Abstract

The question of the “nature of action” is one of the most important issues in ethics and the philosophy of action. In the tradition of al-ḥikma al-muta‘āliyya (Transcendent Philosophy), all phenomena are interpreted within the framework of a causal system, and Motahhari is one of the modern representatives of this tradition who believes in causal necessity within the fabric of reality. Nevertheless, he also strongly emphasizes human freedom and moral responsibility. A fundamental question arises here: How is it possible to simultaneously affirm causal necessity and human freedom?
This article, through an examination of Motahhari’s philosophical and ethical thought, seeks to reinterpret the structure of human action from his perspective in order to address this issue. In this reinterpretation, human action consists of two essential components: the “material of the action,” which refers to the external behavior, and the “form of the action,” which refers to the agent’s intentionality. This intentionality necessarily requires the element of freedom as an essential condition for the realization of action, from which human responsibility also follows. Ultimately, it is shown that although Motahhari accepts the principle of causality, he nevertheless affirms a real ontological status for human freedom, even though his account of this relationship faces certain challenges and criticisms.