 1994, p. 124).

Conclusion

Ameri considers unity as a factor in the realization of the desired society and its survival. The unity he has in mind is one in which all parts and classes of society are placed in their proper and special places, and unity is achieved through this proportion and arrangement. In other words, the main factor in the formation of unity for Ameri is moderation or justice, which is not only presented as a balance of the forces of the soul (lust, anger, and reason) and at the individual level, but also acts as a unifying factor at the social level. This social unity, according to Ameri, can be considered in a single collective identity called "culture", which is known as the main basis for the formation of a civilized and virtuous society. Ameri defines moderation and justice at the individual level as the balance of the three forces of the soul. This balance primarily leads to the

realization of individual virtues such as chastity, courage, and wisdom. However, the ultimate individual virtue is justice or moderation, which is presented as a sum of forces and gathers all other virtues. Ameri emphasizes that this individual justice creates an inner unity among human powers that leads to a complete human form, and therefore, without this unity, man will not be truly and completely complete.

At the social level, moderation also acts as a unifying factor. Ameri believes that a society that enjoys virtue must also enjoy social unity. This social unity is realized through social justice, which is not simply the sum of individual justices, but a single and comprehensive justice that gathers all individual justices within itself.

According to this view, from Ameri's perspective, culture, which can be considered the main basis for the realization of social unity, is realized by human reason. Reason, as the distinguishing feature of man from animals, is the main factor in the creation of culture. Because it is reason that is the source of justice for all powers, and the moderation and unification of the levels and aspects of human existence occur in the shadow of reason. Hence, Ameri believes that culture is a specific product of human reason and that animals lack culture due to their lack of reason. This social unity, which is created through collective moderation and social justice, leads to a civilized and virtuous society.

Ameri also introduces love as the main factor in creating social unity. Love is an inner and heartfelt state that connects human souls to each other and makes them a true unit, and Ameri believes that love causes a true bond between humans, which is the basis of social unity and the formation of culture. On the other hand, hatred and grudges cause division and the destruction of social unity.

In addition to moderation in the forces of the soul and society, Ameri also refers to geographical moderation. He believes that geography also plays a role in the formation of culture and civilization, and sees an example of social moderation in "Iranshahr". Ameri emphasizes that reason is the main axis of realizing geographical and cultural moderation.

Ameri believes that Islam, as a comprehensive system, provides a platform for the formation of a moderate or just culture and society by guiding individuals towards individual and collective virtues. By providing moral and social instructions, Islam guides individuals towards individual virtues such as chastity, courage and wisdom, and at the same time, places these individual virtues on the path of forming a moderate and unified collective identity. In other words, Islam forms a united and civilized society by creating a balance between individual and collective virtues.

Thus, it can be said that from Ameri's perspective, moderation, as the main element of virtue and happiness, functions at both the individual and social levels. At the individual level, moderation of the soul's powers leads to the realization of the virtue of justice and unity and ultimately leads to the perfection of the human "form" and individual happiness, and at the social level, moderation and justice, as a factor that unifies society, forms a virtuous, complete and civilized society.

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The Role of Knowledge and Practice in Human Happiness from the Perspective of Sadr Al-Mota'allehin

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ABSTRACT

Are opinion (as the product and perfection of theoretical reason) and practice (as the result and perfection of practical reason) involved in the ultimate happiness of humans? Why and how? According to a well-known perspective, Sadr Al-Mota'allehin regards the perfection of theoretical reason as the foundational structure of ultimate human happiness and the perfection of practical reason as a means of removing obstacles toward achieving theoretical reason's perfection, which constitutes ultimate happiness. Furthermore, he advances a related theory suggesting that ultimate happiness not only stems from the knowledge derived from theoretical reason but also requires detachment from material concerns—a practical virtue and outcome of practical reason. This detachment is an intrinsic affirmative act within the core structure of ultimate happiness. In this view, the perfection of theoretical reason (knowledge) is the principal element of ultimate happiness, while the perfection of practical reason (virtuous dispositions) forms its supporting framework. Finally, Sadr Al-Mota'allehin identifies the highest human ascent as annihilation, where theoretical and practical faculties unify and merge in the Divine Essence, culminating in ultimate happiness.

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Introduction

Islamic philosophers throughout the history of Islamic philosophy have consistently paid attention to the essence of human happiness and the methods of attaining it. They have evaluated it in relation to the roles of theoretical reason and practical reason, considering it as the most significant intellectual issue regarding happiness. The central question revolves around whether the perfection of theoretical reason (true knowledge) constitutes the real and ultimate happiness of humans, whether the perfection of practical reason (virtuous dispositions) does so, or whether both play a role, and more broadly, what the role of each is in shaping the ultimate goal of human perfection.

The well-known perspective among Muslim Peripatetic philosophers on happiness emphasizes its intellectual and rational nature, asserting that in ultimate human happiness, the highest level of theoretical reason—referred to as "intellectual emanation"—is realized. This entails the acquisition of all intelligible forms within the human soul. Within this framework, the perfection of practical reason, defined as the attainment of virtuous dispositions by the soul, serves merely as a preparatory step for the perfection of theoretical reason and nothing more (Farabi, 1995, p. 101; Al-Aati, 1998, p. 222). From Ibn Sina's viewpoint, ultimate human happiness is defined by intellectual and rational perfection, consisting of the knowledge of existential truths (Ibn Sina, 1404 AH, p. 426; 1379, p. 686; 1375, p. 345; 1383, p. 80), which corresponds to the perfection of the faculty of theoretical reason. Additionally, the influence of practical reason, non-rational faculties, and the body on absolute happiness is viewed as merely preparatory (Ibn Sina, 1404 AH, p. 426; 1379, pp. 687–688; 1980, p. 59; 1383, p. 103).

Shihab al-Din Suhrawardi, the founder of the illuminationist school of philosophy in Islamic philosophy, acknowledges the hierarchical nature of human happiness and rejects the exclusivity of intellectual perfection in defining ultimate happiness (Suhrawardi, 1976a, p. 95). Although Suhrawardi does not limit ultimate happiness to the perfection of the

theoretical reason, he recognizes the perfection of lower faculties (e.g., imagination and estimation) as contributing to ultimate happiness. However, he identifies the greater happiness (Azma) as solely derived from the realization of theoretical reason's perfection and the attainment of knowledge and vision of higher existences. In the path toward the soul's happiness, Suhrawardi considers detachment from material attachment (Suhrawardi, 1976b, p. 225; Shahrazuri, 1373, p. 541) and achieving superiority and governance of the soul over animalistic and bodily faculties as necessary (Qutb al-Din Shirazi, 1380, p. 478; Shahrazuri, 1385, p. 597). Therefore, in Suhrawardi's view, ultimate happiness is composed of knowledge and vision concerning higher existences, which represents happiness in the domain of theoretical reason and cognitive faculties beyond it. Other faculties and their happiness—including practical reason—are excluded from this ultimate happiness.

The central question of this article is: From the perspective of Sadr Al-Mota'allehin, what is the relationship between the soul's ultimate happiness and the perfection of theoretical and practical reason? Is his view consistent with those of other schools in Islamic philosophy? Mulla Sadra presents three perspectives, with his second and third views differing significantly from the well-known perspective and his final (third) view diverging substantially from the dominant theories among Islamic philosophers and the Peripatetic and Illuminationist schools. Considering the distinctions and priorities Mulla Sadra assigns to his final view over the other two, it becomes evident that he intentionally differentiates these three perspectives.

This article is organized as follows:

1. Explanation of theoretical and practical reason according to Mulla Sadra.
2. Analysis of happiness from Mulla Sadra's perspective.
3. Relationship between human happiness and the perfection of theoretical reason.
4. Relationship between human happiness and the perfection of

practical reason.

5. Finally, a clear synthesis of the perfection of theoretical and practical reason and their relationship to human ultimate happiness is presented.

1. Theoretical and Practical Reason from Mulla Sadra's Perspective

As a starting point for this discussion, understanding Mulla Sadra's definitions of theoretical and practical reason is essential. Mulla Sadra defines theoretical reason as the essence of the soul (Mulla Sadra, 1368a, Vol. 9, p. 176), the faculty that perceives universal theoretical matters (i.e., matters where truth and falsehood are meaningful), and as the faculty that discerns universal practical matters (i.e., matters where good and evil, or beauty and ugliness, are significant). He considers its function to be one of discovery (Mulla Sadra, 1363, p. 515; 1368a, Vol. 9, p. 176; 1381b, pp. 258, 261; 1391, p. 64).

He defines practical reason as the faculty that perceives specific practical matters (Mulla Sadra, 1363, p. 515; 1381b, pp. 258, 261; 1368a, Vol. 8, p. 148). This perception leads to the formation of specific judgments related to actions, ultimately resulting in the management and governance of the body to actualize external actions (Mulla Sadra, 1368a, Vol. 8, p. 148; 1381b, Vol. 2, p. 432). Mulla Sadra emphasizes that practical reason necessarily depends on bodily faculties for its functions, whereas theoretical reason does not rely on bodily faculties. Therefore, in the afterlife, theoretical reason performs its intellectual functions without the need for the body (Mulla Sadra, 1381b, p. 261).

Additionally, Mulla Sadra's primary assertion regarding the purpose and goal of these two faculties is that theoretical reason provides the capacity for the soul's intrinsic perfection, enabling it to reach higher states. Consequently, the ultimate purpose of theoretical reason is the soul's attainment of such perfection. On the other hand, practical reason facilitates the soul's avoidance of afflictions and impurities (obstacles to happiness) and oversees the body and its faculties. Thus, the goal of

practical reason is to govern the body and remove impediments to the soul's happiness (Mulla Sadra, 1381b, p. 261). Practical reason achieves its goal through a partial cognition accompanied by judgment and deduction.

2. Happiness from Mulla Sadra's Perspective

Mulla Sadra broadly defines happiness as the attainment and realization of that which the soul desires, accompanied by partial awareness and understanding of it. Conversely, he defines misery as the absence of such attainment, coupled with an awareness of that absence (Mulla Sadra, 1366c, p. 519). Based on this explanation, Mulla Sadra equates happiness with pleasure, aligning himself with a hedonistic perspective in this definition. In Sadrian philosophy, pleasure is defined as the perception of something harmonious and compatible with the soul and its faculties—specifically in its relation to the soul (Mulla Sadra, 1368a, p. 142; 1360, p. 192). Objects of the soul's inclination are considered harmonious with it.

Accordingly, in another definition, Mulla Sadra describes happiness as the realization of what is compatible with an individual's essence and aligned with their nature. He considers what aligns with a being as that which is a requisite of its existential properties and constitutes its perfection (Mulla Sadra, 1381a, p. 164). Therefore, whatever aligns with the essence of a thing is genuinely harmonious and compatible with it, a concept that also influences the understanding of the essence of pleasure.

Considering the above, and noting that in Sadrian philosophy, what aligns with the true essence of the human soul and its highest faculties is certain knowledge (Mulla Sadra, 1422, p. 452), the most delightful objects for the soul are true perceptions that bring joy to its highest faculty, the rational faculty (Mulla Sadra, 1368a, p. 122). Consequently, Mulla Sadra identifies certain knowledge as the essence of true happiness and regards doubt and ignorance as the essence of misery (Mulla Sadra, 1390, p. 196).

In another perspective, Mulla Sadra equates happiness with existence (Mulla Sadra, 1368c, p. 121; 1381b, p. 363) and considers the most blissful beings and the happiest individuals to be infinite existence (God), which is self-aware and self-present (Mulla Sadra, 1360, pp. 144–145; 1363, p. 267). This identification stems from his existential perspective on the essence of the soul and knowledge (Mulla Sadra, 1368b, p. 223). Consequently, what aligns with the soul is also existence, and ultimate happiness equates to existence—a realization that entails the genuine expansion of the soul. Since knowledge is a mode of existence, ultimate happiness for the human soul, defined as achieving true and certain knowledge, represents the expansion of the soul's existence (Mulla Sadra, 1360, p. 144). Thus, the highest degree of perfection and happiness is defined as the certain perception or direct observation of Absolute Being (God):

“Therefore, the perception of the Truth and the vision of His Beauty and Majesty are considered by the mystics and divine philosophers to be the ultimate perfections and the most delightful forms of happiness” (Mulla Sadra, 1381a, p. 165).

Regarding the happiness of the soul's faculties, Mulla Sadra also discusses obstacles (impediments) to happiness. He believes that the happiness of each faculty is defined as the realization of what is a natural consequence and function of that faculty, provided that there is no impediment: “without an obstacle” (Mulla Sadra, 1368c, p. 126). Obstacles may prevent faculties from achieving their unique pleasure and happiness, even if their functions are fulfilled. Each faculty has its specific perception, and when the realization of its natural function aligns with this perception, the faculty's pleasure and happiness are achieved. In contrast, the presence of obstacles prevents such realization and, consequently, the faculty's pleasure and happiness.

According to this analysis, the happiness of the rational faculty lies in attaining certain knowledge, the happiness of the faculty of desire lies in the satisfaction of its inclinations, and the happiness of the faculty of

anger lies in the fulfillment of dominance and retribution. Similarly, Mulla Sadra extends this framework to the five external senses. However, in Sadrian philosophy, it is emphasized that the happiness and perfection of faculties lower than the rational faculties, including practical reason, do not play a direct role in achieving ultimate human happiness but instead serve to remove obstacles to it (Mulla Sadra, 1368c, p. 128). This perspective will be discussed further when examining the relationship between happiness and practical reason.

In Sadran philosophy, the happiness of each faculty of the human being, in a general sense, as mentioned earlier, is related to the essence and specific function (effect and role) of that faculty. Therefore, in determining human happiness, especially from the perspective of his specific faculties, special attention must be given to his specific characteristics. According to Mulla Sadra, the essence of humanity is summarized in two characteristics: 1) the imagination and apprehension of abstract meanings and the attainment (reaching) of knowledge about unknown intellectual matters, which is the function and characteristic of the theoretical intellect; 2) the ability to act in general and particular matters; action here means positive influence, and thus action in general matters only results in belief, not in action. However, acting in particular matters, which require the addition of perceptions and particular opinions, leads to action (Mulla Sadra, 1363, p. 603). This can be rephrased by saying that in Mulla Sadra's philosophy, the special function of the theoretical intellect is to accept higher levels, which is a scientific and intellectual function, appropriate for the cognitive (perceptive) faculty. The specific function of the practical intellect, on the other hand, is to bring about action in lower levels (bodily faculties), corresponding to the operative faculty (Mulla Sadra, 1360, p. 199). Therefore, it should be noted that the first characteristic (imagination and apprehension of meanings, etc.) is passive and intellectual, while the second characteristic (acting in particular and general matters) is active and practical. Of course, acting in general matters, which is considered a specific function

of the practical intellect, does not mean acquiring general knowledge; because acquiring knowledge is a process of passivity towards the higher realms, and passivity is distinctly different from action, which is active. Instead, acting in general matters means issuing the preliminary steps for acquiring belief and certain knowledge. A precise analysis of this action would state that the theoretical intellect in Islamic philosophy, especially in Transcendent Wisdom, has four stages: 1) the potential intellect, 2) the intellect by habit, 3) the actual intellect, and 4) the acquired intellect. The practical intellect also has stages such as 1) purifying the outward, 2) purifying the heart, 3) enlightening the heart with scientific forms and divine knowledge, and 4) annihilation (Mulla Sadra, 1363, p. 609) In these stages, the third stage of the practical intellect, enlightening the heart with scientific forms and divine knowledge, is considered the process by which the intellect is purified. Given the non-scientific nature of the practical intellect, especially its distance from acquiring general beliefs, it can be understood that the emphasis in this stage is on illumination, which leads to the attainment of scientific forms and divine knowledge. This results in a level of the theoretical intellect, which is referred to in the above phrase as the acquired intellect: "The human soul is like a mirror, and when polished by the intellect... and the veil of nature is removed from it, the light of knowledge and faith shines upon it... and this is what is called by the philosophers the acquired intellect." (Faiz Kashani, 1383, p. 194). This phrase shows that the result of the purification of the soul (the first two stages of the practical intellect) is a state in the soul that leads to the reception and reflection of the light of knowledge, wisdom, and faith. These sciences and wisdoms in the soul constitute a level of the theoretical intellect, which in the above phrase is termed the acquired intellect¹. A detailed explanation of this discussion

1. Regarding the matter of why Mulla Muhsin Faiz Kashani referred to this level as the "acquired intellect," several points can be mentioned. In general, what he has called the acquired intellect is, in an absolute and general sense, referred to as the actual intellect. However, when it is restricted by the condition of "all" sciences and divine knowledge, it becomes the acquired intellect.

will be provided in the final conclusion.

Thus, it became clear that the happiness of each being is related to its essence, and that human beings have two main characteristics in theoretical and practical intellects. Therefore, we will now examine the relationship of these two characteristics with happiness.

3. The Relationship Between Ultimate Happiness and the Perfection of Theoretical Reason According to Mulla Sadra

The happiness of the rational faculty of the human soul culminates in its transformation into the “acquired intellect,” a state that signifies the existential perfection of the human being while maintaining their personal identity through the integration of all stages of this gradual journey (Mulla Sadra, 1368c, p. 95).

The beginning of this journey starts with material existence, which Mulla Sadra explains is not the “lifeless body” (the mortal frame), as it is outside the scope of transformation and growth. Instead, it refers to something that has a relationship with the soul analogous to the relationship between light and the sun (Mulla Sadra, 1368c, pp. 95, 99). From this starting point, the journey progresses through levels of sensory, imaginal, and intellectual perception, culminating in intellectual growth within the four stages of intellect. This process is called abstraction (*tajrid*).

Mulla Sadra clarifies that abstraction, contrary to common understanding, does not mean eliminating some attributes and retaining others. Instead, it involves a transformation of lower forms of existence into higher and nobler forms while preserving the personal identity of the human being (Mulla Sadra, 1368c, pp. 99–100): “When the soul achieves perfection and becomes the actual intellect, it is not by stripping away certain faculties, such as sensory perception, while retaining others, like the rational faculty. Rather, as the soul becomes more perfected and its essence rises, all its faculties rise and achieve perfection alongside it.”

He also stresses that this transformation and abstraction cannot occur without a shift from the transient, ever-changing material realm to a stable and lasting spiritual realm (Mulla Sadra, 1368c, p. 157). In other words, the process of abstraction is an existential transformation rather than a separative change.

Mulla Sadra enumerates the prerequisites for this transformation:

1. Knowledge of it and faith in its occurrence.
2. Recognition that this transformation is the primary purpose of human existence, aligned with human nature, as long as ignorance and wrongdoing do not lead to deviation from the original path.
3. Action aligned with the demands of human nature to facilitate this transformation and remove obstacles hindering its realization.

The first two conditions are intellectual, while the third relates to practice. Although the ultimate result of the third condition is the happiness of theoretical reason, it is achieved through the application of practical reason, a point Mulla Sadra had previously mentioned in his works.

This intensification and perfection, or transformation, ultimately result in the formation of an essential, intellectual form within the human being, originating from the initial qualities and faculties (Mulla Sadra, 1368c, p. 291). Through this existential journey, the human soul attains the status of an active intellect, a state embodying and surpassing the faculties of human souls and their powers in the highest and noblest manner.

In this ultimate state, the soul becomes a purely independent, abstract existence, possessing complete knowledge of all intelligible and real aspects of things as they truly are (Mulla Sadra, 1368c, p. 128). Therefore, the intellectual knowledge and abstract existence that constitute the happiness of the soul encompass the realities of sensory and imaginal perceptions and include all human faculties at higher levels of existence.

From Mulla Sadra's viewpoint, the true happiness of the human being arises exclusively from the intellectual aspect of the soul, which is the

principal part of its essence:

“True dignity and happiness are achieved by the soul through its intellectual part, which is the origin of its essence” (Mulla Sadra, 1368c, p. 131).

In other words, since theoretical reason and the rational faculty form the essential and intrinsic part of the soul, the happiness of the soul is intrinsically tied to this faculty. This perspective stands in contrast to the practical reason, which Mulla Sadra does not consider to be an intrinsic or essential part of the soul. Further exploration of this topic, particularly regarding the relationship between practical reason and happiness, follows in the next section.

4. The Relationship Between Ultimate Happiness and the Perfection of Practical Reason According to Mulla Sadra

Human happiness, as previously discussed, is intrinsically linked to the unique properties of humans in their two dimensions: theoretical and practical. Therefore, achieving happiness requires the presence of both faculties (Mulla Sadra, 1366b, p. 306). In the realm of practice, human happiness is impossible without the functioning of these two faculties (Mulla Sadra, 1367, p. 318). Both are influential in achieving ultimate happiness, and there is no disagreement on this point. Regarding the cognitive nature of theoretical reason, there is no notable divergence between Mulla Sadra’s interpretation and that of other philosophers.

However, when it comes to the cognitive function of practical reason, Mulla Sadra attributes to it a form of specific cognition (Mulla Sadra, 1360, p. 200). The reconciliation of this view with the abstraction of the soul is made possible within his final theory of the soul, which incorporates assertions such as "the soul is corporeal in origination and spiritual in subsistence" and "the soul in its unity encompasses all faculties" (Mulla Sadra, 1368b, p. 222).

4.1. Mulla Sadra’s Initial Perspective on the Relationship Between

Happiness and the Perfection of Practical Reason

As previously explained, theoretical reason is the principal part of the soul, and its perfection brings the human being happiness concerning their essence (Mulla Sadra, 1368c, p. 131). On the other hand, practical reason pertains to the soul only in its relationship to the body, which Mulla Sadra refers to as the "soul-ness" of the soul, making it a secondary or auxiliary component:

“[Practical reason is] its part related to its attachment to the body and its attribution to the soul’s ‘soul-ness’” (Mulla Sadra, 1368c, p. 131).

Mulla Sadra believes that humans’ reliance on practical reason is not perpetual; after death, humans lack certain faculties related to action and the body (Mulla Sadra, 1368c, p. 125). Without a material body, the practical aspects tied to corporeality are rendered meaningless (Mulla Sadra, 1360, p. 201). Even in this world, certain actions, such as the “evil eye,” may occur without the involvement of practical faculties (Mulla Sadra, 1363, p. 602). Thus, the role of practical reason in happiness is intermediate and instrumental; it does not contribute to the person’s essential identity.

Mulla Sadra explicitly states:

“...True happiness is achieved by the soul through its intellectual aspect... As for what the soul achieves through its practical aspect... it merely brings relief from torment and distress, purification and clarity, and freedom from punishment... which alone do not confer true dignity or intellectual joy” (Mulla Sadra, 1368c, p. 131).

In critiquing this perspective, it can be argued that the function of the soul without a material body—though rare—demonstrates the essential abstraction of practical reason. Its dependence on the material body is situational and confined to specific states, emphasizing its higher degrees of operation. Indeed, Mulla Sadra himself acknowledges the abstract nature of practical reason:

“The practical intellectual faculty must necessarily belong to the abstract level in essence, while being relatively connected to material

forms, as we have previously stated regarding the faculty of estimation and the estimated forms” (Mulla Sadra, 1368c, p. 85).

This statement affirms the abstract essence of practical reason and its relative connection to material levels, paralleling the abstraction of the estimative faculty. In general, Mulla Sadra considers theoretical and practical faculties to be aspects of a single soul, differing only in perspective:

“The soul, as the source of actions derived from prudence and expediency, is referred to as practical reason, and as the source of intellectual contemplation of existents, it is called theoretical reason” (Mulla Sadra, *Alchemy of the Gnostics*, p. 314).

Thus, the distinction between theoretical and practical faculties lies in their subject matter—one concerning non-manipulable truths and the other concerning actionable truths—rather than their essence.

On one hand, the relational or existential nature of the soul and the instrumentalization of the practical powers, which in the view of some Islamic philosophers is interpreted as the connection between the soul and material matters outside of itself through a tool called practical reason, according to Mulla Sadra, does not mean a connection with something outside of the soul. This is because, for him, the material prime matter body or the dead body that remains after death and does not continue its existence with the soul in this world is outside the jurisdiction of the real body and is fundamentally outside the true control of the soul; therefore, it is outside the essence of the human being. Hence, the real controlling and practical relationship between the soul and the body, through practical reason, is a relationship between higher stages of the soul and lower stages of it, where these lower stages (the material, imaginal stages) are considered the true body and under the control of the soul (Mulla Sadra, 1368, Vol. 2, p. 99). Therefore, this relational or existential nature of the soul ultimately has an integrative root within the essence of the soul itself, and from this perspective, the soul can be considered one of its aspects: "The relationship of the soul is like the relationship of light to the

sun." (ibid.)

To explain this perspective regarding the relationship between theoretical and practical reason, one can refer to Sabzavari's statement: "Both [theoretical and practical reason] are two levels of a single intellect, not two distinct powers." (ibid., p. 83, note 2), which means that their essence is one, and both are considered within the essence of the human soul, with the only difference between them being their respective objects: the object of theoretical reason consists of things that cannot be controlled by the soul, while the object of practical reason consists of things that can be controlled by the soul. Therefore, the difference between the two lies in something external to their essence (their object) (ibid.).

4-2. Mulla Sadra's Secondary View on the Relationship Between Happiness and the Perfection of Practical Reason

In another analysis, Sadra presents an affirmative view on the relationship between happiness and practical reason. The preface to this view, which is aligned with another set of his statements, was introduced in the critique of the previous view. It seems as though Sadra progresses from a pre-transcendental state to an intermediate state, and then to a final stance. This intermediate state sometimes refers to the critique of the initial view (the view of negation) – as discussed earlier – and sometimes refers to the positive presentation of a new perspective. In this view, the practical powers of the soul are preserved in its ascending journey, and rather than being negated, they are perfected. Therefore, even after death, these powers will continue to exist with the soul. He states: "Thus, when the soul reaches perfection and becomes actual intellect, it does not lose some of its powers such as the sensitive power, while retaining others such as the rational power; rather, as it completes and elevates its essence, so too all its powers complete and elevate along with it." (Mulla Sadra, 1368, Vol. 2, p. 100). In this statement, Mulla Sadra rejects the idea that some powers (such as the sensitive powers) are removed while others (such as

the intellectual powers) remain. For him, the process is one of the perfection and elevation of all the soul's powers – both its higher and lower powers – which shows that the ultimate happiness of the soul occurs when all the powers of the soul, including the practical powers, are perfected, not just one or a few particular powers.

In another section, he considers the abstraction of the perceiving faculty (which appears to be a condition for human happiness and is typically associated with the elimination and negation of certain material or near-material powers of the soul) not as the negation of some powers of the soul, but as their transformation into a higher and more sublime existence: "The abstraction of the perceiving faculty does not mean the negation of some of its attributes and the retention of others, but rather the transformation of a lower, incomplete existence into a higher and more perfect existence. Thus, the abstraction of man and his transition from this world to the next is nothing but a transformation of his initial state into a second state." (ibid., p. 99). In other words, in the process of the soul's happiness, known as abstraction, both in this world and in the afterlife, all powers move together in an ascending journey, and the existence of each power moves towards a more abstract existence of that same power, becoming perfected. Thus, neither the sensory cognitive power, which is the closest cognitive power to the material world, nor the practical powers, which in this world are the closest powers of a human to the material world, are negated in the process of human perfection and happiness. Rather, the perfection and happiness of these powers are essential to the ultimate perfection and happiness of the human being. Additionally, it was previously mentioned that, according to Sabzavari, theoretical and practical reason have the same essence, and their only difference lies in their objects: one concerns matter beyond the capacity of the soul to control, while the other concerns matter within the capacity of the soul (ibid., p. 83, note 2). Given this shared essence, it is clear that the ultimate happiness of the human being, in terms of the perfection of theoretical reason, also entails the perfection of practical reason.

Although practical reason is involved in the human ascent and its perfection is aligned with the perfection of the soul and theoretical reason, Mulla Sadra maintains that the essence of the soul's happiness and the highest rank of humanity in the process of evolution are depicted through the final perfection of theoretical reason. For him, the essence of happiness is still knowledge: "...The knowledge of God and the knowledge of His kingdom is the essence of true happiness." (Mulla Sadra, 1366, Vol. 1, p. 484); "The essence of all true happiness is knowledge and certainty... The true distinction between reward and punishment originates from knowledge and ignorance." (Mulla Sadra, 1390, p. 333). Therefore, although all the practical and theoretical powers are perfected in the process of the soul's evolution and ultimate happiness, and true and final happiness is the result of deeds and acts of worship – in this sense, practical reason is influential in ultimate happiness – the final certainty-based knowledge, or the state of acquired intellect, which forms the essence of human happiness, is the perfection of theoretical reason and the soul's intellectual faculties: "The essence of true happiness for the servant is for his intellect to be acquired from God..." (Mulla Sadra, 1366, Vol. 2, p. 383). Thus, Mulla Sadra states that the beginning and the end of the journey of the soul are both knowledge (Mulla Sadra, 1366, Vol. 4, p. 352), and knowledge is the ultimate goal of every action and movement. The result of all righteous deeds and acts of worship is the purification of the heart's mirror from the darkness of the soul's veils, so that with it, one becomes ready to receive the desired form (Mulla Sadra, 1390, p. 333)

4-3. Mulla Sadra's Final View on the Relationship Between Happiness and the Perfection of Practical Reason

In the initial explanation of the relationship between happiness and practical and theoretical reason, it was clarified that some material aspects of the soul¹, including some powers and practical faculties of the human

1. The material aspects of the soul, in the discussions of practical wisdom and happiness, refer to the soul's attachment to the material body, a concept frequently mentioned in the texts of Islamic

being, must be removed and discarded in its journey toward true happiness. In a more complete and harmonious explanation, Mulla Sadra interpreted this removal as the negation of these aspects and faculties, transforming and perfecting them. Because the soul's cognitive and practical powers, even though they are connected to matter, have a degree of abstraction (imaginative abstraction), and as they reach perfection, they will accompany the soul in its upward and evolutionary journey. However, despite the perfection of the practical faculties within the perfection of the soul, the essence of happiness, according to Transcendent Philosophy, is defined in the final certain knowledge, which is the realm of actualized intellect and derived intellect, which is the perfection of theoretical reason. Therefore, it can still be said that the perfection of practical reason does not constitute the essence of true human happiness. Thus, it seems that up to this point, Mulla Sadra has only turned the initial view of the elimination of some faculties in the ascending and perfectionist journey of humans into the perfection of these faculties and their transformation into more abstract stages. Nevertheless, he still considers practical perfections and non-cognitive, non-theoretical perfections to be lower stages of human final perfection.

Mulla Sadra, once again elevating his view, in his final view, instead of the aforementioned intermediate view, states that the essence of happiness is composed of the perfection of all faculties. This is because in the final stage of the perfection of the soul, which is the stage of its essential annihilation, all human faculties will merge into one, and the practical and theoretical faculties will become identical: "It becomes one

philosophers. The necessity of the soul's abstraction as a movement and behavioral change on the path to happiness relates to these material aspects. Therefore, expressions like this, and similar ones in the context of practical philosophy, do not mean that materiality exists within the essence of the soul itself. Of course, since Sadra's viewpoint in this regard begins from a quasi-Aristotelian perspective, and practical intellect, according to the Peripatetic philosophers (at least the part of it concerned with detailed and operative matters), is considered a faculty of the soul and a material entity, the term "material aspects of the soul," based on earlier discussions – which referenced a quasi-Aristotelian foundation – may carry a more specific meaning. It is also clear that this perspective represents an initial standpoint in Mulla Sadra's thought, and such viewpoints are often designed by him to guide the reader to a higher and more precise understanding.

power, so its knowledge becomes action, and its action becomes knowledge" (Mulla Sadra, 1360, p. 200). Thus, according to Sadra, "Every soul consists of hearing, seeing, powers, and limbs, and will become identical with the body... [in this state] the body will be identical with the soul" (Mulla Sadra, 1390, p. 159). Consequently, in the final stage of happiness, a person will become a unified essence of both the perceiver and the mover: "Thus, in the human being, there is one thing, which is both the perceiver and the mover" (Mulla Sadra, 1368b, p. 222).

This event in the soul happens because, with the intensification of the unity of existence, greater unification occurs, and what existed with multiplicity in lower stages of existence exists in higher stages with a greater unity. The meaning of the principle of "simplicity of the ultimate truth," which, as the great philosophers have clarified, is applicable to the various stages of existence in a hierarchical way, is that the more unity and simplicity there is in higher stages of existence, the more inclusivity and totality will be realized relative to lower stages. Thus, Mulla Sadra asserts that the direction of unity and inclusivity in the soul dominates, and the direction of multiplicity and fragmentation decreases in this stage (Mulla Sadra, 1368c, p. 100). As a result, the soul achieves the perfection of knowledge, and the delusions and false desires of the imagination are eliminated (Mulla Sadra, 1381a, p. 131). In reality, with the dominance of the direction of unity and simplicity in the soul, the ontological principle of simplicity of the ultimate truth will impact it, and the aspect of unification and inclusivity of the soul relative to the lower faculties, which includes faculties at the highest and noblest levels, will be actualized. Thus, the soul, in its true perfection, will unite all of its faculties in the most complete way, with unity and simplicity (Sabbzawari, 1369, p. 182).

An interesting metaphor that Sadra presents in this context is that he compares the human soul to a bird, where its theoretical and practical faculties are like its two wings. The feathers of these two wings are the branches of the two powers of theory and practice, and when the final

flight occurs, both powers, by encompassing all their branches, experience the flight of happiness (Mulla Sadra, 1363, p. 696).

It is noteworthy that Fayz Kashani also accepts this explanation as the final clarification and interpretation of happiness (Fayz Kashani, 1428, p. 431). He does not consider the general object of theoretical intellect's reception to be superior to the particular reception of practical intellect (Fayz Kashani, 1377, p. 912). Fayz explains this point by stating that intellect is abstract and cannot perceive particulars without the law (Shari'ah), which results in incomplete knowledge. Therefore, according to him, the theoretical intellect requires the practical intellect for the completion of its perceptions, and vice versa. Thus, neither intellect has absolute precedence over the other (Ibid). This view of Fayz supports and even explains Mulla Sadra's final perspective, which sees the ultimate happiness of the human being as the perfection and unity of all faculties without any superiority or inferiority.

As discussed in the stages of growth of practical and theoretical reason, according to Mulla Sadra, the practical intellect, in the second stage, reforms and purges (removes bad traits), and in the third stage, through the acceptance of good traits, becomes the locus for intellectual images, which is the beginning of the union between the cognitive and practical faculties. This is the stage where, according to Sadra, the rational soul (or theoretical intellect) is illuminated by the light of the practical intellect and, through its spiritual senses contained in the practical intellect, receives symbolic perceptions: "The source of these [symbolic] unveilings is the human heart, i.e., its rational soul illuminated by the practical intellect, which uses its spiritual senses" (Mulla Sadra, 1363, p. 150). This is the stage where the external senses, by elevating, reunite with their origin, the spiritual senses, and at a higher level, namely in the realm of spirit (which are inherently his faculties), they unite (Ibid, p. 151). He asserts that this is the stage of intellect where, because of being the ultimate simplicity according to the aforementioned principle, all existences, including external senses and practical intellect, are seen by it:

"The spirit witnesses all of that by itself because these truths merge in its stage when it is in the state of intellect, as intellect encompasses all things as demonstrated in theoretical knowledge, and we established the proof for it" (Ibid).

In this stage, the theoretical intellect also attains a corresponding spiritual insight, which in two different states is called spiritual perception or inspiration. This, in a higher level, becomes spiritual perception, and in this case, all of the inner and external faculties of the human being become illuminated by it (Ibid). Thus, according to Sadra, in the initial stage of union, which is the stage of purging the soul with good traits and intellectual forms, the human soul, in union, has both the perceptions of practical and theoretical intellects. In a higher level, which is the stage of union of faculties at the level of spirit, all of these perceptions merge into one. In fact, this spiritual union stage is the fourth stage of practical intellect, which is annihilation. The annihilation here refers not to essential annihilation but to functional and attributive annihilation, where human actions at the spiritual level are purified and disappear. The symbolic spiritual perception is the effect of such an annihilation. Similarly, in this spiritual level, the fourth stage of the theoretical intellect, which is the derived intellect, occurs, and all intellectual images are witnessed in the unity of the spirit in the soul (the intellect is the sum of all things). In this stage, the theoretical intellect becomes active, having all intellectual forms within it, so in this stage, the theoretical intellect also undergoes a type of functional annihilation, specifically in the intellectual forms of the theoretical intellect, which resemble the actions of the practical intellect. In other words, in the fourth stage (derived intellect), the theoretical intellect becomes the active intellect that encompasses all forms, and in this stage of functional annihilation, the intellectual forms merge into the active intellect, where the union between theoretical and practical intellects occurs with no loss of their functions (Ibid).

But above these levels of spiritual union and annihilation (functional

annihilation), Sadra explicitly states that the stage of essential annihilation occurs (Mulla Sadra, 1363, p. 150), where all of these perceptions and unveilings reach complete unity. As mentioned earlier, the functional annihilation stage is considered the final stage of practical intellect, which applies to the spiritual level and final perfection of both theoretical and practical faculties. However, in essential annihilation, the very essence of these two faculties, which are considered attributes of the soul, are completely absorbed into the attributes of the Divine, following the essential annihilation of the soul in the essence of the Divine. Thus, not only do the two faculties unite, but even the notion of differentiation and multiplicity between them (i.e., the essence of these two faculties) and the multiplicity between them and the soul (i.e., the essence of the soul and its two attributes) disappears, and a perfect unity is created, the effect of which is the perception of annihilation (divine manifestation). As stated by Mulla Hadi Sabzevari, the final stage of human perfection, in which essential annihilation occurs, is the stage of true witnessing and knowledge, which this witnessing and annihilation, as explicitly stated by the mystics, is considered the final stage of action and practical intellect. It encompasses both the theoretical perfection (knowledge) and practical perfection (power) in an annihilated and unified state: "He guides you to this by making them witness the final actions of practical intellect... and they describe annihilation¹ as seeing every knowledge consumed in its own knowledge and every power consumed in its own power, and likewise, in all the higher attributes, in fact, all existence is consumed under its existence; thus, the final action is also witnessing, which is the perfection of knowledge" (Mulla Sadra, 1368c, p. 285). In other words, in the final stage of human perfection in Transcendent Philosophy (essential annihilation), with the essential annihilation of the soul and its attributes, both power, representing the practical intellect, and knowledge,

1. However, Mulla Hadi Sabzevari considers this annihilation, which he later calls "essential annihilation," to be the fourth stage of the perfection of practical intellect in Mulla Sadra's view. In the opinion of the author, this interpretation is incorrect based on Sadra's expressions.

representing the theoretical intellect, are absorbed into the attributes of the Divine. Thus, the witnessing and knowledge achieved in this stage, with its unity, is both the ultimate goal of the theoretical intellect and the ultimate goal of the practical intellect.

It is clear that, according to the mystical journeys (Asfar), this happiness and perfection could, in Sadra's expressions, reach the stages of post-annihilation, but no clear statement was found from him in this regard. If the happiness of the soul were depicted in the stages of continuation after annihilation, the final perfection of practical intellect would have been clearer in terms of its divine influence over multiplicity. In other words, just as we accept that, in the stages of annihilative perfections, practical intellect, like the theoretical intellect, has a perceptive and intellectual end that encompasses both action and contemplation, in the stages of continuation after annihilation – if Sadra's philosophical analyses were to progress in that direction – we would have to accept that the final goal of the theoretical intellect, corresponding to the final goal of the practical intellect, is its divine influence and engagement with multiplicities...

Summary

The relationship between the perfection of theoretical and practical intellects and ultimate human happiness has long been debated by Islamic philosophers. Most have adopted the view that the perfection of intellect, particularly theoretical intellect (a form of knowledge), is the key element of human happiness, while the goal of practical intellect is to remove obstacles preventing this state. According to the famous viewpoint in Islamic philosophy, Mullā Ṣadrā asserts that the perfection of theoretical intellect, or acquiring knowledge, is central to human happiness, while the perfection of practical intellect, initially, serves as a negative foundation (removing hindrances like the soul's attachment to material things) for achieving the ultimate happiness through theoretical intellect.

However, Mullā Ṣadrā's view diverges from the common approach.

Drawing on his theories about the soul, where the soul's essence includes a relative aspect to the body (practical intellect) and considers the faculties below theoretical intellect as separate and part of the soul's unity, he cannot fully accept the traditional view without contradiction. Thus, he revises the commonly accepted perspective, shifting toward a view where the soul's detachment from materialism is not purely negative but also carries a positive aspect. For him, as the soul ascends, its faculties become less attached to material things, while gaining more intellectual and immaterial qualities. He argues that practical intellect, rather than simply serving as a tool for removal of obstacles, is part of the soul's perfection, working alongside the soul's gradual ascent into higher spiritual realms.

Mullā Ṣadrā further argues that practical intellect contributes to the soul's happiness by progressing through various stages, such as the example world ('ālam al-mithāl) and intellectual worlds. He maintains that practical intellect plays a role in helping the soul to reach ultimate happiness, even though theoretical intellect remains the highest form of knowledge and happiness. Therefore, practical intellect, in his final view, is essential in human happiness and can coexist with the soul's higher faculties without conflict.

In conclusion, Mullā Ṣadrā's revised perspective on the role of practical intellect in ultimate happiness aligns with his view of the soul, where the soul does not lose its faculties but refines them as it ascends. In this context, practical intellect remains part of the soul's higher, perfected form, which contributes to its eternal happiness. While this view contrasts with earlier philosophers like al-Fārābī and Avicenna, Mullā Ṣadrā merges these ideas and adapts them within his own philosophical system, showing how various faculties of the soul interrelate in the journey toward ultimate spiritual fulfillment.

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Some of non-Aristotelian elements in philosophy of Avicenna

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ABSTRACT

Aristotle is the founder of Peripatetic Philosophy. And Avicenna is the inheritor of Peripatetic Philosophy. However, Avicenna has developed Peripatetic Philosophy strongly and achieved to philosophy that nowadays we call 'Peripatetic Islamic philosophy'. In his Peripatetic Islamic philosophy, Avicenna was affected four factors: (1) Greek philosophy, (2) religion of Islam, (3) mysterious aptitude, and (4) intellectual genius. On these factors, Avicenna set aside some Aristotelian elements and yielded some non - Aristotelian elements. He set aside (1) God the non-creator, (2) active intellect surrounded in body, (3) unity of body and soul in one substance, and (4) generating one thing from only matter and form. He yielded (1) God the creator, (2) active intellect in body and out of body, (3) two substances of body and soul, and (4) generating one thing, first, from Being and, second, from matter and form.

In this article, in proper order and brief manner, I will present a description and explanation of the three elements that are non-Aristotelian and have a great impression on Avicenna's philosophy, and finally detect same agreement of opinions in their works. The elements that we will speak of them are as follows: (1) on the doctrine of emanation and proceeding world from First Principle. (2) on the reason and soul and body. (3) on the matter and form.

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Introduction

Avicenna (Ibn Sinā) is the inheritor of Peripatetic Philosophy. Peripatetic Philosophy is the same as Philosophy of Aristotle, and Avicenna always praised Aristotle for that he reformed and reorganized philosophy in a logical and intellectual framework so that One can deliberate its truth and false according to reason.

However, Avicenna in his Philosophizes was extending new approaches, and under several decisive elements he produced a new collection and presented his special philosophy.

Four decisive elements in presentation of special philosophy of Avicenna are (1) Greek philosophy, (2) religion of Islam, (3) mysterious aptitude, and (4) intellectual genius.

1. Greek philosophy is the inheritor of human thought about world. Avicenna completely dominated the philosophical thoughts of Aristotle. On his own philosophy, Aristotle thought that the world is eternal (Aristotle, 1984, 278 a 26; 1069 b 35-1070 a 1); He thought that the First Principle is the immovable mover of the first sphere and believed that the movement of the first sphere is caused by the desire that the first sphere indicates to the first principle (Aristotle, 1984, *Metaphysics*, 12, 8); the existence of matter world was a compound of its Matter and Form (Aristotle, 1984, 1043 a 26-29) and didn't believe that the Being (*Wojod*) is a thing different from them; imperishability of individual souls and the immortality of potential intellect were ambiguous; soul was a form of body and, together, were one thing and not different substances (Aristotle, 1984, 412 b 6); ...

2. The religion of Islam was the religious doctrine of Avicenna, and, under Shi'ism, and probably Ismailism, He was intended to conciliate between religion and philosophy. On the principles of Islam, Avicenna had accepted that God has all perfections (See, for example, Avicenna, 1404, *Al-Ilāhiyāt*, 9, 1) and the same is eternal as is the creator of the world (Avicenna, 1331, 9); assumed the world is advent (essential) and tried to establish an intellectual connection of temporal to eternal

(Avicenna, 1402, manner 5, problem 5); the world of sensibles was full of Being (*Wojod*) of Matter and Form (Avicenna, 1404, *Al-Ilāhiyāt*, pp. 342 and 347); believed in spiritual, and even, bodily resurrection (Avicenna, 1404, *Al-Ilāhiyāt*, article 2, chapter 34) and convinced to eternality of rational souls and reasons (Avicenna, 1402, manner 7, problem 1); believed that soul should be properly form of body and perfection to body and supposed it to be a substance other than body (Avicenna, 1404, *Al-Tabiyāt*, art 6, pp. 11-16). Avicenna tried to keep a patriotism to the principles of his Religion and, as a result, made an effort to accommodate philosophical principles of Peripatetic with them.

3. Mysterial aptitude of Avicenna had grew up under religious teachings, but the philosophy of Peripatetic left a special impression on that. In this article, it will relatively be evident that constitution of his mysterious aptitude is spread in the whole of his philosophy. Even when he speaks of reason and its impression on the mode of attaining one's cognition, reveals mysterious nature of his philosophy; in his opinion, One gets cognition when it is in close connection with active intellect and this emanation is intelligibly reflected in his soul (Avicenna, 1402, vol. 2, pp. 367-8). In Avicenna's opinion, attaining Truth [God] and divine knowledge is possible through stability in the same line of the connection with active intellect and as a result of this stability this intelligible world becomes equal to the world of the whole Being (*Wojod*) and sees goodness and beauty and absolute gracefulness and unites co-substance with them (Avicenna, 1404, *Al-Ilāhiyāt*, 9, 8).

4. Intellectual genius of Avicenna, undoubtedly, had cast a shadow on the whole of his philosophy. With his critic and creature mind, Avicenna neither perfectly gave up Aristotle's philosophy nor accepted the whole of that.

The variety that existed in Aristotle's discourses which appeared in his numerous books during his life, and the different viewpoints of commentators in commenting of his opinion brought about Avicenna

relying on his powerful genius to comment on them and calls together or criticizes and renders them and produces a new composition; a composition that is compatible with religious doctrines of Avicenna.

These factors drove Avicenna to a conclusion that by avoiding some Aristotelian elements and approaching to some non - Aristotelian elements, attain his special philosophy, a philosophy that, in spite of being Peripatetic, is in accordance with Religion and compatible with spirit and principles of Islamic culture.

In order to firm his philosophy up, Avicenna turned to elements that weren't Aristotelian or erroneously had ascribed to Aristotle. An important instance that erroneously has been ascribed to Aristotle is the doctrine of Emanation; For, it erroneously has been thought that it is Aristotle who has composed the books *Uthulujiyā* and *Al-Kheir-o-Al-Mahz* some thought that the doctrine of emanation is an Aristotelian doctrine. Perhaps Avicenna is the first person that recognized *Uthulujiyā* isn't of the works of Aristotle and he has mentioned this subject in his different works, nonetheless, he was greatly influenced by that work (Badavi, p. 121; also *content of Avicenna's work*, margin the book of *Al-Insāf*, specially margin Dr. Yahya Mahdawy).

The book *Uthulujiyā* is neither the work of Aristotle nor Porphyry and isn't the direct work of Plotinus, but all its ten procedures is a liberal translation and quotation from some sections of Plotinus's *Enneads* (4, 5, 6), and probably it is collected by one of Plotinus's student called Amelius. This work has translated apparently by a christian translator in the name of Abd-Al Masih- ben- Abd-Allah-ben-Nāemah- Al-hemsi from Syriac to Arabic language. The Book *Al-kheir-o-Al-Mahz* is the same *liber de causis* and is a liberal translation and summary of Proclus's *Elements of Theology*.

In this article, in proper order and brief manner, I will present a description and explanation of the three elements that are non-Aristotelian and have a great impression on Avicenna's philosophy, and finally detect same agreement of opinions in their works. The

elements that we will speak of them are as follows:

- (1) on the doctrine of emanation and proceeding world from First Principle.
- (2) on the reason, soul, and body.
- (3) on the matter and form.

1. The doctrine of emanation and proceeding world from the first Principle

1-1. In presenting an outlook of the overall world, Aristotle accepts motion as one of the most important elements. In his opinion, the motion exists only in the space of a world which has a spherical shape. In any sphere there can be only three kinds of motions: direct motion from centre to environs, direct motion from environs to centre, circular motion to the round of centre. Any motion is depending on a certain body and, then, those three kinds of motions belong to the three bodies and any of this bodies intrinsically and naturally possess that motion. Therefore, the motion a flight of centre is being allocated to fire and the motion towards centre to earth and circular motion belongs to the body which is found only in the realm of stars and he calls this body Ether (*αιθηρ*).

Ether (and, in Islamic philosophy, *Asir*) means a body which always is rotating and since its circulation is everlasting, then, it is eternal. For its natural place is not in any point of its circle of revolution, but it rotates through the whole of that and is always in motion. The existing world has three classifications. the under - moon and the sphere of fixed stars and the space between this two that is full of ether (*αιθηρ*) and is eternally in motion.

In this way, Aristotle describes a world which neither has come into existence nor disappear, but it is eternal, everlasting, unbeginning and unending. Such a description of the world indicates that Aristotle regards the whole world eternal. The world has been steered in to motion by immovable mover from eternity and is in motion eternally (Aristotle, 1984, *On the heavens*, 2-3)

1-2. Aristotle was regarding the world uncreated and eternal, since in the Greek thought there are no room for the creation out of nothing, and for this reason he thought that the matter of world is uncreated. If a thing was created it should be potency of creation in the former matter, and we have to come to a matter which is uncreated, otherwise, there also must be a potency in the former matter and this chain continues infinitely (Aristotle, 1984, I 033 b 1-5). In order to elucidate the "creation *ex nihilo*", which is a doctrine of Qur'an, and bring it into an agreement with his religious doctrines and explain transmission from First principle to world, Avicenna planned to deny this saying that there are two eternal. He believed, eternal Being (*Wojod*) is not the Being (*Mojod*) which have a temporal duration but "the Eternal is a thing that in its existing doesn't need an agent but its existence is intrinsicall" (Avicenna, 1331, p. 9) and such a Being can't be a thing but the essence of First Principle. Therefore, in his eyes, the Being (*Wojod*) of First Principle is prior essence and other Beings (*Mojodāt*), whether they are prior to time or they are posterior to time or they are connected to time, are noneternal and created and originated (Ibid, pp. 10-11)

1-3. On the creation of Beings (*Mojodāt*) and the connection of temporal to eternal Avicenna, with avoidance of Aristotle's and even Motakallemin's theory, in this case, develops a special theory. He presents his theory, like Al-Farabi (Al-Fārābi, 1361, chapters 7 and 8) and under the influence of Plotinus, on the theory of emanation (see, for example, Avicenna, 1402, manner 6). This theory fills the necessary and important distance between creator and created. However, it should not be concluded that this theory results to theory of Pantheism. Distinguishing between Being and Essence, Avicenna placed realm of First Principle higher than creatures and regarded His essence the very His Being (*Wojod*); He is the Simple Being (*Wojod*) and it is the creatures that are a combination of being (*Wojod*) and essence (Avicenna, 1402, manner 4, problem 5).

1-4. Avicenna explains proceeding of the creatures by means of emanation (Avicenna, 1331, pp. 14-15). Emanation is the same as self-revelation of First Principle, the Creator that the world is resulted by his reasoning of his essence and of his being principle for order of goodness. In Avicenna's opinion, the emanation is a necessary act that results from the essence of the First Principle and his sacred reasoning; considering that God either knows his essence or reasons his essence, the world emanates from this knowledge and reasoning. Therefore, God's knowledge is a producing potency and his reasoning is the cause of an infinity act, and emanation also is the same eternal knowledge and essential reasoning of God, the knowledge and reasoning which always is happening and is the origin of bringing to existence and manifestation of creatures.

Avicenna, in strengthening his principles, has grounded his theory of emanation on the origins and foundations that are compatible with his own philosophy. In his philosophy, he has founded the theory of emanation on the following principles:

1. division of beings (*Mojodāt*) to necessary and contingent, and temporal and eternal.
2. innovated creation of world that the result of his generosity and foreknowledge.
3. reasoning of God which is the source of bringing into existence.
4. being God's agent - by - foreknowledge.
5. non-procession from one save one.

1-5-1. What we see in the world of Being (*Wojod*) is the demand of things to one another. The order of the world has a causal and effectual relation and any caused needs an effect. If this chain will not end to an uncaused cause, it would found necessary to impossible endless regress (Avicenna, 1402, vol. 3, p. 20). There must inevitable be a being (*Mojod*) which hasn't taken its being (*Wojod*) from another, but has necessity being by itself. In this endless regress of beings (*Mojodāt*), save the necessity Being, the whole beings are caused by preceding and cause of the subsequent (Ibid, p. 17) Here, it must be questioned that what is the

criterion of neediness of caused to cause? Like Motakallemin, if we consider the criterion of neediness as a temporal accident, the whole intelligences wouldn't need any cause and, like the First Cause, becomes eternal in essence and results to plurality of eternal. The criterion of neediness must be a thing that contains the whole other than the First Principle and this is not a thing save it be contingent. other than the First Principle are involved in the difficulty of essential possibility and their essence demand neither the Being (*Wojod*) nor the non-Being and the same is the reason of their neediness to cause (Ibid, pp. 75-6).

Therefore, First Principle is Necessarily Existent by itself and other beings (*Mojodāt*) are possibly existent by themselves (Ibid, p.18). Their self-possibility doesn't conflict with their being pre-eternal by virtue of time; temporally, other than First Principle are eternal, but they need the cause; these are possible by themselves and the same is the criterion of their neediness to the cause.

We have said that, in Avicenna's opinion, God is everlasting and eternal and creatures are essential advent (Ibid, p. 113). He meant by eternal to a thing which is self-subsistent and free from want of a cause.

Avicenna, in order to explain the "creation out of nothing" and account the plurality of possibilities, resorts to the theory of emanation and their inventively creation. Divine emanation instantly invents the world and always connects that with him, in the frame of a motion that emanated to them from eternal. The same emotion, also, is a fixed and eternal emanation and is derived from the Most High God.

1-5-2. The procession of immaterial beings (*Mojodāt*) from the perfect cause is the same as their invention. In Avicenna eyes, the inventive creation of the non-materials world results from Divine generosity and providence. In the definition of innovation, he says: "the innovation is the same as generosity granting of a thing that is worthy of granting"(Ibid, p.145) and he believes His innovation "granting a thing whose granting is desirable for the creatures". On the

true innovated, he says: "then the true innovated is one whose emanation of efficacy doesn't result from his desire and intention of demand to a thing which comes back to him" (Ibid).

The Divine creation results neither from the nature of aspiration nor the intention of utility that comes back to himself, but it results from emanation of his innovation and providence. He defines the providence with numerous phrases. once, he says "this order with its arrangement and detail is an emanation of imitating the whole order in the former knowledge together with its necessary and proper time and the emanation of that is reasonable for the Great God and this is the same as the meaning of the providence" (Ibid, p. 151). And, in another place, he says "it should be noticed that providence means that First Principle, in his own essence, knows that what an order should the Being (*Wojod*) have to bring for the goodness, and He is in His own essence, in terms of possibility, the cause of goodness and perfection of beings (*Mojodāt*), and in the same manner He is satisfied to the good order, and therefore, as much as possible, reasons the good order, and therefore emanates from Him the order and good that He reasons, in terms of the most perfect manner that He reasons, an emanation that, as far as possible, results to the most perfect order, and this actually is the meaning of providence" (Avicenna, 1404, *Al-Ilāhyāt*, p. 415).

Divine providence is the same as his domination to the whole world; he is knowing the good order and he is its cause and he is satisfied of it; his reasoning of the good order is the source of emanation of this order, and this means providence. In Avicenna's opinion, this divine innovation and providence causes to the innovational creation of the world. In the definition of innovation, he says "the word innovation is a name that is used in two senses: first is creation of thing not from a thing and not by means of a thing, and the other is that the thing, absolutely, receives its being (*Wojod*) from a direct and immediate cause, whereas its exitance, essentially, is this that it doesn't exist and because of innovation loses perfectly what it has intrinsically" (Avicenna, 1366,

pp. 42-3).

Avicenna attends, in the first definition, to the innovator and, in the second definition, to the innovated. Also, about innovation of innovator, he says "the innovation means that Being (*Wojod*). was granted from one thing to the other thing, without any interference of matter or means or time" (Avicenna, 1402, vol. 3, p. 120). "Therefore, First Principle innovates an intellectual substance which in fact is the innovator, and because of this he produces another intellectual substance and celestial bodies" (Ibid, p. 254).

Therefore, in Avicenna's opinion, innovational creation belongs to intelligence and this intelligence leads to the creation of soul other beings (*Mojodāt*).

We said that Avicenna believed, contrary to many, that *Uthulujiyā* and *Al-kheir-o-Al-Mahz* are of the works of Aristotle and he was greatly influenced by the doctrine of emanation and innovational creation discussed in those books. These books abstracted from works of Plotinus and Proclus and this doctrine is a neo-platonic theory. In *Uthulujiyā* it is said that "indeed goodness comes down by the Supreme Principle to the two worlds, for He is the originator of things; and life and souls are issued by Him to this world" (Plotinus, 1356, p. 12) "And that the first agent is previous to all things and He is both originator and finisher, and there is not at all any difference and separation between origination of one thing and Finish of this thing".(Ibid, p.75). The same contents are declared In *Al-kheir-o-Al-Mahz*, as well: "First Cause is higher than any name which is called to that name... First Cause neither is imperfect nor is only completeness but is super-completeness, for He is originator of things and emanates goodness perfectly on things" (Proclus, 1955, pp. 22-23). "And First Cause neither is intelligence nor is soul or nature, but He is higher than intelligence and soul and nature, for He is originator of all things, but He originates the intelligence immediately and the soul and the nature and other things by means of intelligence" (Ibid, p.12). "Prime Ipseity while he is the cause of causes is, unmoved,

and if he bestows his ipseity to anything he will bestow that with a kind of origination" (Ibid, p.19).

In this way, it is evident that the cause of causes is the first originator, the first thing that is originated, is intelligence and the intelligence is highly resembling to God, God originates soul and other creatures by intelligence. Therefore, like First Principle, the ten intellects have the potency of production and origination and this origination results from their own reasoning and knowledge, regarding the difference that God is the cause of causes and the agent of the whole world and intelligences are His creatures and effects.

1-5-3. The act of First Principle and His first essential work is nothing but reasoning. He reasons his essence, an essence that is the pure reason and pure goodness. This reasoning of His essence is the origin of being (*Wojod*) and things that he reasons and, in terms of Avicenna, his reasoning is the same as "the First epiphany of the Truth" (Avicenna, solar 1331, p. 7) by which beings (*Mojodāt*) are being created. In this regard, Avicenna's words are as follows: "but the First work and the essential work of First Principle is that He reasons that His own essence spontaneously is the principle of good order in the being (*Hasty*) and therefore He reasons the good order in the being (*Hasty*), ... His reasoning of good order in being (*Hasty*) requires that He reasons the manner for the possibility of it and He reasons the best way that external being (*Wojod*) of the whole order to be in accordance with the knowledge that is in His essence, ... therefore His reasoning is the cause of being (*Wojod*) a thing that he reasons" (Avicenna, 1404, *Al-Ilāhyāt*, p. 403).

Following this subject, Avicenna believes creation of God is requisite to His being (*Wojod*) and dependance to His being (*Wojod*) and he introduces his creation by means of a rational necessity. But, as will be evident in the fallow, it doesn't mean that He has been compelled to the creation of world and He is agent-by-being forced.

1-5-4. Divine Act is neither from intention nor from nature. In

Avicenna's opinion (Ibid, pp. 402-3) the act from intention requires defect and plurality in the Essence of the Creator, and the act from nature requires non-knowledge of the Maker to His Maked and non-consent to that. In his opinion, God's reasoning of the world requires to bring into existence the whole world from Him and there is not in His Essence any hindrance or prevention from procession of the whole world, His Essence discerns that His Perfection and Elevation is in a manner that the good emanates from Him, then any essence that discerns the procession of a thing from himself and there is no hindrance to prevent; he will be consent to that procession; so, First Principle is consent to emanation of the whole world from Himself. Therefore, In Avicenna's opinion, God is agent-by-foreknowledge and His Act is as a result of His consent.

1-5-5. The principle of "*ex uno non fit nisi unum*" (the One doesn't proceed from him but one) means that since the First Principle is one and simple Firstly proceeds nothing but the one and simple caused which is the first intellect. But, since the first intellect itself is caused and non- eternal and in relation to its cause is imperfect and limited and poisoned to non-being, is composed of being (*Wojod*) and essence. Therefore, this intellect has two things, the one is its being (*Wojod*) which is proceeded from First Principle, and the other is its essence that isn't proceeded from First Principle but results from its imperfection and limitation. Therefore, second intellect proceeds from the existing aspect of first intellect and the body and soul of first sphere proceeds from the essential aspect of the first intellect (Ibid, pp. 403-6).

1-6. In Avicenna's view, the whole world is the emanation of Divine being (*Wojod*) and in this case he says "and He is the agent of all things, that is, He is a being (*Mojod*) that the whole being (*Wojod*) emanates from Him, the emanation which is other than His essence".(Ibid, p. 403) But, in his opinion, the first intellect is the mediator of the emanation of other creatures and he says "therefore the soul stimulations are

emanating continually from the Intellectual Separate Principle to the soul of celestial bodies and the same emanation on soul figures is on order by which, in the manner that has been said, celestial bodies are brought into motion" (Avicenna, 1402, vol. 3, p. 207). "But, forms also are emanated from this intellect, and nevertheless these forms are different in their matters, according to the merit of that matter to these forms from different aspect of their readiness" (Ibid, p. 257) "And at this time vegetable and animals and rational souls emanate from the intellectual substance that is adjacent to the world of elements" (Ibid, p. 259).

As it was mentioned before, procession of these creatures from First Principle is not immediately. Since First Principle is one and simple. He doesn't create but only one being (*Mojud*) that is the first intellect. In fact, in Avicenna's view, first intellect, considering its existence, is similar to First Principle and is also capable of innovational creation and emanation of creatures; except for that since first intellect is mixed of essence and imperfect, as against to First Principle, has different aspects that are the origin of procession of more than one thing. In this regard, he says "since there is, under any intellect, a sphere with its matter and form- that is the same soul- and a lower intellect, therefore in the outside under any intellect there are three things; therefore it must be for the sake of these triple aspects that the existence of these three things have been contingent in the original manner from first reason; and any one of these three realities, in the order of their existential superiority, results from the higher aspect that exists in intellect and there are many reasons to prove it...". (Avicenna, 1404, *Al-Ilāhyāt*, p. 406)

The plurality that has been found necessary in the first intellect is for it is being non-eternal. Therefore, the first intellect, reasoning the essence of the First Principle emanates the second intellect, reasoning its essence, as necessary-existence-by-the other, emanates the soul of the first sphere, and reasoning its essence, as contingent-existence-by-

essence, emanates the body of the first sphere. This chain, in this manner, continues to the tenth reasons which is the active intellect. The chain of emanation comes to an end in the tenth intellect; active intellect emanates the souls of the world of under - moon and deliberates the world of generation and corruption.(Ibid, pp. 405-9)

1-7. As we mentioned, Avicenna in the case of emanation theory is under the influence of Aristotle. In *Uthulijiyā* there are many phrases about the hierarchy of the world which are derived from this doctrine: "it is the First Being and the Truth that emanates life first on intellect, then on soul, and then on natural things, and He is God that is the pure goodness" (Plotinus, 1356, p. 42). "and although intellect has an actual ipseity, is caused by the First Cause, for intellect emanates form on soul by means of a potency that has been given by the First Cause".(Ibid, p. 74) "and the intellectual world benefits and emanates the sensory world, and the sensory world profits and accepts the potency given by the intellectual world" (Ibid, p. 79).

Plotinus himself more clearly, emphasizes on this doctrine in Ennead the fifth, second tract, number 1: "Seeking nothing, possessing nothing, lacking nothing, the One is perfect and, metaphorically, has overflowed, and its exuberance has produced new creature; this product ... has become ... an Intellectual-Principle. That station towards the one [the fact that something exists in presence of the One] establishes the Intellectual-Principle ... attaining resemblance in virtue of this vision, it repeats the act of the One This active power sprung from essence [from the Intellectual-Principle considered as Being] is the same soul" (Plotinus, 1952, p. 214).

Also, in the *Al-Kheir-o-Al-mahz*, it has been mentioned that "and He manages all the originated things and emanates on them potency and life and good to the extent of their ability and power" (Proclus, 1955, p. 20) "and His Person is pure good and emanates all goods on intellect and by means of intellect on other things" (Ibid, p. 12) "and as God -blessed and exalted- emanates good on things, hence the

intellect emanates knowledge on the things that are lower than intellect" (Ibid, p. 23).

In the *Elements of Theology* there are some episodes that clearly implies this doctrine: "For all things are dependent on the gods, some being irradiated by one god, some by another (Proclus, 1992, p. 129). "For some divine principles in virtue of their substance and the especial character of their station are completely exalted in their simplicity above the beings which they irradiate".(Ibid, p. 125) "For through the mediation of Intelligence and Soul such henads irradiate certain parts of the world - order" (Ibid, p. 143). " ...if soul proceeds from intelligence and has intelligence as its originative principle, and intelligence being unmoved produces all things by its mere existence, then it will give to the soul which arises from it, as part of that soul's being, rational nations of all that is contains" (Ibid, pp. 169 -171). Therefore, it is evident that, regarding the doctrine of emanation, Avicenna is not under the influence of Aristotle but under the influence of Plotinus and Proclus.

1-8. When Avicenna talks about the processions of the first intellect estimates them three things: second intellect, soul of the first sphere, and body of the first sphere. Aristotle never believes it to be so. Al-Fārābī (Al-Fārābī, 1361, p. 127) doesn't reject this idea, but he is also, under the influence of Plotinus, says that two things emanate from first intellect: being (*Wojod*) of the third being (*Mojod*), and being (*Wojod*) of the first heaven. nevertheless, in spite of the fact that Plotinus (Plotinus, 1952, 5, 2, 1) considers the first intellect both intellect and being says that only one thing, that is, spirit (soul), proceeds from intellect. Therefore, it is evident that saying that three things proceed from first intellect is advanced by Avicenna himself on doctrine of procession of Neo-platonic of Al-Fārābī.

1-9. Up to now, it would be obvious that according to whreliminary basis Avicenna has attained the doctrine of emanation. Actually all of these preliminaries are not of the inventive genius of Avicenna; in

division of being (*Mojod*) to necessary and contingent and to non-eternal and eternal he is completely in agreement with Aristotle;¹ in inventive creation and emanation of the world and in that God reasoning is the origin of creation he agrees with Plotinus and Proclus; and in the case of principle of "*ex uno non fit nisi unum*" he accepts Al-Fārābī.² Among these preliminary, being God's agent-by-foreknowledge is of the inventive genius of Avicenna himself.

2. intellect, soul, and body

2-1. The term of "active intellect" is not from Aristotle himself. Aristotle in *on the soul* applies the term of "passive intellect" only one time, (Aristotle, 1984, 430 a 24) but when he distinct it from intellect that is essentially act, (Ibid, 430 a 18) commentators call this second intellect "active intellect". When Aristotle talks about active intellect, he, intends to solve the problem of reasoning. In his mind, without active intellect, nothing would think (Ibid, 430 a 24 -5). Despite his master, Plato, he doesn't believe that intellectual forms have independent and actual being (*Wojod*) and so he doesn't think that they are directly capable of perception and reasoning. In his opinion, these intellectual forms have potential beings (*Wojod*) in sensible things and he propounded active intellect to bring out these intellectual forms from sensible things and turn them into actual. Active intellect has a being (*Wojod*) in the soul of human beings, and it is the only thing that can separate itself from the soul, and, in its separation, it will gain an imperishable and eternal being (*Wojod*) (Ibid, 430 a 23-4). Aristotle assimilated active intellect to the light that is the means of perception of colours (Ibid, 430 a 15).

1. Of Course, Aristotle speaks, in *metaphysics*, 5, 5, of necessary and, in *ibid*, 9, 4, of contingent and, in *ibid*, I 069 and 1070. For example, it has been mentioned that matter and form are eternal, but the one who has made clear the discussion of necessary and contingent is Al-Fārābī (for example, in the beginning of his book *Eun-Al-Masāel*) and the origin of discussion of non-eternal and eternal turns back to the discussion of non-eternity and eternity by Muslim Motakallemin (Islamic theologians).

2. Al-Fārābī himself also says that this principle is from initiatives of Aristotle. See Al-Fārābī, dateless, p. 7.

In Avicenna's opinion, active intellect is a thing higher than what is thought by Aristotle. In his mind, active intellect:

(1) has a substantial and separate being (*Wojod*) and is situated out of the individual human beings (Avicenna, 1402, vol. 2, p. 361; Avicenna, 1404, *Al-Ilāhyāt*, p. 142).

(2) is the last intellect of the tenth separate intellects and is the administrator the world of under-moon (Avicenna, 1404, *Al-Ilāhyāt*, p. 401).

(3) is the dispenser of form and the emanator of forms to anything and intellectual forms to the reasons of human (Ibid, pp. 401 and 410).

(4) in its connection to souls of human, by means of its emanation, arises intellectual forms in them; However, it isn't human's intellect that have achieves this intellectual forms by means of sensation and imagination, yet this sensation and imagination paves the way for the soul of human to connect to active intellect and receive the forms (Avicenna, 1402, art 6, p. 208-9).

Avicenna assimilates active intellect to the sun. He says the relation of active intellect to our souls is similar to the relation of sun to our eyes, and as the sun is essentially luminous and with its shine's lights other things, active intellect emanates the light of intellect on our souls (Ibid, p. 208).

2-2. I said that Aristotle maintained only to two intellects, that is active intellect and passive intellect and even though the phrase active intellect doesn't belong to him. Avicenna, mainly under the influence of Al-Fārābi (Al-Fārābi, 1361, p. 218-224) maintains that the kinds of intellects are more than two. In addition to these two intellects, he maintains three other intellects: actual intellect, habitual intellect, and acquired intellect. Active intellect is higher than human reason, and other four intellects are degrees of human reason (Avicenna, 1402, vol. 2, pp. 353-4).

2-3. On the passive intellect or the same material intellect, Aristotle, on one hand, maintained that this intellect when gaining intellectual

forms must be devoid of any form and, on the other hand, maintained that this intellect is not mixed of matter and was assimilating that intellect to a *tabula rasa* (Aristotle, 1984, 429 a 20-21 and 430 a 1). Al-Fārābī accepted the second view of Aristotle and concluded that passive intellect doesn't have any appointment and attainment and is pure capacity and acceptance (Al-Fārābī, 1361, pp. 218-221). Contrary to Al-Fārābī who believed in the subsistence of perfect human intellect and therefore regards passive intellect as a pure capacity, Avicenna believed that the souls of all humans are subsistent; and since he contends that rational soul of human, while still hasn't attained the comprehension of intelligibles, is the same as material intellect and accepts the first view of Aristotle, and as result he maintains that material intellect in addition to having appointment and attainment has substantial being (*Wojod*) (Avicenna, marginal notes on Aristotle's *On the soul*, in Badavi, 1947, vol. 1, pp.100-101).

2-4. In Aristotle's mind, forms and intellectual universals haven't a being (*Wojod*) other than sensible things. But Avicenna assumes two class of intellectual forms; the first class hasn't a being (*Wojod*) separate from sensible things, but the second class is essentially immaterial and separate from matter.

Therefore, as is said, Aristotle believes in the abstraction of intellectual forms from sensible and imaginal pictures and thinks that this isn't practicable without the help of sensation and imagination. This idea of Aristotle is in accordance with his own view about potency and act. On the potency and act, Aristotle declares that act is prior to potency and one can't actualize any potential unless by means of a thing that is essentially actual (Aristotle, 1984, *Metaphysics*, book 9, 1049). In gaining intellectual forms, he says that actual forms are gained from sensible beings (*Mojodāt*).

As opposed to Aristotle, Avicenna believes that universal and intellectual forms proceed not from sensible beings (*Mojodāt*) but from an actual thing. Although paying attention to sensible and

imaginational pictures paves the way for the rational soul in acceptance of the universal and intellectual forms, this isn't the forms that are transferred from the imagination to the intellect, but it is the rational soul that after gaining a potency from sensation and imagination receives intellectual and separate forms from active intellect (Avicenna, 1402, vol. 2, pp. 365-7).

2-5. When Aristotle talks about soul, he intends that "substance in the sense of form". In his opinion, the soul is a substance which is a form to the organic and natural body (Aristotle, 1984, 412 a 20).

Avicenna, in contrary to Aristotle and in order to confirm the independent permanence of the soul, says that if it is due to the soul to be a particular part of a thing which is compound of soul and the subject matter of soul it can't be substance; if soul is to be "substance in the sense of form", it becomes a necessary for the soul to be impressed in body, whereas body itself is dependent to soul and unless the soul hasn't been connected to the body it won't have positivity and specificity. Therefore, in Avicenna's mind, soul is a separate substance; and in his view, in spite of the fact that soul has a being (*Wojod*) other than the body, its interest and relation to body is an interest of administering, applying, dominating and controlling on it (Avicenna, 1404, *Al-Tabiyāt*, art 6, pp.12- 4).

2-6. Aristotle contends that soul and body, in other words, the body which possess a soul are the same. In his mind, the matter and form of everything are separable and distinctionable from each other only in the realm of logic, but they consist one truth in the real world. In the case of soul and body he also believes to the same unity and says "That is why we can dismiss as unnecessary the question whether the soul and body are one" (Aristotle, 1984, 412 b 6).

Avicenna says when Aristotle declares that soul is the first entelechy for potential, organic and natural body (Ibid, 412 a 28), he just intends to indicate the relation of soul and body and reveals the essence of the soul. In concurrence with his religious beliefs, he really plans to

separate between soul and body, and consequently he takes soul as a substance that essentially is stripped of body. In his mind, substantiality of soul is due to the its dependence to body. The body is dependent on the control, dominance and occupation of soul (Avicenna, 1404, *Al-Tabiyāt*, art 6, pp. 9-14).

2-7. Where Aristotle proposes the five substances he distinguishes between substantial form and substantial matter (Aristotle 1984, 1 070 a 10-12). In discussing the soul, he agrees that human soul is the form for his body. In his mind, the realization of the first substance, that is, the living body, depends on belonging of the soul to it (Aristotle, 1984, 412 a 20). Moreover, when Aristotle assumes soul as a perfection to organic and natural body, his intention of perfection is the same actuality and form. In the *on the souls*, he writes: "Hence the soul must be a substance in the sense of the form of a natural body having life potentially within it" (Ibid, 412 a 19-21).

Although Avicenna, approved that matter can't live without form and body can't exist without soul, he couldn't accept Aristotle's opinion. Aristotle (Aristotle, 1984, *On the souls*, 3, 5) maintained that the whole efficiencies of the human soul except what he called the agent intellect -in terms of Islamic Philosophy "active intellect"- would be destroyed at death time along with perishing of body. But Avicenna maintained that the status of active intellect is in the outside of human being, hence in case of human being he believed to the resurrection of rational souls. Therefore, Avicenna came to this point that although soul is the perfection of the body it isn't the form of it. In Avicenna's mind, perfection has a meaning more than form. Perfection means something which determinate and realize an undetermined and unrealize thing, whether or not this perfection is the form of it. For the condition of form is that it isn't impressed in matter, whereas perfection is the whole of impression in matter and separation of matter (Avicenna, 1404, *Al-Tabiyāt*, art 6, pp. 11-16).

2-8. Since Aristotle maintained that passive intellect, namely material

intellect, is pure potency and receptivity, in case of knowledge of soul to itself he maintained that passive intellect in order to make itself reasonable, in contrary to other reasonables, doesn't change from potency to act immediately under the influence of active intellect; that is when the other reasonables became actual and united with the passive intellect, and while the required knowledge is obtained for these reasonables, at the same time the self- knowledge is created immediately by their union with intellect. Therefore, in Aristotle's mind, knowledge of soul to itself is dependent on comprehension of things that are outside of the soul itself and unless they are been obtained by the passive intellect the very passive intellect doesn't take place reasonable and the soul hasn't any knowledge to itself (Aristotle, 1984, 429 b 28 and 430 a 1-9)

Avicenna, on the contrary, maintained that rational soul of human being would perpetual be remaining and eternal even in the period of material intellect. In his opinion, in the period of material intellect, in spite of the fact that intellect hasn't any comprehension of the outside world, is conscious of its essence in any condition so that even with being free and unconscious from the comprehension of everything also it has knowledge to its essence and is aware of himself.(Avicenna, 1402, vol. 2, p. 292) In his defense of the substantiality, immortality and eternity of the soul, he comes to this point that any individual rational soul is responsible for their thoughts and acts and believes them to be present in the Resurrection and answer for their own behavior and conduct.

2-9. As is said previously in 2-7, Aristotle maintained that active intellect can be separated from the body of human being, and so he believed it to be immortal and eternal (Aristotle, 1984, 430 a 23-4).

Avicenna, being loyal to his religious belief, explicitly, introduces soul not the form of body but the perfection of body. He maintains that the soul of any individual person, keeping his individuation, is eternal and perpetual. In his mind, not only the active intellect has a transcendental position, but also the actual intellect and even material intellect that are the substance of rational soul of human being, after their separation of the

body, will continue to their life and endurance in the other world.

3. Matter and Form

3-1. Aristotle maintains that, in the hierarchy of the world, the first mover is necessary and simple being and the inferior of the first mover is a possible being which is composed of matter (υλη) and form (ειδοξ). In his mind, matter and form of the world of superior to moon and even matter of the world of under the moon are eternal.

When Aristotle was talking about things maintained that their components are matter and form and, in their cognation and definition, he assigned genus to matter and the difference to form.

3-2. Owing to his domination to the philosophy of Aristotle, Avicenna discerned that we recognize a thing in accordance with its genus and difference and also this genus and difference manifest the matter and form. If we recognize something by means of universal concepts and while we ignore all its universal concepts, there remains nothing of it except pure matter then how we can say that this thing has come into existence from a pure matter which is a pure potency and even non-being and from a form that is universal and non-being. Consequently, if the constituting particulars of a thing is only matter and form, we can never realize the objective being of a thing.

Therefore, Avicenna propounds a third affair. Matter and form are non-requirement of being and non-being and it is due to the occurrence of "being" (*Wojod*) that they obtain objective beings.¹ When he says that being (*Wojod*) is occurring on them his intention is that being (*Wojod*) has been granted to them in relation to God (Avicenna, 1404, *Al-Ilāhyāt*, p. 347). In his mind, except Necessary Being are possible-by-themselves

1. Averroes and, subject to him, Aquinas and even Gilson have made a mistake in understanding Avicenna's intention of occurrence of being (*Wojod*) on essence. They have thought that his intention of "occurrence" is categorical accident and have been surprised that how being (*Wojod*) surpasses the accident of the essence. This affair has impelled Aquinas to set forth "action of being (*esse*)" and this become his noble an initiative theory, neglecting that Avicenna's intention wasn't the occurrence of being (*Wojod*) on essence but is contradiction of being (*Wojod*) and essence and Avicenna himself long before than Aquinas knew "action of being(*esse*)" which was granted by the Supreme Deity. In this case, for example, see Gilson, Etienne, 1989, P. 179.

and their being (*Wojod*) have originated from Necessary Being; they intrinsically have the merit of non-existence absolute, not that they are non-existence in only matter or in only form but they ,were non-existence in their totality and Necessary Being has generated and proceeded the whole of their matter and form (Ibid, p. 342).

3-3. We see that, in Avicenna opinion, the existence of possibilities depends, not only on matter and form, but also on a third affair, that is, occurrence of being (*Wojod*) or the same generation and proceeding from Necessary Being. In propounding of this third affair, Avicenna, as opposed to our expectation, isn't under the influence of Neo-Platonists. For Plotinus himself he lived that things are composed of matter and form; (Plotinus, 1952, 2, 4, 4, and 2, 4, 6), but, despite of Aristotle, he not only accepts the origination of form (Ibid, 2, 4, 8 and 3, 8, 1) but also the origination of matter, (Ibid, 2, 4, 5) and maintains that forms are higher status and they are existing in the Divine Knowledge.(Ibid, 5, 9, 5) In Plotinus mind, what is proceeded (not come into existence) from one is universal intellect and the universal intellect has two aspects of intellect and being and the universal soul proceeds from universal intellect and the soul of Plants and Animals proceeds from universal soul (Ibid, 5, 2, 1) and the world of matter, namely matter and form, proceeds from the inferior aspect of soul that is the same nature (the world of matter in comparison with nature is similar to the fishnet in to the water of sea (Ibid, 4, 3, 9)) (Ibid, 3, 8, 1 and 2, 4, 5) Why Avicenna propounds a third affair in addition to matter and form?¹

In propounding of this third affair, he intends to account for the existence of the possible beings. In Avicenna mind, things can't exist unless being (*Wojod*) occur on the essence (matter and form) of them, that is, things can't come into existence unless they are in relation to God. The existence (*Wojod*) or possible beings depends on the existence (*Wojod*) of

1. Of Course, the intention isn't that. in the outside, one thing has been composed of three things, that is, matter and form and being (*Wojod*). It is in rational analysis that we analyze one thing into matter and form and being (even the rational beings doesn't have matter at all).

God (Avicenna, 1404, *Al-Ilāhyāt*, p. 404).

3-4. In Aristotle view, a being (*Mojod*) is composed of matter and form but he doesn't determine the causality of matter on form or form on matter. But Avicenna, after a detailed discussion, comes to this point that form is somehow the cause of matter. The main cause for emanation of the under-moon beings (*Mojodāt*) is the active intellect; but active intellect is the dispenser of forms and emanates form to matter. Form, in other word, is the partner of cause in coining into existence of beings (*Mojodāt*) (See Avicenna, 1404, *Al-Ilāhyāt*, pp. 83-85)

Conclusion

Avicenna, in his philosophy, where he is influence of Aristotle, has followed from Aristotle, and where he has mentioned new points of view, has transcended from Aristotle. Religion of Islam, mysterious aptitude, and intellectual genius are three factors that are origin of his transcend from Aristotle. Avicenna, with believing that world is God's creature and innovation and is God's emanating of emanation and emanate from God's innovation and providence, active intellect is means of God's emanation and creation of creature and the emanator of intellectual forms to the reasons of human, soul and body are two separate substances that soul's interest and relation to body is an interest of administering, applying, dominating and controlling on it, and Being's things is stopped, in addition to matter and form, on Being's emanation from God to them and through active intellect, has transcended from Aristotle and has penetrated to his special philosophy that is Peripatetic Islamic Philosophy.

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Knowledge of Logic: Necessity or Refusal (Examining the Views and Reasons of Muslim Proponents and Opponents)

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ABSTRACT

Knowledge of logic includes the rules that govern the way of thinking and reasoning. Muslims became familiar with this science in the third century by translating Aristotle's books and immediately faced the challenge of what does this science have to do with Islam? Should Muslims use the same method as Aristotle in their religious sciences or avoid paying attention to this science? The present research, by searching the books of Muslim jurists and theologians, shows that each of these two assumptions had supporters, and of course, the number of opponents of the science of logic was more than its supporters. And those opponents used violence against the proponents of the science of logic and brought arguments to ban the science of logic and tried to show that God is not pleased with this knowledge.

This article also tries to bring these two views closer together. The final result of this research is that most of the arguments of the opponen of the logic are a warning for those who may not use this knowledge correctly or are involved in the thoughts of philosophers who have distanced themselves from religion.

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Introduction

Logic teaches thinking and reasoning in the form of rules to define concepts and arguments. Although these laws are given to man by nature; But sometimes it doesn't use them properly. Aristotle tried to collect those rules by writing books. When these books entered the Islamic world in the third century, Muslim thinkers were faced with the question of what is the relationship between these books and the Islamic religion. Muslim thinkers were divided into two groups in this regard.

First category: A number of Muslim thinkers considered the use of these books in religious studies a necessity; Because otherwise there is no guarantee that we will not make mistakes in our studies and will not mislead others. In this category, in addition to logicians and philosophers, there are some jurists and theologians who considered the use of logic important to the extent that they said that without the use of logic, one cannot achieve the happiness that religion wants us to have.

The second category: There were many jurists and theologians who, mainly paying attention to the characteristics of the centuries before the arrival of logical books in the Islamic world, came to the conclusion that the use of logical books in religious studies is not only unnecessary; They should also be avoided. The number of jurists and theologians who fall into this category has been so great that the claim of their consensus has become a reason to ban the use of logical books in religious studies. They did not refrain from any violence against those books and their use, and they accused those who used them of infidelity and called them the people of Hell.

The present article examines the above categories and the ups and downs that the Knowledge of logic has found among these conflicts. Hence, he first deals with the views of those who considered the use of the laws of logic necessary for religious studies, and then refers to the reactions of their opponents. It then examines the arguments of those opponents as to whether the Knowledge of logic is useful or harmful to Muslims, and finally tries to cite as many aspects as possible that bring

the two groups closer together.

1. The necessity of logic for religious people

Many Muslim thinkers consider the study of logic necessary for human happiness. They believe that there is no other way to distinguish truth from falsehood and reasoning from sophistry except using the science of logic. According to Ibn Sina (d. 428 AH), human nature requires the use of logic. (Ibn Sina, 1985,1:9) Al-Farabi (d. 339 AH) considered the Knowledge of logic to be a set of rules that strengthen the intellect and prevent people from making mistakes on the right path (Farabi,1999: 29) Rather, there is no other way to reach the truth except by applying the science of logic (Ibn Rushd,1993: 221) The main argument was that the science of logic provides religious people with rules that help them not fall into error when thinking and reasoning about religious doctrines. It also helps believers to recognize the fallacies of others and not be deceived. Although these claims were made by philosophers and logicians, they were also accepted by a number of Muslim jurists and theologians. One of these jurists was Ibn Hazm of Andalusia (d. 456 AH), who considered the logic to be a good and high-ranking knowledge (Ibn Hazm,1983, 4:35) because it helps people to know the facts. Knowing the facts is also a prelude to knowing God and His commands and achieving happiness (Ibid, 4: 75) He wrote a book titled "Al-Taqrīb Le had al-Mantiq" and said: "Anyone who reads this book will see that its usefulness is not limited to one Knowledge, but it is useful for the thinkers of all Knowledges." It is useful for everyone in understanding the Holy Qur'an and the instructions of the Prophet, as well as in jurisprudence (Ibid, 4: 98). According to Ibn Hazm, it will not be possible to understand the words of God and the Prophet and recognize the correct fatwa without knowing the Knowledge of logic.

Among Muslim theologians, the number of Ash'ari theologians who considered the use of logic necessary to achieve human happiness was not small. It seems that the first of them is Abu Hamid Ghazali (d. 505 AH).

He believed that the achievement of eternal happiness for humans and freedom from the domination of the senses and the domination of the intellect are conditioned by the use of logic. All benefits are small compared to such happiness, and the eternal happiness of man is conditional on the acquisition of knowledge, which, of course, is only possible with the help of the laws of logic (Ghazali, 1961, 36). Therefore, whoever does not know the laws of logic, his knowledge can never be trusted (Ghazali, 2015, 1: 20). He said: I do not claim to evaluate only religious knowledge with the help of logic rules, but with their help, I also measure each of the sciences of arithmetic, geometry, natural sciences, jurisprudence and theology. With the help of the rules of logic, I can distinguish right from wrong. Because logic is an accurate scale that does not make mistakes when measuring (Ghazali, 1996, 195) He introduced logic terms into jurisprudence and included jurisprudential examples in his logic books. However, he gave the titles of *Mahak al_Nazar*, *Meayar al_ilm* and *Al_Qastas al_Mustaqim* to the books he wrote in the science of logic. Because he wanted to avoid the possible harm of the opponents of logic (Goldziher, 1966, 154). Fakhr Razi (d. 606 A.H) was another Ash'ari theologian who, by authoring several books on the Knowledge of logic, pointed out the place of this knowledge and its place in achieving happiness. He wrote the book *Logic al_Mulkhas* and also explained and summarized the books of Ibn Sina in the Knowledge of logic, and he wrote *Sharh al_Isharat*, *Sharh oyun al_Hikmah*, *Sharh al_Najat* and *Lubab al_Isharat*. Saif al_Din Ali ibn Muhammad Amodi (d. 622 A.H) also wrote books on logic and philosophy such as *Daqayq al_Haqayq* and *Kashf al_Tamwihat fi Sharh al_Tanbihat*. Shams al_Din Muhammad ibn Ashraf Samarqandi (d. 704 A.H) also wrote an important logical book called *al_Qistas* and later wrote a commentary on it. He also wrote the book "*Basharat al_Isharat fi Sharh al_Asharat*". Saad al_Din Taftazati (d. 792 A.H) wrote both *Tahzeeb al_Mantiq* and described the book *al_Shamsiyah*. Jourjani (d. 816 A.H) also wrote the book *Al_Kobra fi al_Mantiq* and in his commentary on the book "*Al_Mawaqif*" Azod

al_Din Eeji (d. 756A.H) gave logical arguments.

2. Reactions to the necessity of logic for religious people

After the translation and introduction of logical books in the Islamic world, many Muslim thinkers expressed their opposition to them in different ways. Ibn Taymiyyah (d.728 AH) writes: After the Knowledge of logic was translated into Arabic and became famous, Muslim scholars always criticized it and did not pay attention to that knowledge and its people in religious studies (Suyuti, 333) This opposition was not limited to the jurists, and as Ibn Taymiyyah wrote: "Most of the early theological schools, such as the Ash'arites, the Mu'tazilites, the Karamites, and the Shiites, dealt with logic in the strongest possible way." (Ibid,324) To the extent that they have said: Whoever teaches logic becomes an infidel (Badawi, 147) Many of its topics are a kind of sophistry and deception, and those who are engaged in those topics will be the people of Hell and the examples of the Companions of the Fire of Hell (Ibn Taymiyyah, 1971, 1:218) Salafists considered logic to be a tool in the hands of Satan (Recher,2005, 164) Suyuti considered the Knowledge of logic to be evil and reprehensible. According to him, whoever says that learning logic is obligatory is ignorant and a heretic; Because even interpretation, hadith and jurisprudence -which are the best of all knowledge - are not objectively obligatory (Suyuti, 2004, 1: 301). Suyuti also said: One of the most false lies and worst slanders is when someone says that belief in the oneness of God cannot be realized without knowing the laws of logic. Because on this basis, we must say that most Muslims are infidels (ibid). The opponents of logic considered it abhorrent to even greet someone who is engaged in logic and did not allow communication with such a person except out of necessity. Such a person cannot be a judge and his verdict is not valid in any court. His testimony will not be accepted in any court unless he repents. Also, you should not go to him and hear hadiths from him (Suyuti, 2008, 184). It is not permissible to rent a building to teach logic teachers and it is obligatory to expel them from schools

(Zarkashi, 1998, 1: 51). Under the influence of such words, the Abbasid ruler banned the purchase and sale of logical books in 279 AH (Ibn Emad, 1986, 3: 326) The jurists opposed to the logic considered it the Sharia duty of the ruler to ward off the evil of these misguided people and expel them from Religious schools and punish them for engaging in the Knowledge of logic. If a logician promotes the ideas of philosophers, he should be killed unless he returns to Islam. One of the most important religious duties is to expel professors of philosophy and philosophical sciences such as logic from religious schools. After that, they should be imprisoned or imprisoned at home and a teacher from the elders of religion should come in their place. (Ibn al_Salah, 1986, 1: 211) These kinds of words caused Saif al_Din Ali bin Muhammad al-Shafi'i (died 622 AH) to be threatened with death by some jurists, because he also taught logic in addition to teaching religious sciences in Cairo. He also fled to Syria for fear of his life (Ibn Khallaqan, 1900, 3: 293). Abu Hayyan al_Andalus wrote about Ibn Rushd (d.595 AH): People turned away from him and did not narrate from him; Because he was engaged in Philosophical knowledge and logic. Finally, the ruler of Andalusia, at the request of the jurists there, expelled Ibn Rushd and exiled him, causing him to be beaten and cursed (Abu Hayyan Andalusi, 1420, 6: 46) Burning logical and philosophical books has been a relatively common Opinion for jurists (Suyuti, 2008, 145). In the news of 277 AH, at the height of the Baghdad scientific movement, they wrote: All those whose profession was the reproduction of books were sworn not to write philosophical and logical books (Badawi, 135). Historians also wrote in the news of 555 AH, that is, 50 years after Ghazali's death, that the Abbasid ruler, al_Mustanjad, arrested one of the judges and took his books and found every philosophical and logical book among them (such as al_Shifa Ibn Sina and the letters of Akhwan al_Safa) ordered to burn all those books in the city square (Ibn Athir, 1965, 11: 258). Ibn Kathir al_damasqi (d. 774 AH) also wrote in the events of 603 AH that the Abbasid ruler set fire to the books and property of Abdul Qadir Jilani's grandson, that is, Abd

Salam bin Abdul Wahhab (d. 611 AH); Because among them he had seen philosophy and logic books (Ibn Kathir, 1986, 13: 45). It was in this direction that Yahya bin Sharaf Navavi (d.676 AH) prohibited the purchase and sale of philosophical and logical books and ordered their destruction (Novavi, 9: 253). Such violence in Andalusia led to the fact that when someone wanted to buy a book on logic, he secretly bought it. The logicians there did not allow themselves to use the word logic (Al_mantiq) for this science and used the term "Al_mafal" instead (Abu Hayyan Andalusi, 1420, 6: 48).

3. Reasons for opposing the necessity of logic for religious people

The jurists and theologians who opposed the conversion of Muslims to the Knowledge of logic have cited various reasons to show that learning logic is not necessary for Muslims and that God is not pleased with Muslims paying attention to it. And for this reason, it must be said that the Knowledge of logic not only does not lead to the perfection of human beings, but also leads to their cruelty. On this occasion, the most important reasons for their examination are examined.

3.1. Uselessness of logic for Muslims

The jurists and theologians who oppose the science of logic in the first step say that even if it can be claimed that logic is not inherently an obstacle to knowing God and His commands and serving Him, it will undoubtedly be of no use. Logical laws only refer to general matters, and generalities do not exist externally in the outside world, and do not imply specific and particular matters (Suyuti, 1: 301). According to these opponents, Islamic rules do not need the science of logic. The rules that the science of logic provides about definition and reasoning are useless, and God has made religious scientists without the need of those rules (Ibn al_Salah, 1986, 1: 211). According to these opponents, even if it is useful to learn the knowledge of logic, it should not be accepted that pure people are inherently deprived of these benefits and it should not be assumed that

these people are forced to learn logical concepts and terms (Subki, 1999, 281).

3.2. Disadvantages of logic for Muslims

The jurists who are against the knowledge of logic have counted many evils for the study of logic. Ibn Taymiyyah considered many issues of this science to be sophistry (Ibn Taymiyyah, 1971, 1: 218) Ibn Qayyim Juziyeh (d.751 AH) enumerated these corruptions in a poem as follows: 1) It is full of lies and slander. 2) It drives good minds to the brink of insanity. 3) It destroys human nature and disrupts its principles and foundations. 4). Science is unstable and on the edge of the abyss. 5) He secretly and openly betrays the one who feels that he needs that knowledge. 6) The movement of language in the field of logic is like the walking of a person who cannot walk because a stone is tied to his feet. 7) It is accompanied by slips and weaknesses. 8) It is like a mirage that sees a thirsty person in the desert and thinks that it will quench his thirst, but it disappoints him and he regrets that he spent his life in a false dream (Ibn Qayyim, 158) He also claims that if logic is used in any other knowledge, that knowledge will be destroyed and its rules and principles will be messed up (Ibid) Such corruptions and harms lead every Muslim to the conclusion that studying logic is not rewarding and if he spends a lifetime studying it, he will not be safe from divine punishment on the Day of Resurrection, Unless he repents (Zubaydi,2005, 1: 283).

3.3. Logic is the cause of disbelief and misery

Jurists such as Abu Mansour Muhammad ibn Asaad al_Attari (d. 571 AH) (Subki, 1999, 281), Ibn al_Salah (d. 643 AH) (Ibn al_Salah, 1407, 1: 210), Siraj al_Din al_Qazvini (d. 736 AH) (Suyuti, 145) Taqi al_Din ibn Abdul_Sattar al_Hanbali, the master of Ibn Taymiyyah (Ibid. 148), Badr al_Din al_Zarkashi (d. 794 AH) (Zarkashi, 51), Suyuti (d.911 AH) (Suyuti, 300), Ali al_Qari al_Harawi (d.1014 AH) (Zubaydi, 2005, 1: 277) says that learning the logic causes Muslims to disbelieve. Because

logic is an introduction to philosophy and philosophy contains blasphemous claims (Ibn al_Salah, 1986, 1: 210). Sheikh Abu Mansour al_attari also wrote in response to the question of Yusuf ibn Muhammad al_damasqi about the permissibility or prohibition of studying logic: No one deserves to turn to logic; Because the one who plunges into these issues is not sure that he will be safe from dangerous consequences like disbelief (Subki, 281)

3.4. Refusal of the Qur'an, Prophet, Companions and followers from the knowledge of logic

Some opponents of the knowledge of logic say that God has not allowed learning the knowledge of logic. If there was any good in this knowledge, the Quran or the Prophet would have said something about it (Suyuti, 156). Also, the companions of the Prophet and the mujtahids did not allow the teaching of logic. God has removed all these leaders from this pollution. Ibn Salah disagrees with Ghazali who says: You cannot trust the words and thoughts of someone who does not know anything about logic (Ibn al_Salah, 210-211) The reason for Ibn Salah's opposition is that Abu Bakr, Umar and many of the Companions were convinced of their religious beliefs, while none of them had studied logic (Ibn al_Salah, 1992, 1: 252) Ibn al_Daqiq (d.702AH) also made the same objection to Ghazali (Zarkashi, 1994, 8: 233). On the other hand, if the topics of logic had an impact on the guidance and growth of Muslims, the Prophet and his companions would not have stopped expressing it. Before his death, the Prophet stated what Muslims needed in religious affairs and never refrained from stating what would bring Muslims closer to God or avoid His punishment. Therefore, learning logic is heresy. According to them, only the knowledge that has reached us from the Prophet can be considered knowledge, and anything else, even if it is knowledge, is of no benefit. If it were, the Prophet would have definitely explained it to us (Abdollahi, 2024, 77).

3.5. Hadiths imply a prohibition of logic

Opponents of logic believe that the prohibition of paying attention to the Knowledge of logic can be seen as one of the requirements of the hadiths indicating the prohibition of employment in any work that leads to corruption or fear of sedition (Suyuti, 65) According to Suyuti, logic does not lead to good and anyone who thinks about it will not reach the goals of religion, because there is incompatibility between it and religious issues (Zubaydi, 2005, 1: 282).

Al-Zubaydi (d. 1205 AH) also listed some of these general hadiths and under some of them, he considers the logic to be one of the examples of Knowledges that have no use for its companions except in this world. Those who want to show their superiority over their co-religionists turn to the science of logic. Also, these opponents warn by relying on another hadith: Whoever learns the science of logic to achieve his worldly goals will not taste the smell of heaven (Ibid) Therefore, logic is not one of Knowledges that can be paid attention to with the divine eye, and the only motivation to deal with it is worldly motives such as gaining fame and excellence.

3.6. Muslim consensus on the ineffectiveness of the laws of logic in happiness and the hindrance of those laws to reach perfection

There have been a large number of Muslim jurists and theologians who have opposed the science of logic. Ibn Taymiyyah introduces them as those who are very careful in scientific matters (Suyuti, 333) Ibn Qayyim Joziyeh had access to the books of theologians that were written in opposition and prohibition of logic. The books of: Abu Bakr ibn Tayyeb Baghalani (d. 403 AH), Abdul Jabbar (d. 415 AH), Abu Ali Jubai (d. 304AH) and his son Abu Hashem (d. 321 AH), Abu Al_Maali Juvini (d.478 AH), Abu al_Qasim Ansari (d. 319 AH) (Ibn Qayyim, 158) Before these books, Abul Al_Hasan al-Ash'ari (d.324 AH) wrote a book titled "Al_rad ala Al_Mantiq" which is not available now (Badawi, 1997, 516). Ibn Khaldun (d. 809 AH) also wrote that before Ghazali, Ash'ari

theologians adhered to laws and principles that were never compatible with logical criteria in proving their religious claims, so they were not happy with the Knowledge of logic (Ibn Khaldun, 1988, 1: 647) In addition, a number of jurists of the four Sunni schools banned the Knowledge of logic and thus showed that the Knowledge of logic should not be included in religious studies. Imam Shafi'i (d.204 AH) is at the head of them. Among the Shafi'is are people like Ibn al_Sabbagh (d.477 AH), Ibn Qushiri (d. 465 AH), Nasr Al_Muqdisi (d. 490 AH), Imad al_Din Muhammad Ibn Yunus (d. 608 AH), Al_Hafiz Abu Tahir Ahmad Al_Salfi Al_Isfahani al_Damashqi (d. 576 AH), Abul Muhasen Yusuf Ibn Bandar Damasqi (d. 563 AH), Ibn Asaker (d. 571 AH), Ibn Athir (d. 555 AH), Taqi al_Din Ibn al_Salah Shahrzuri (d. 643 AH), Abu Muhammad eazz al_Din Abd al_Aziz Ibn Abd al_Salam (d. 660 AH), Shahab al_Din Ibn Ibrahim Muqdisi (d.665 AH), Yahya Ibn Sharaf al_Navavi (d.676 AH), Muhammad Ibn Ali Ibn Al_Wahaab known as Ibn Daqiq (d.702 AH), Abu Ishaq Burhan al_Din Al_Jabari (d. 732 AH) , Abuhian al_Tawhidi (d. 414 AH), Sharaf al_Din Abdullah ibn al_Mu'min ibn Khalaf al_Damyati (d.705 AH), Shams al_Din Dhahabi (d.748 AH), Hassan ibn Muhammad ibn Abdullah al-Taibi (d.743 AH), Abu Muhammad Abd al_Rahim ibn Hassan ibn Ali al_Asnawi (d.772AH). Shahab al_Din Al_Azraei (d.837 AH), Abdul Rahim Ibn Hossein known as al_Wali al_Iraqi (d.806 AH), Sharaf al_Din Ismaeil Ibn Abi Bakr Al_Muqari (d.837 AH) and Sharaf al_Din Manawi (d.871 AH) with knowledge Logic has opposed. Among the jurists of the Maliki sect, some jurists such as Abu Muhammad Abdullah ibn Abi Zayd al_Qairwani (d.386 AH), Abu Bakr Ibn Al_Arabi (468-543 AH), Abul Waleed Sulaiman Ibn Khalaf al_Baji (d.494 AH), Abu Talib Makki (d. 386 AH), The author of Qut al_Qulub, Abul Hasan Ibn al_Hassar (d.610 AH), Abu Bakr Muhammad Ibn Walid al_Tartushi (d. 502 AH), Abu Amer Ibn Al_Rabie, Abul Hasan Ibn Habib Maliki (d. 520AH), Abul Hasan Ali Ibn Habib (d. 540 AH), Ibn Al_Munir and Ibn Abi Jamarah (d.599 AH) and most of the jurists living in the Maghrib consider learning logic

forbidden. Abu Saeed al_Serafi (d.368 AH) and Siraj al_Din Qazvini Baghdadi (d.745 AH) are two Hanafi jurists who forbade the Knowledge of logic. Hanbali jurists such as Ibn Juzi (508-598 AH), Saad al_Din Harithi (d.711 AH) and Ibn Taymiyyah (d.728 AH) also prohibited learning logic (Suyuti, 39) As it can be seen, by listing the names of the thinkers of the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence, Suyuti tried to show their consensus on the prohibition of logic; But the truth is that the number of jurists of these schools cannot be limited to this number, and therefore his claim of consensus cannot be accepted. Some of the figures of those religions, such as Ibn Hazm Andalusi, Abu Hamid Ghazali, Ibn Rushd and Fakhr Razi, considered the use of the laws of logic necessary for Muslims. It is surprising that Suyuti mentions the names of Ghazali and Ibn Rushd among the jurists who sanction logic; It seems that he did not pay much attention to the logical books of these two scientists.

3.7. Dangerous motivations to introduce the Knowledge of logic to the Islamic world

How can we expect logic to be a kind of perfection for Muslims, while the entry of this Knowledge into the Islamic world was motivated to distance Muslims from religion? During the rule of Ma'mun Abbasi, the Barmakians translated and published logical books with the motive of spreading heresies in the Islamic society and deviating from the prophetic way. Barmakians (whose hearts were full of disbelief and enmity with the Islamic government) created events to destroy the religion of Islam. If God had not promised his prophet that the religion of Islam would win over other nations, those perverts might have invalidated the religion of Islam. According to Suyuti, the first events that the Abbasids created in Islam was the issue of bringing Greek books to the land of Islam and translating and distributing them among Muslims. The Roman ruler, fearing that the Christians would abandon their religion and follow the Greeks, hid all those books from the Christians. When Yahya ibn Khalid Barmaki became a minister in the court of Bani Abbas government, he

learned about those books and sent gifts to that Roman ruler to take those books from him. After receiving many gifts, the Roman ruler consulted his ministers. The next time Barmaki's envoy brought him a gift, the ruler of Rome said to him: What does Barmaki want from me instead of these gifts? Barmaki replied: You have to lend us the books you have hidden. The ruler was pleased to hear Barmaki's request and asked Barmaki to never return those books so that they would be safe from the evil of those books. After receiving those books, Barmaki tried to gather every infidel and philosopher and give the books to them to translate. Among those books were logical writings that were translated, and of course most of the translators of these books became infidels. Barmaki held meetings in his palace with the presence of these translators and promoted those misleading books (ibid).

4. Efforts to bring views closer

4.1. The difference between logic in human nature and books written in logic

Proponents of logic note that logic has the dignity of a method used in thinking and reasoning. Thinking and reasoning are not limited to a moment in human life, and since the beginning of their existence, humans were equipped with a method that helped them not to make mistakes when thinking or reasoning. They also relied on a method when they wanted to present their ideas and arguments to others or to examine the ideas and arguments presented by others. This method was in human nature and it was a kind of logic that they had not learned from anyone and had not read a book about. Years and centuries later, some people (Aristotle) sought to compile and regulate these natural ways of human thinking and wrote books in this field. These books were translated and entered the Islamic world in the third century. Therefore, it can be accepted that the books of logic were not useful for people like the Prophet, Companions and followers; Because they followed the rules of logic with their pure nature and not having logical books did not cause

mistakes in their rational and reasoning concepts. Although the Prophet and his companions did not learn the terms and logic expressed by Aristotle and did not advise others to learn it, they used the rules of logic based on their pure nature. Therefore, it should not be assumed that other people and religious people should not use those books; Because it is quite conceivable that factors such as the passage of time and the influence of other cultures have caused Muslims to need logical books. Of course, it should be added that according to the numerous verses of the Holy Qur'an, both God and the prophets used the rules of logic to guide people. Ghazali clearly showed that the Holy Qur'an and the prophets used the laws of logic in guiding people to God. Ghazali considered God as the first teacher, Gabriel as the second teacher, and God's Messenger as the third teacher in using logical rules (Ghazali, 1996, 195). God revealed these logical laws in his book and taught them to his prophets. The laws of logic are examples of the proofs that God has given to Ebrahim (Ibid.194). Ebrahim used the first form of analogy against Nimrod; This argument is stated in verse 258 of Surah Al-Baqarah as follows: «فَإِنَّ اللَّهَ» ؛ يَأْتِي بِالشَّمْسِ مِنَ الْمَشْرِقِ فَأْتِ بِهَا مِنَ الْمَغْرِبِ 'Indeed Allah brings the sun from the east; now you bring it from the west (Ibid). Ebrahim also used the second form of analogy. God has narrated his argument in verse ٧٤ of Surah Al_an'aam as follows: «فَلَمَّا جَنَّ عَلَيْهِ اللَّيْلُ رَأَى كَوْكَبًا قَالَ هَذَا رَبِّي فَلَمَّا أَفَلَ قَالَ لَا أُحِبُّ الْإِفْلِينَ» ; When night darkened over him, he saw a star and said, 'This is my Lord!' But when it set, he said, 'I do not like those who set (Ibid, 202) Of course, al_Ghazali immediately added that although this analogy was used by Prophet Ebrahim, God also taught it to Prophet Muhammad (Ibid) God has asked the Prophet to use this analogy in verse 18 of Surah Al_maa'idah and verses 6 and 7 of Surah Jumu'ah (Ibid, 203). In verse 91 of Surah Al_an'aam, the third form of analogy is used. «وَمَا قَدَرُوا اللَّهَ حَقَّ قَدْرِهِ إِذْ» . «قَالُوا مَا أَنْزَلَ اللَّهُ عَلَى بَشَرٍ مِنْ شَيْءٍ قُلْ مَنْ أَنْزَلَ الْكِتَابَ الَّذِي جَاءَ بِهِ مُوسَى نُورًا وَهُدًى لِلنَّاسِ» ; They did not regard Allah with the regard due to Him when they said, 'Allah has not sent down anything to any human.' Say, 'Who had sent down the Book that was brought by Moses as a light and guidance for the people

(Ibid, 204) An exceptional analogy is also used in verses 22 of Surah Anbiya and 42 of Surah Bani Israeil (Ibid, 206). In addition to Ghazali, another Muslim thinker named Sadr al_Din Muhammad ibn Ebrahim Shirazi (d.1050 AH) also shows the use of these analogies by divine prophets such as Noah, Abraham, Moses and Muhammad (Sadr al_Din Shirazi, 1985, 5: 338) It should also be noted that Farabi collected hadiths from Prophet Muhammad in which the use of logic was recommended in some way; However, now nothing remains except the name of this Farabi book (Ibn Abi usiba'ah, 609) Taghi al_Din Subki even said: The first and second caliphs had such a mastery over these logical issues that even Ghazali and his ilk were unaware of even a tenth of it. Anyone who thinks that the first two caliphs did not know about this introduction has insulted them. We are sure that this introduction was in their nature. As they mastered the science of syntax and we must learn it now. Grammar scholars have always tried to introduce us to the rules that early Muslims naturally observed in their speech. By following these rules, we make ourselves similar to those companions of the Prophet (Subki, 281).

4.2. The non-use of the knowledge of logic by the Qur'an, the prophets, the companions and the followers does not indicate the heresy and illegitimacy of this knowledge.

It cannot be said that the topics of the science of logic have not been used by the Holy Qur'an and the prophets of God and the companions of the Messenger of God, therefore, the Knowledge of logic is heretical and illegitimate. Also, it cannot be said that anyone who says that logic is useful for Muslims, wants to say that we consider the Prophet and his companions to be ignorant; Because the Prophet and his companions were not unaware of any of these matters and knew them in detail, but only talked about the issues that were raised in their time. In addition, the Prophet did not say anything about some jurisprudential issues, such as vows and rulings of servants and testaments. Therefore, many jurists and imams of the past, including Shafi'i, Abu Hanifa and Malik, should also

be considered heretics (Ash'ari, 1925, 88). According to Ibn Hazm, it was not only the Knowledge of logic that the righteous ancestors did not mention, but other sciences also have a similar fate. None of the Muslim forefathers have said anything about syntax, but after Muslims paid attention to these issues and examined the effect of the difference in movements at the end of words and the Arabs' difference in the difference in meanings, grammar books were written and the misunderstanding of the meaning of the word of God was prevented (Ibn Hazm, 1983, 4: 94) Ibn Hazm used to say: Muslims also needed logic in this way. And being alien to logic could cause them to fall into error and sophistry and make them unable to distinguish right from wrong (Ibid) From Subki's point of view, the relationship between logic and mind is like the relationship between syntax and language; Just as the knowledge of grammar was needed when the Arabic language was mixed with other languages, the science of logic was needed when minds lost the ability to distinguish right from wrong (Subki, 281).

4.3. The difference between humans in the need for the Knowledge of logic

From the beginning, the proponents of logic did not claim that all humans need to learn logic or that all humans need it equally so that no one can object why the Prophet and his followers did not use it. Ibn Sina believes that human nature is familiar with the laws of logic and learning the Knowledge of logic is not obligatory for those who have been approved by God (Ibn Sina, 1985, p. 9). Abul Barakat al-Baghdadi (d. 547 AH) considers logic useful for guiding the mind to the truths of science and preventing the mind from wrong thinking, but he considers human beings to be of four types. Two of them do not require learning logic. People who have a clean nature and the purity of that nature has made them unnecessary to learn logic. The second category is people who have completely contaminated this nature and instinct. This contamination prevents them from using the Knowledge of logic (Baghdadi, 1994 ,vol.1,

p. 7). Fakhr Razi Ash'ari also came to the conclusion that only two groups benefit from logic. People who have not benefited from any of the acquired knowledge, but have the ability to have this knowledge, and people who have acquired a part of knowledge, but due to the contamination of their minds, do not understand other parts of knowledge. Also, people whose divine nature has reached perfection do not need the science of logic (Fakhr Razi, 1994, vol.1, p. 46).

4.4. The need to distinguish between the nature of the Knowledge of logic and the practice of logicians

Sometimes, some claimants of the Knowledge of logic, when using this knowledge, do not follow its rules correctly, and fall into sophistry and mistakes in the position of thinking and reasoning, and mislead others as well. This statement is not specific to the knowledge of logic, and some people may be engaged in the knowledge of jurisprudence or hadith and interpretation, but due to not observing the terms and conditions of using this knowledge, they mislead both themselves and others. Therefore, it cannot be concluded that because some people who used the laws of logic have become disbelievers or gone astray, then this Knowledge should not be used. According to Ibn Rushd, what is inherently beneficial should not be prohibited due to complications. On the other hand, the contents of the summary hadiths which indicate the condemnation of seeking knowledge for the sake of the world and superiority over others cannot be attributed to the principle of the Knowledge of logic; Rather, the scholars of any Knowledge (including the logic) are subject to these hadiths if they study and promote this knowledge with such motivations. Also, it cannot be said that because this knowledge is common among infidels and polytheists or originated among non-Muslims, its nature has the ability to lead Muslims to disbelief and sedition.

4.5. The difference between the motives of studying a Knowledge and its nature

When logicians count the benefits of the Knowledge of logic, they only

pay attention to the principle of this Knowledge; Regardless of the motivations of translating these books, the degrees of Islam. According to them, following the rules of logic requires that everyone can use them when thinking and reasoning so as not to make mistakes. On the other hand, some may think that the laws of logic can be a tool to confront and oppose Islam. It is even possible that people with such motives have translated logical books or introduced them to the Islamic world. But it cannot be concluded that the essence of logic necessarily has such a capacity that it can be used to confront Islam; Even if those who have followed the translation of logical books with such thinking, they have mistakenly assumed that such an expectation can be expected from logical books. In addition, history has shown that the translation of logical books and their entry into the Islamic world did not lead to the negation of Islam, and Muslims used the laws of this Knowledge to explain the teachings of Islam and answer the opponents. We do not have any reports that show that after the spread of the Knowledge of logic in the Islamic world, the desire of the Abbasid rulers, i.e. the deviation of the Muslims, was fulfilled, and it cannot be said that the translation of these sciences. He helped the rulers in this regard.

4.6. The difference between the nature of a knowledge and its application

Logicians and supporters of logic have never claimed that logic corrects the details of thought and reasoning; Rather, they claimed that the knowledge of logic provides humans with general rules that can be used to provide reliable thinking and reasoning. In logic, like in other knowledges, laws are presented in general, and when a person needs the details of his thoughts, he refers to those general laws and adjusts and corrects his thoughts. On the other hand, the details are infinite, and checking unlimited details is impossible and unnecessary; Because they can be put in a general description, and therefore by discussing that general, there is no need to discuss the details that come under that general title.

5. Conclusion

Many Muslim thinkers, including philosophers, logicians, theologians, and jurists, believed that it was necessary to use logic in religious studies. The knowledge of logic is useful in studying the perfection and happiness of religious people and strengthens the religiosity of Muslims. Of course, this does not mean that all human beings, even prophets, must read Aristotle's books on logic in order to achieve this happiness; Rather, it is possible that human beings, who had these laws in their nature and without access to or need for logic books, practically followed the laws that were later put into the science of logic by Aristotle.

Although the science of logic has such a capability, it should be noted that it is always possible that some people do not use this knowledge properly or use it as a method and tool to explain or prove their false or even blasphemous beliefs. The jurists and theologians opposed to the knowledge of logic, in most of their criticisms of this knowledge, were concerned with preserving the religion of the Muslims. They wanted to discourage Muslims from paying attention to the knowledge of logic and recommend the same method of studying religion that the Prophet and his companions used that method of understanding religion. Of course, these objections should be taken as a serious warning, but it cannot be concluded based on them that the use of logic is forbidden for all Muslims; As it cannot be said that the use of logical books has been obligatory for all Muslims.

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