Abstract
The difference in the subject of philosophy with philosophers has a considerable effect on the design and presentation of scientific theories and innovations, and consequently the scope and function of philosophy. This paper uses a descriptive-analytical method to answer the question of how Allāma Tabātabāī, with the thematic development of philosophy, prepared the conditions for the presentation of the theory of i'tibārīat in philosophy? The approach obtained shows that Allāma Tabātabāī, by thematically developing philosophy, prepares the ground for the presentation of i'tibārīat theory in this knowledge. According to Allāma’s thematic range of philosophy, philosophy can be divided into two types, one of which is more general than the other. 1. "Divine philosophy" whose subject is being qua being or “Absolute being”.

Philosophy in a more general sense whose subject is "absolute reality" that including all facts contains “general being” and “special existence” as well as “truths” and “i'tibārīat”

Keywords: Allāma Tabātabāī, the Subject of Philosophy, truths, Reality, Being qua Being
 
Extended Abstract
Introduction
The scope of the subject of a knowledge has a significant effect on increasing its functionality and the creation of new theories. The subject of philosophy for philosophers such as Ibn Sina, Suhrawardi, and Mulla Sadra is “being qua being” or universal being that flows through all beings and does not include partial existences or non-objective things.
 Therefore, philosophy only deals with real concepts, that is, concepts that have objective and external instance; But Allāma Tabātabāī, in addition to facts, also raises issues related to i'tibārī perceptions in philosophy. With these explanations, one of the most important issues regarding Allāma Tabātabāī’s i'tibārīat theory is that how can he investigate issues related to non-objective and i'tibārī perceptions in knowledge whose subject is real existences and perceptions abstracted from it?
 Does Allāma have a new point of view regarding the subject of this knowledge, which can include credit by influencing the scope of philosophy?
 Therefore, the main question of the present article is how Allāma Tabātabāī provided the ground for the “i'tibārīat theory” project in philosophy by developing the subject of a knowledge.
Method
To answer the problem of this article, first, the subject of philosophy by Allāma Tabātabāī is read and then the relationship of this subject with the i'tibārīat theory is measured.
Findings
By developing the subject of philosophy and forming new philosophical branches, Allāma Tabātabāī provides the ground for the ontological analysis of i'tibārī perceptions. A branch of philosophy with the title “Divine Philosophy” and the subject of being qua being or general being analyzes only the facts and perceptions related to it; but philosophy in the general sense, considering that its subject is "reality", has the capability of ontological analysis of all realities, including general being, particular being, abstract and concrete being, and true and i'tibārī concepts. Since, according to Allāma’ view point Philosopher recognizes facts from unreal things in general philosophies, he must first categorize "perceptions related to human actions" and specify "whether they are real or not"; Secondly, according to the relationship of these concepts with reality, explain the "how these perceptions exist" and distinguish them from "real existence" and "illusive".
Allāma Tabātabāī’s explanation of these perceptions indicates its close relationship with "reality"; because first of all, i'tibārī perceptions have real existential effects and factors;
Secondly, "necessary i'tibārī relations" are based on "real necessary relations", in such a way that if these necessary relations are not real and self-evident, necessary i'tibārī relations will not be formed;
Thirdly, the criterion of i'tibārīat is to have real effects in accordance with the real needs and goals of human beings. Therefore, i'tibārīat have a share of reality due to multiple links with reality.
In this way, the necessary capacity to deal with “i'tibārī perceptions and related to human actions” in philosophy whose subject is reality is provided. In this way, considering that the practical activities of man are his life, “man’s life”, his actions, needs and goals are also discussed philosophically. As a result, the connection between philosophy and human life expands.
Conclusion
Allāma Tabātabāī, by developing the subject of philosophy, prepares the ground for presenting the i'tibārī theory in this knowledge. According to the subject scope of philosophy according to Allāma, philosophy can be divided into two categories, the subject of one of which is more general than the other: 1. "Divine philosophy" whose subject is universal being or being qua being. 2.Philosophy in a more general sense, the subject of which is “absolute reality” and includes all realities including “general being” and “particular being” as well as “truths” and “i'tibārīat”. The i'tibārī concepts, although they do not represent the objective and real thing, they find a share of truth through the connection with the subject of general philosophies, that is, reality. This provides the ground for the ontological analysis of i'tibārīat in philosophy with the absolute subject of reality.