Intellect is one of the important topics in the history of philosophy since Aristotle and his commentators, some of Aristotle's commentators whom have written a treatise on Intellect. What made the issue of Intellect a challenging issue for Aristotle's commentators is the view of what First Intellect is as a part of the human soul or is level in the hierarchy of beings. Examining it can also explain the ontological position Intellect and its duties. The question is, what is the truth of First Intellect according to Kindy and what is its ontological and epistemological position in his philosophical thought? On this basis,In this article, with the analytical descriptive method, we found that tThe first intellect is always Actual and the cause for the Intelligible and the cause for the second intellects and precedes all of them, and the second intellects are the other three levels of intellect And these three levels of intellect, are a part of the Thinking soul and there is no clarity in expressing Al-Kindi to separate the first intellect from the Soul. Eepistemologically, it actualizes the soul that is potentially intellect. We have reached this conclusion through Kindy's theory of first intellect. And we have reached this conclusion: Al-Kindi's theory of the first intellect is a combination of the Aristotelian, Platonic, and Book of Causes perspectives.
 
Extended Abstract
 
Introduction
Looking at the whatness and reality of the first intellect and its ontological and epistemological position in the thought of Kindi is the issue of this article. The question is how is the first intellect explained by Kindi and what is its ontological and epistemological position in his thought? First, we will examine the whatness of intellect in relation to the soul. Then, in the levels of intellect, while explaining the different levels of intellect, we will examine the ontological and epistemological position of the first intellect.
 
Methods
The method of this writing is descriptive-analytical.
 
Findings
Kindi has discussed intellect in various treatises, including the Treatise on First Philosophy in particular and in parts of the Treatise on First Philosophy, the Treatise On Soul, and the Treatise On Sleep and Dreem. There are also brief explanations On Intellect in other treatises. However, his extensive view On Intellect is in the same Treatise on First Intellect.
In the Treatise On Intellect, Kindi has considered Aristotle’s intellect to be of four types: 1. The first intellect, which is always actual; 2. Potential intellect, which is specific to the soul; 3. Intellect that has reached from potential to act; 4. Apparent intellect, which is called the second intellect (Kindi, 1950, pp. 353-354).
Kindi says about the first intellect, “The first is the intellect that is always actual” (Kindi, 1950, p. 353). The first intellect is actually intelligent. If a thing is actual in its essence, it will always be actual, because its essence is always with it as long as it exists (Kindi, 1950, p. 356).
What is the intellect in Kindi is known in terms of forms and what is it is identified with the soul and their difference is in the type of forms, in the soul there are material forms and in the intellect there are non-material forms? In the soul there are potential forms, and in the intellect there is actual intellect in the third, fourth and first intellects. On this basis, the second intellect, which is the potential intellect, is one with the soul whenever potential forms are in the soul and do not become actual; but when potential forms become actual, the third intellect becomes one with the soul and whenever actual intellect is used, it is also the apparent intellect. However, the first intellect is not one with the soul in terms of intelligible and in terms of actuality, because it is always actual.
 
Conclusion
Kindi does not speak about the nature and essence of the first intellect, but rather speaks about the functioning and activities of the first intellect, and in this way its essence can be understood. On this basis, there is no explicitness in his statement for the separation of the first intellect in the sense of being separate from the system of beings; but its separation from the soul is understood in the texts. In terms of the activity of the first intellect, its ontological position is independent of the soul and is the cause for subsequent intellects and intelligible; and its epistemological position is the actualization of the potential intellect to the actual intellect, and the manner of transition from potentiality to actuality is through the "union" of the soul with universals, types, and species, not the union with the first intellect as something beyond man. The first intellect is not God because God is in the position of the true active cause in Kindi, and in the first philosophy, in the discussion that says that the true unit of intellect is not, he considers intellect to be the essence that comprehends the truths of things.
Kindi's theory of the first intellect relies on Aristotle in terms of the division of sensible forms and intelligible forms, and the definition of intellect based on intelligible forms, and also in terms of the fact that intellect reaches from potentiality to actuality, and in terms of the fact that the potential intellect reaches actuality with the help of the first intellect, and that in union with types and species, it has a combined Aristotelian-Platonic view; but in terms of the fact that the first intellect is the second creature and is the cause of intellects and intelligible, it focuses on the Pure Good.
Therefore, regarding the ontological and epistemological position of the first intellect, it can be said that intellect in three levels, the second (potential), the third (actual), and the fourth (apparent) intellect, are part of the soul and the same soul, and are also plural. But the first intellect, which has a higher role in all levels, is always actual and is the cause of intelligible and the cause of the second intellects, which is potential, is one and independent of the soul. And also, from an epistemological perspective, the second intellect, by receiving universal forms potentially; and the actual intellect, by receiving universal forms actually; and the level of the apparent intellect, by applying the actual universal forms in practice, their epistemological positions have ascending levels. And the first intellect is the cause of intelligible and the cause of the second intellect.